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ABSTRACT

The length and depth of the Great Recession of 2008 provides an opportunity to
examine the policy behavior of local governments unlike any window since the 1930’s
post Depression era. Utilizing Peterson’s (1981) City Limits typology as a framework
for local government policy allows for an evaluation of whether or not the economic
downturn caused local governments to change their relative expenditures between policy
categories. The City Limits typology has been widely used in the literature to explain
how expenditures define a local government’s role in economic development. The
typology has had limited use in a pre-post natural experimental research design to
determine if a local government has ‘shifted’ policy priorities as measured by changes in
expenditures among and between policy categories. This research design and the use
Peterson’s framework combine for a study that has not yet been conducted under similar
conditions.
Most of the existing literature, including the research from the 1980’s, failed to
account for inter-state differences that directly affect local government expenditures and
policy. Concentrating solely on Florida local governments, this study eliminates the
confounding nature of a national study and ensures that the unit of analysis is
comparable for research purposes. The study utilizes actual expenditure data for all
cities and counties in Florida from FY2006 through FY2011. The research tests for the
relationships between changes in policy priorities from pre- to post-recession, and the
type of government, form of government, and various socio-economic factors.
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The research contributes to a new body of knowledge that is just beginning to
emerge in the literature about how local governments respond to periods of extreme
fiscal stress. The findings suggest that cities and counties had an inverse response from
pre- to post-recession with cities shifting toward developmental expenditures and
counties prioritizing allocational spending. Differences were also found between forms
of government. In addition, the density of population was found to contribute
differently to shifts in expenditures for cities and counties. The study identifies
emerging patterns that can help local governments understand past behavior and better
anticipate future economic downturns.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
The depth of the recent U.S. economic crisis for local governments (cities and
counties) is more severe than any experienced in the last half century (Miller & Svara,
2009; Muro & Hoene, 2009). Budget deficits for local governments in the United States
are averaging nearly 12%, which is of such magnitude that when stability returns to the
national economy, new approaches to revenues and cost cutting will be inevitable
(Edwards, 2011). Local governments will continue to face enormous fiscal challenges in
funding public services based on their traditional service delivery models.
In its most recent survey, the National League of Cities reports that 48% of U.S.
cities cut their workforce during 2012 (Pagano & McFarland, 2013). The continued
degradation of the local tax base, prolonged unemployment, depressed wages, the cost of
employee and retiree health care, and underfunded pension obligations are cited as the
continuing causes of fiscal stress for the nation’s cities. The year 2012 represented the
sixth consecutive year that there has been a constant dollar decline (adjusted for inflation)
in general revenue funds for America’s cities (Pagano, Hoene, & McFarland, 2012).
Cities across the country have cut back on staffing levels, shuttered branch libraries, and
closed recreation centers, and the prospect of resurgence in new revenues continues to be
bleak (Ginsberg, 2010). The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
identified that the pre-existing long term fiscal pressures facing America’s counties and
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cities is being further complicated by the current economic cycle as a result of the Great
Recession of 2008 (Government Accountability Office, 2009).

Problem Statement
This economic downturn has been determined to be the deepest since the 1950s
and the longest since the Depression of the 1920s (Ebel, Petersen, & Vu, 2013). While
the impacts of the economic downturn are still being realized in Florida, a ‘new normal’
for local governments is quickly taking hold (Cawley, Levey, & Martin, 2012). The data
showing the change in local government expenditures from pre to post recession is
emerging but have not yet been analyzed and interpreted to determine whether the Great
Recession caused a shift in local government policy. This represents a current gap in the
literature.

Significance of the Study
This is a rare opportunity to examine the response of Florida’s local governments1
to an extreme level of fiscal stress. While there has been extensive research conducted
following other recessions that research only dealt with modest reductions in local
government revenue similar to what occurred in the 1980s. More drastic revenue
reductions will require a new model to explain local government response to fiscal stress
(Downs & Rocke, 1984). Many researchers have utilized local government expenditures
In this study, the unit of analysis includes all of Florida’s 410 cities and 67 counties. As will
be discussed later, Dade and Duval counties have become a hybrid form of local government and are
excluded from this research, leaving 65 of the 67 counties as a population of county governments to be
analyzed.
1
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as an indicator of policy positions (Basolo, 2000; Choi, Bae, Kwon, & Feiock, 2010;
Peterson, 1981; Schneider, 1989). This study is significant in that it will evaluate local
government expenditures expressed as policy as opposed to just quantifying variation in
spending or programmatic cutbacks, as has been the focus of academic research in the
past. It is a form of a fiscal stress test of local governments to better understand the
relationship between external economic conditions, attributes of the governmental
organization, and policy change.
The historical service delivery model for local governments has been a component
of a larger social contract between government and its citizens (Eggers & O'Leary, 2010).
This study will document how expenditure patterns and policy priorities might have
shifted post-recession, and will attempt to better understand some of the factors that
explain differences between the local government responses to the Great Recession in
Florida. The notion of a new ‘municipal contract’ between local governments and its
constituents may emerge, which could have significant implications on a resetting of the
role of local government in the lives of its residents and provide a new policy framework
within which local governments will function. It is clear that in order for local
governments to be able to become financially sustainable, they must seek a new revenue
and expenditure policy framework (Chapman, 2008; Dadayan & Ward, 2009; Okubo,
2010).
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Uniqueness of the Study
The length and depth of the Great Recession provides an opportunity to examine
the policy behavior of local governments unlike any window since the 1930s postDepression era. Utilizing Peterson’s (1981) City Limits typology as a framework for
local government policy will allow for an evaluation of whether or not the economic
downturn caused local governments to change their relative allocation of expenditures
between policy categories. The City Limits typology has been widely used in the
literature to explain how expenditures define a local government’s role in economic
development (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Choi et al., 2010; Logan, 1976; Longoria, 1994;
Molotch, 1976; Sanders & Stone, 1987; Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). The typology has
had limited use in a pre-post natural experimental research design to determine if a local
government has ‘shifted’ policy priorities as measured by changes in expenditures among
and between policy categories. This research design and the use Peterson’s framework
combine for a study that has not yet been conducted under similar conditions.

Research Questions
This research is organized into two distinct studies. Study 1 will examine whether
or not the relative importance of per-capita expenditures among the three City Limits
policy categories changed from pre-recession to post-recession for all local governments,
as well as by type and form of local government. This analysis is a detailed descriptive
examination of data based on the entire population of cities and counties in Florida.
Research Questions 1-3 are associated with this first analysis. The measurement period
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that is considered pre-recession includes the average per-capita expenditures for the three
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008. The measurement period that is considered postrecession includes the average per-capita expenditures for the three Fiscal Years 2009
through 2011. This is further discussed in Chapter 4.
Study 2 will focus on the determinants of change – what factors explain the
proportional changes in the expenditure patterns from pre to post-recession. Research
Questions 4 and 5 is associated with the second part of this study.

Study 1 - Descriptive Analysis
RQ 1. Did the expenditure pattern of local governments in Florida change from prerecession to post-recession?
RQ 2. What differences or similarities, if any, exist between the type of local government
(cities or counties) and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to postrecession?
RQ 3. What differences or similarities, if any, exist between the form of local
government and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to postrecession?2

An extensive explanation and discussion of form of local government occurs in Chapter 2 –
Literature Review
2
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Study 2 - Explanatory Analysis
RQ 4. What relationships exist, if any, between the types, form, and socioeconomic
characteristics of a local government, and changes in expenditure patterns from
pre-recession to post-recession?

Policy, Theoretical or Methodological Implications
A governmental policy can be conceived as the stated or inferred position on a
purposeful course of action. Policies reflect the relationship between the government and
its environment. As with all levels of government, local government policies change in
response to changes in the social, political and economic environment within which local
governments operate (Eyestone & Eulau, 1968; Hill & Hupe, 2009). Public policies are
supposed to have purposeful role and relate to societal problems (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p.
5).

Local Government Budget as Policy
This research examines the fiscal behavior of Florida’s local governments – its
cities and counties. When adopting a fiscal year budget, local governments are setting out
their planned expenditures for the upcoming year. The budget is the tool that defines and
implements public policy through the allocation of scarce resources to fund the delivery of
projects, programs, and services (National Advisory Council on State and Local
Budgeting, 1999; Smith & Lynch, 2004). Since all resources are allocated through the
budget process, it is one of the most important and powerful tools in setting public policy

6

(Government Finance Officers Association, 1998; National Advisory Council on State and
Local Budgeting, 1999).
In Florida, as in most states, local governments are required to adopt balanced
annual budgets (Government Accountability Office, 2013). They cannot utilize deficit
spending to ‘ride out’ the impacts of a recession. Analyzing the actual expenditures of
local governments before and after the Great Recession allows for a clear look at the effect
of the economic downturn on the stability of local government policy.
The Great Recession of 2008 was a monumental economic shock to local
governments in Florida and throughout the U.S. Local governments in Florida are
dependent on property tax to finance a significant component of their operations. City and
county revenues are more vulnerable to extended downturns in the economic cycle due to
this dependence on the property tax as a primary source of revenue (Florida Legislative
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, 2010). The stability of Florida’s property tax
base is dependent on a number of factors, including levels of employment and demand for
new housing driven by population growth (Institute for Economic Competitiveness, 2013).
The loss of employment and downturns in population growth has been referred to as the
tax base erosion model of fiscal stress (Kloha, Weissert, & Kleine, 2005). Employment
recovery to pre-recession levels in Florida is projected to take several years (Office of
Economic and Demographic Research, 2013a). As of mid-2013, about 445,000 public
and private sector jobs had been lost in Florida since the pre-recession peak. Nearly
850,000 jobs would need to be added in Florida to reach the same percentage of
employment that existed prior to the Great Recession (Office of Economic and
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Demographic Research, 2013a). Florida added an average of 120,000 jobs per year for the
years 2011, 2012 and 2013 (Institute for Economic Competitiveness, 2013). The
magnitude of this economic shock presents an important opportunity to measure the effect
of the recession on local government policy in Florida.
Most of the existing literature, including the research from the 1980s, focuses on
national trends using data from local governments from across the country (Basolo, 2000;
Corni & Usher, 1981; Kelly & Rivenbark, 2008; Lewis, 1984; Morgan & Pammer, 1985;
West & Davis, 1988). Many of these studies failed to account for inter-state differences
that directly affect local government expenditures and policy. Significant variation in
local government functions and authority exists between the states and creates challenges
in finding comparable units of analysis. Concentrating solely on Florida local
governments, this study will eliminate the confounding nature of a national study and
ensure that the unit of analysis is comparable for research purposes. Failure to control for
differences between states in how municipalities generate revenue, intergovernmental
revenue sharing, and limits on taxing authority make a comparison difficult (Alm,
Buschman, & Sjoquist, 2011; Chernick, Langley, & Reschovsky, 2011; Chicoine &
Walzer, 1985; Liebert, 1974; Mounts, 1983; Nelson, 2012; Peterson, 1981; Wolman,
1982).
This proposed research would contribute to a new body of knowledge that is just
beginning to emerge in the literature. Determining how local governments in Florida
responded to this unprecedented period of fiscal stress is important in understanding them
as organizations. Identifying patterns that may emerge could help local governments
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anticipate and prepare for future downturns through revisiting long held policy positions
and management practices in their service delivery models.

Theory and Conceptual Framework
This study relies upon Lindbloom’s (1959) theory of incrementalism to explain
local governmental behavior when making budgetary decisions under normal conditions
as well as under the pressures of fiscal stress. This theory helps explain public sector
budgeting and the behavioral norm that exists when agencies adopt spending plans for the
upcoming year. Since the analysis in this study relies upon actual local government
expenditure data, it is important to note the relationship between budgeting and
expenditures. Expenditures, or spending by local governments, are authorized through the
adoption of an annual budget. Generally, all expenditures must be consistent with the
approved budget of the local government (National Advisory Council on State and Local
Budgeting, 1999). This study’s reliance on Lindbloom’s (1959) theory of incrementalism
as a budgeting theory is used to establish a basis for analyzing the expenditure behavior of
Florida’s cities and counties.
The conceptual framework that will be used in this study to operationalize the
incrementalism theory as applied to local government budgeting is a model that explains
local government policy regimes using a three-category classification developed by
Peterson (1981) in his book City Limits. This has come to be known as the City Limits
typology. This conceptual framework provides the foundation for this research and is the
structure for testing of the hypotheses.
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Budgetary Incrementalism
There have been several theories applied to how governments make budgetary
decisions. In applying the incrementalism approach to the expenditure decisions of local
governments, the funding for next year’s services would be largely based on last year’s
expenditures, with only a modest increase in keeping within the existing policy context
(Baker, 2011; Davis, Dempster, & Wildavsky, 1966; Dempster & Wildavsky, 1979;
Levine, 1979; Lewis, 1984; Lindblom, 1959). The incrementalist model of government
spending assumes that the budget process is complex, its participants act with limited
information, there are multiple actors involved, it is a compartmentalized process between
receiving agencies, and it results in imperfect agreements on its ends (Bailey & O'Connor,
1975; Bozeman & Straussman, 1982). Incremental budgeting is predictable, limits
changes to annual spending, and reflects a stability, or equilibrium, that exists between
competing interests for resources. (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Bozeman &
Straussman, 1982; LeLoup, 1978; Wildavsky, 1964). This equilibrium represents a
balance between the internal and external interests of a local government that are
competing for limited funding. In the case of local government expenditures, this theory
can be shown to exist by confirming that there is a relationship between the funding of a
service for the coming year with that of prior year expenditures. In government budgeting
vernacular, this is referred to as “across-the-board” changes to levels of funding where
each competing agency receives a comparable percentage adjustment, up or down, to
current funding levels.
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Historically, this theory has been used by researchers to explain year-over-year
expenditures during normal periods of growth in revenues and expenditures. During times
of fiscal stress, the positive growth in revenues is replaced with funding reductions. In the
vernacular of Lindbloom, incrementalism in times of funding reductions becomes
decrementalism, or the cutting of spending in a systemic manner based on prior years base
budget (Dempster & Wildavsky, 1979).

City Limits Typology
The second component of the theoretical and conceptual framework for this study
utilizes work done in the early 1980s to describe the policy regimes, or policy arenas, of
local governments. The central focus of this scheme is built upon a foundation of the
theme in Peterson’s (1981) landmark book titled City Limits. In that work, Peterson
theorizes that the primary driver of public policy at the local level is the economic survival
of the community and the enhancement of the local government’s position in the national,
state, and regional economy. Each of the policy categories is characterized by its
relationship and impact on the local economy. This classification system has come to be
known in the literature as the City Limits Typology (CLT), and has gained widespread
utilization in urban policy research (Longoria, 1994). The classification system is
composed of the three following policy regimes, or arenas:
1. Developmental Policies – policies that enhance the economic interests of the local
economic base and support competition with other local governments for tax base
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and regional economic significance; for example expenditures on economic
development, roads and highways, and utility systems;
2. Redistributive Policies – policies that benefit lower socio-economic residents
including low and moderate income housing, and human services; and
3. Allocational Policies – policies that are neutral in their effect on the local
economy in that they are distributed evenly throughout the jurisdiction, including
public safety, parks and recreational facilities (Peterson, 1981).

Methods

Sources of Data
There are a number of secondary data sources available for use in this study.
These include the state of Florida Department of Financial Services, the Florida
Association of Counties, the Florida League of Cities, and the University of Florida
Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR). The most relevant and effective
data to use in examining the effects of the Recession of 2008 on local government policy
priorities is actual annual expenditures. The source of expenditure data for cities and
counties is updated annually as part of the state of Florida’s Local Government Financial
Reporting System (State of Florida Department of Financial Services, 2012).

Study Population and Sample
The unit of analysis in this study is the local government. In Florida, the term
local government is used to describe all the units of government that provide services
12

whose governing body is elected to govern countywide, or to govern a sub-area within an
individual county such as a municipality or special district. Local governments in Florida
are comprised of cities, counties, school boards, and special districts. There are 67
counties and 410 municipalities in existence today (Florida Association of Counties, 2009;
Florida League of Cities, 2012). There are approximately 1000 additional special districts
that, when combined with city and county governments, spend over $80 billion annually
delivering public goods and services to their constituents (Florida Tax Watch, 2011).
Given the wide variety of special district forms and functions, they will not be included in
this study. This study excludes education expenditures and the 67 school boards in
Florida.
This study will focus on just two types of Florida local governments – city
(municipal) and county governments. While there are 67 named counties in Florida, two
of those counties, Dade and Duval, have been eliminated from this research because they
are neither a city nor a county. Miami-Dade County and Jacksonville-Duval County each
have established a unique form of local government whose expenditures do not reflect the
same or similar organizational approach to the other 65 counties in the state.
Differentiating between conventional municipal and county expenditures, and those of
these two unique counties for comparative purposes is not possible. Including these two
counties in this research would only confound the results. Lubell et al. (2005) also
eliminated these two counties in their study of political institutions and county
conservation policy in Florida for similar reasons. Therefore, for the purposes of this
research, there is a total county population of 65.
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Part 1 of this study - the descriptive analysis - will include all 65 counties and all
410 cities. This represents the entire population of cities and counties in Florida, and
requires no sampling.
Part 2 of this study - the explanatory analysis - will utilize 65 counties and a
sample of the 410 cities in Florida. Cities with populations greater than 5,000 in 2010 (n =
197) will serve as the sample for Part 2. The selection of these cities based on a minimum
population is a type of non-probability sampling called purposive or judgmental sampling,
and is used when the researcher has critical knowledge of the population and the negative
effect that random sampling of that population would have on the usefulness of the study
(Babbie, 2010). Examination of the expenditure data revealed that cities of a smaller size
had a higher incidence of missing data, likely due to those cities not providing the full
array of municipal services.

Measures
This study will examine the proportional change in per capita expenditures for the
three policy regimes within the City Limits Typology from pre to post-recession. The use
of per-capita expenditures is common in this type of research and represents one of the
better measures to be able to compare one local government’s pattern of expenditure
change to another (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Eskridge & French, 2011; Wolman,
1982). Whether there has been a shift in local government policy can be achieved by
using per-capita expenditure data for selected governmental services for each local
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government pre and post-recession. Basolo (2000) identifies actual local government
expenditure data as one of the best indicators of public policy choice.

Model Specification
This research will examine what changes occurred in the pattern of city and
county expenditures as a result of the Great Recession, and will attempt to explain these
changes. The explanatory model relies upon independent variables that are attributes of
each city or county - the type of government, the form of government, and the socioeconomic characteristics of the government’s jurisdiction. The three dependent variables
are the change in per-capita local government expenditures for each of the three City
Limits typology policy regimes – developmental, allocational, and redistributive
expenditures. The explanatory component of the research will utilize multiple regression
as the primary analytical tool to test the hypotheses associated with Research Question 4.
The goals of the study are to determine if the Great Recession caused a shift in local
government policy priorities and to what degree the independent variables explain the
variation in the policy shift.

Hypotheses
This study is focused on city and county policy and whether there has been a
‘shift’ in policy priorities as expressed by measuring the change in per-capita expenditures
from pre to post-recession, using the City Limits Typology as a framework. Utilizing
research on quantifying what constitutes an incremental change in budgetary terms,
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Wildavsky (1974) concluded that budgetary outcomes that are within ± 10% of last year’s
budget are considered incremental (LeLoup, 1978). Anderson and Harbridge (2010)
reached the same conclusion. The resulting hypotheses for this study test the extent of the
proportional change among and between the three policy regimes – developmental,
allocational and redistributive, from pre to post-recession, using Wildavsky’s measure of
incremental change. Various aspects and characteristics of the local governments are
tested based on the literature review in Chapter 2. A proportional change within ± 10%
would be deemed to be incremental and not identified as a shift in local government
policy.

Study 1 - Descriptive Analysis
RQ 1. Did the expenditure patterns of local governments in Florida change from prerecession to post-recession?


Hypothesis 1: The proportionate share of expenditures of all Florida local
governments for all three policy groups from pre to post-recession is within
± 10%, indicating no significant difference in expenditure patterns as a

result of the Great Recession.
RQ 2. What differences or similarities, if any, exist between the type of local government
and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to post-recession?


Hypothesis 2: The proportionate share of expenditures for all cities for all
three policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating
no significant difference in expenditure patterns.

16



Hypothesis 3: The proportionate share of expenditures for all counties for
all three policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%,
indicating no significant difference in expenditure patterns.



Hypothesis 4: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of
charter counties from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for non-charter
counties.

RQ 3. What differences or similarities, if any, exist between the form of local
government and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to postrecession?


Hypothesis 5: The proportionate share of expenditures of Council-Manager
cities and Commission-Manager form counties for all three policy groups
from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant
difference in expenditure patterns.



Hypothesis 6: The proportionate share of redistributive expenditures of
Council-Manager cities for from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for
non-Council Manager cities.



Hypothesis 7: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of
Council-Strong Mayor form cities from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of
that for other forms of city government.
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Study 2 - Explanatory Analysis
RQ 4. What relationships exist, if any, between the types, form, and socioeconomic
characteristics of a local government, and changes in expenditure patterns from
pre-recession to post-recession?


Hypothesis 8: Average household income is positively associated with a
change in the proportionate share of local government allocational
expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 9: Average household income is negatively associated with a
change in the proportionate share of local government redistributive
expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 10: Population size is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from
pre-recession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 11: Population size is negatively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures
from pre-recession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 12: Population density is positively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from
pre-recession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 13: Population density is negatively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures
from pre-recession to post-recession.

18



Hypothesis 14: The Council-Strong Mayor form is positively associated
with a change in the proportionate share of local government
developmental expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 15: The Commission-Manager form of county government is
negatively associated with a change in the proportionate share of local
government developmental and redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.



Hypothesis 16: Home rule charter counties are positively associated with a
change in the proportionate share of local government developmental
expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession.

Organization of the Next Chapters
The remainder of this study is divided into chapters that set out the approach to
this research. Chapter 2 focuses on the review of literature associated with the Great
Recession of 2008 and local government’s response to fiscal stress. Chapter 3 describes
the theoretical framework that will be used to analyze what happened to local
government expenditures as a result of the recession and what factors might begin to
explain whether the economic downturn caused a shift in local government policy.
Chapter 4 establishes the methods and techniques that will be used to collect and analyze
the data. Chapter 5 will identify the findings and results of the analysis in light of the
study hypotheses. To complete the research, Chapter 6 will discuss the study results as
they support or refute previous empirical studies in the literature.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a long line of research in the literature dating to 1960s known as
determinant studies which analyzed the factors that influence public policy and
government expenditures. These early studies focused on which social and economic
variables influence public policy and expenditure decisions (Dye, 1969; Fry & Winters,
1970; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969; Sunley, 1971). Several studies have concluded
that the choice of strategies used by local governments during times of fiscal stress is a
function of the severity of the government’s fiscal condition, form of government, and
the socio-economic conditions faced by the community (Froman, 1967; Maher & Deller,
2007; Pammer, 1990). Froman (1967) identified similar variables in his summary of
factors that influence local government policy adoption.

The Economic Downturn and Local Government Fiscal Stress
Local governments are at the bottom of the fiscal food chain (Pagano & Johnston,
2000). As organizations, they are constrained in their ability to perform their service
delivery function by the availability of resources (Wolman, 1983). Since local
governments are dependent upon their external environment (taxpayers, businesses,
residents, etc.) for the resources necessary to function, they strive to establish stability and
equilibrium with that environment (Bolman & Deal, 2008). When cities and counties are
in a state of growth, they appear to have a rational, consistent, and more predictable
approach to policy setting, including a consensus on organizational objectives. In a state
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of retrenchment due to fiscal stress, cities and counties will exhibit fragmentation and
inconsistent strategies as they attempt to understand the depth and breadth of their fiscal
challenges (Levine, 1978).

Cyclicality and the Great Recession of 2008
The economic cycle, which has caused this fiscal stress for local governments, is
illustrated by data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as shown in Figure
1. The official estimates of seasonally adjusted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the
United States are reported by quarters. According to the BEA, GDP is defined as the
market value of goods and services produced by labor and property in the United States,
and is the most widely used indicator of the state of the U.S. economy (Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2012).

Figure 1. U.S. gross domestic product 2007 – 2011.
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The first quarter of 2006 is often cited as the period in which the sub-prime
mortgage crisis surfaced in the U.S. The collapse in the housing market caused all growth
in the property tax base which had been growing steadily for over a decade to vanish,
resulting in significant reductions in overall revenues for cities and counties (Acharya,
Philippon, Richardson, & Roubini, 2009). Although the recession may have technically
started at the end of 2007, the housing market and resulting financial crisis was well under
way earlier in 2007 with a large number of households losing a major percentage of their
net worth when housing prices started their steep downward trend (Acharya et al., 2009).
Local governments began to see the erosion of their tax base and a drop in overall tax
revenues in their next fiscal year (FY2008), which began on October 1, 2007. For the
purposes of this study, the pre-recession time frame for local governments in Florida
includes fiscal year 2008, and the post-recession time frame begins with fiscal year 2009.
The measurement period that is considered pre-recession includes the average per-capita
expenditures for the three Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008. The measurement period that
is considered post-recession includes the average per-capita expenditures for the three
Fiscal Years 2009 through 2011. This is further discussed in Chapter 4.
There has been a modest national recovery of some local government revenues
from 2008 to the third quarter of 2012, returning some revenues to pre-recession levels
(GAO, 2013). However, most of this recovery has been a result of growth in income and
sales taxes. Property taxes have not recovered on a national basis and continue to lag.
Property taxes remain as the single largest source of local government revenues nationally
(Alm et al., 2011; Chernick et al., 2011; Ebel et al., 2013). Overall, the GAO projects that
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local government property tax revenue will not recover to 2007 pre-recession levels until
2060 (GAO, 2013).

Local Government Revenue Crisis in Florida
Local government revenues are generated from a number of sources, and typically
include property taxes, sales taxes, user fees, and intergovernmental revenues. Ad
valorem property taxes in Florida, which are generated from the assessed value of real
estate, were 45.2% of total revenues for counties and 23.1% of total revenues for cities for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008. These represent the single largest source of
revenues for counties and the second largest source of revenue for cities in Florida.
Florida, unlike most other states, is overly dependent upon property tax to finance local
government, and city and county revenues are more vulnerable to extended downturns in
the economic cycle (Florida Legislative Committee on Intergovernmental Relations,
2010).
The assessed value of real estate in Florida is the driving economic force behind
local government revenues. As a result of the national economic downturn, the resulting
loss of assessed value of real estate in Florida between the years of 2007 and 2011 was a
staggering 26.6%, amplifying the revenue crisis facing cities and counties in the state
(Table 1).
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Table 1
Year-to-Year Change in Ad Valorem Values in Florida
Fiscal Year

Total Property
Value in Trillion $

% Change from Prior
Year

2007

2.52

2008

2.43

-3.83

2009

2.20

-9.26

2010

1.94

-12.02

2011

1.85

-4.52

Cumulative % Change
from 2007 to 2011

-26.6

Note. Adapted from Florida Property Valuation Tax Data, 2012. Retrieved from
http://dor.myflorida.com/dor/property/resources/data.html

Local Government Response to Fiscal Stress
Several authors have identified a pattern of organizational response to fiscal stress
as the depth of the economic downturn intensifies. During the initial stages of revenue
constraints, local governments will seek to ‘buy time’ by utilizing efforts to balance
budgets through modest operating cost reductions, use of reserve funds, and deferral of
facility maintenance, and delays in capital expenditures - items that are relatively invisible
to the external environment (Baker, 2011; Hoene & Pagano, 2009; Levine, Rubin, &
Wolohojian, 1981; Lewis, 1984; Wolman, 1980, 1982). As the fiscal crisis worsens,
sources of revenue enhancement are explored, either through intergovernmental sources or
from self-generation (Cooper, 1996; Levine, 1978; Wolman, 1980). Maintaining levels of
service for as long as possible promotes policy stability, which is one of the hallmarks of
the incrementalist view of public sector budgeting (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Boyne,
Ashworth, & Powell, 2000; LeLoup, 1978; Lewis, 1984; Wildavsky, 1964). However,
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continuing revenue shortfalls well into the economic cycle will ultimately require local
governments to look at significant expenditure reductions. They will defer program
and/or personnel cuts to the very last possible moment, but cuts eventually have to be
made (Levine, 1978; Wolman, 1980). In an assessment of the nation’s parks and
recreation programs in 2010, declining revenues and tax support is placing pressure on
local government parks and recreation agencies resulting in staff furloughs, freezing of
positions, and reduction of part-time positions in seasonal and maintenance areas
(Mulvaney, 2010).
As the economic environment worsens, local governments gravitate to modest
reductions in service levels and cutting of staff across multiple functions as opposed to
elimination of programs (Levine et al., 1981). This generalized sequence of actions in
response to fiscal stress is consistent with an incremental approach to local government
policy adoption and has been confirmed in several empirical studies (Levine et al., 1981;
Morgan & Pammer, 1985).
During times of economic retrenchment, decision makers have a limited number
of budgetary tools available to address gaps between revenues and expenditures. Often
times, it is the local government’s own internal management structure that constrains the
available options. Examples of these include personnel classification systems and union
contracts. The rigidity of some personnel systems and the existence of union contracts can
prevent leadership from using all available strategies to mitigate the impact of a recession
on the local government budget (Levine et al., 1981).

25

Cutback Strategies – Incrementalism and Political Equilibrium
One of the hallmarks of a budget that is developed consistent with Lindbloom’s
(1959) theory of budgetary incrementalism is its stability from a policy standpoint. Yearover-year changes in an incremental budget are typically consistent and reflect consensus
of policy within the organization (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Levine, 1979; Wildavsky
& Caiden, 1997). The concept of a ‘base’ budget is held by actors in the budgeting
process as a common expectation that an agency’s funding will continue into the next
budget year at or near its current level. This belief contributes to the stability of the
resource allocation environment. Past expenditures are accepted as legitimate and the
focus is on balancing the budget (Boyne et al., 2000; Breunig & Koski, 2012; Davis et al.,
1966; Lewis, 1984).

What Is Incrementalism?
The definition of what is an incremental change in budget and expenditures is the
subject of considerable analysis in the literature. The term increment could imply that the
annual change in appropriations is small in comparison to the preceding year. Anderson
and Harbridge (2010) describe a range of 2% to 30% that has been documented in the
literature. Their analysis of the federal budget reveals that more than 60% of the
budgetary changes are more than 5% and almost 50% of changes are more than 10%.
Wildavsky (1974) concluded that budgetary outcomes that are within ± 10% of last year’s
budget are considered incremental (LeLoup, 1978). Anderson and Harbridge (2010)
reached similar conclusions regarding a no more than ± 10% change constituting a year-
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over year incremental change to expenditures. Boyne, Ashworth and Powell (2000) add a
refinement to the percentage change view. They define incrementalism as adherence to
the budgetary norms of the organization. In operationalizing these norms, two decision
rules are invoked. First is the marginality, or size of the annual change. Second, there
must be regularity, or consistency of deviations over time. These norms compose the
simple rules that are used to reduce the complexity of spending decisions.
Bailey and O’Connor (1975) criticized Wildavsky when he determined that
changes up to 30% could constitute incremental budgeting. Wildavsky responded by
claiming that it is the regularity of change, and not the size of the increment that is most
important (Dempster & Wildavsky, 1979).

Cutback Strategies – Seeking Political Equilibrium through Decrementalism
Wolman (1983) concluded that local governments under fiscal stress act to
maintain their equilibrium relationship with both their external and internal environments.
They achieve this by initially using tactics that do as little disruption to these relationships
as possible. These tactics generally do not include new revenues from increasing fees or
taxes, for that would likely upset external relationships and disrupt the political
equilibrium that is being sought. Instead, the actions typically start out as reducing capital
expenditures and other service reductions that are marginal in their impact and generally
invisible to the external environment. Service level cuts are considered the least desired
policy choice and come only when it is perceived that there are no other options. Maher
and Deller (2007) confirmed this in their study of local governments in Wisconsin. The
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equilibrium that exists among governmental services during times of normalcy is
threatened during periods of extreme stress. As a result, the political consequences of
changes to the equilibrium achieved during times of stability is challenged (Nelson, 2012;
Wolman, 1983).
During times of fiscal stress, the positive growth in revenues is replaced with
funding reductions. In the vernacular of Lindbloom, incrementalism in times of funding
reductions becomes decrementalism, or the cutting of spending in a systemic manner
based on the equity principles associated with Simon’s (1957) theory of bounded
rationality and the desire to maintain political equilibrium (Dempster & Wildavsky, 1979;
Schick, 1988).
The choices facing local governments when deciding how to cutback is a tradeoff
between equity and efficiency. An efficiency cutback typically results in targeted
reductions for specific services or functions based on a policy directive from the elected
board and/or an appointed manager, based on the form of the local governmental. An
equitable cutback would mean paring back funding relatively equally across the entire
organization. In budgeting jargon, this is also known as “across-the-board” budget
reductions so that the pain of the impact is felt equitably throughout the organization. The
use of across-the-board budget reductions avoids the extensive analysis typically
associated with efficiency or “targeted” cuts and supports the bounded rationality
explanation for incremental budget decisions. The internal and external equilibrium and
stability that local governments strive to maintain with its interest groups is maintained
when decremental budgeting occurs (Levine, 1978; Nelson, 2012; Wolman, 1983). This
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type of equity cutting could also indicate an inability of a local government to address the
concerns of multiple interest groups and therefore resort to a policy of spreading out the
pain equally among operating departments (Jick & Murray, 1982).

Relevant Empirical Studies
In reviewing data reported by 230 of 273 Michigan cities between 2005 and 2009,
and Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) found that certain municipal services were more
susceptible to fiscal stress. Utilizing secondary data from the Michigan Department of
Treasury, they found that General Government, Public Works, and Parks and Recreation
realized expenditure reductions while ‘essential’ services such as Public Safety were not
adversely affected. In the search for a consistent pattern of expenditure reductions
between local governments, there are similarities in the findings among many studies that
also confirm work done in the 1980s, during the last period of significant economic
downturn in the U.S. West and Davis (1988) established that a ‘preferred policy
hierarchy’ existed in the budgeting and expenditure reduction approach taken by over
1000 cities across the country. They concluded that leisure services and social services
were most often the target of funding reductions while public safety functions were least
likely to be cutback.
The Michigan study has implications for this proposed research in Florida for
several reasons. The most important is that the fundamental methodological approach is
replicable. The source data for the study was collected by the state of Michigan under
uniform guidelines of reporting, and the data used was actual expenditure data, not
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budgeted expenditures. Actual expenditures are a more accurate measure of public policy
than forecasted, or budgeted, expenditures. Florida has a very similar system for the
reporting of local government expenditure data that will be used in this research, thus
improving the potential generalizability of the findings. This increases the value of this
proposed research in that it can contribute to body of knowledge about the effects of the
Great Recession of 2008 on local government service delivery by incorporating salient
aspects of the Michigan study.
Kelly and Rivenbark (2008) conducted a study of local government expenditures
from all fifty states for five-year intervals between 1994 and 2004. They chose to use per
capita expenditure data rather than appropriations due to its more accurate measure of
actual impact (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Eskridge & French, 2011). They made a
positive finding of the existence of budgetary incrementalism in all but one state – Hawaii,
in which they described the 2% reduction of expenditures as a negative increment. While
this study provides some guidance and confirmation of the use of certain measures, the
time frame that was studied was during a period of relative consistent economic growth
and did not have to factor in one of the longest and deepest recessions in American
history. However, their research on how to measure and document the existence of
budgetary incrementalism in local government expenditures is germane to the proposed
research.
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Summary of Response to Fiscal Stress Literature
The overall conclusion is that in the early stages of fiscal stress, local
governments attempt to “buy time” to understand whether the conditions will improve or
not. Local governments always seek to stabilize the political equilibrium with their
internal and external environment, and this is true during times of fiscal stress. Using
equitable strategies such as ‘across the board’ reductions in expenditures is supported by
Lindbloom’s (1959) incremental theory of government policy action (Dezhbakhsh,
Tohamy, & Aranson, 2003) . However, prior empirical studies indicate that a preferred
policy hierarchy may exist that favors certain services over others (Skidmore & Scorsone,
2011; West & Davis, 1988).

Type of Government: Florida’s Cities and Counties
Local governments in Florida are the unit of analysis for this study and are
comprised of two types: cities and counties. Any examination of the fiscal and policy
behavior of local governments in Florida must consider the similarities and differences
that exist between cities and counties.

Florida’s Cities
Under the 1885 state Constitution, the authority of any city was specifically limited
by an expressed grant of power by the Florida Legislature (Florida League of Cities,
2013). In 1969, a new Constitution of the state of Florida became effective and included a
provision for ‘municipal home rule.’ Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the 1969 Constitution
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granted home rule powers to municipalities in Florida, as long as it meets two tests: 1) the
powers must be of a municipal purpose, and 2) the powers may be exercised “except as
provided by law” (Florida League of Cities, 2013; Tucker, 2007a).
Florida’s cities enjoy home rule powers, meaning they can be self-governed and
adopt their own laws, as long as those laws do not conflict with state or federal law. A
significant exception to the home rule powers of cities is fiscal authority. That authority
remains with the state of Florida. The state authorizes cities to levy and collect taxes and
fees with the granting of those powers through state statute (Florida League of Cities,
2011).

Florida’s Counties
There is more variation in the structure of county government than there is in
municipal government (Svara & Nelson, 2008). The structure of county government in
Florida has three fundamental components: charter status, form of government, and
districting plan (Jewett, 2010). The first two, charter status and form of government are
most relevant to this study as they are indictors of differences in authority and decisionmaking. The districting plan refers to the number of seats and the method of electing the
governing body either by individual districts or countywide. The districting plan is not
considered as part of this research. The form of county government, along with the form
of municipal government in Florida, is discussed below in a separate discussion.
The Florida Constitution requires that the state be divided into counties. Unlike
municipalities, which must meet certain minimum population and provision of services
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requirements, counties are defined simply by a description of territory. The entire
landmass of Florida lies within a county. County boundaries cannot be modified in the
same manner as cities. Only the Florida Legislature can revise and alter the boundaries of
counties. Florida’s counties are mandated by the state constitution to carry out specific
functions such as property assessment, tax collection, law enforcement and jail
administration, state court administration, public health, road maintenance, solid waste
disposal and supervision of elections, all on a countywide basis, including all of the
municipalities within the county (Florida League of Cities, 2011; Jewett, 2010; The
Florida Legislature, 2013).

County Home Rule Charter
There are two types of counties in Florida - charter and non-charter. A county that
properly adopts a home rule charter can operate in any manner not specifically prohibited
by state law. In a series of laws passed in the early 1970s, the Florida Legislature clarified
the powers of both charter and non-charter counties. The existence of a county home rule
charter takes the Florida Legislature out of the settlement of local issues and put it in local
control (Florida Association of Counties, 2009; Jewett, 2010). When counties adopt home
rule powers, they are better capable of providing services to meet the demands of a
growing metropolitan, unincorporated population (Benton, 2002; McCabe, 2000). Under
the Florida Constitution and state statute, a county charter can be adopted, amended or
repealed only by the registered electors of the county (Tucker, 2007a).
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Another aspect of a county home rule charter is important to this research. Aside
from a number of important distinctions such as the ability of a charter county to organize
itself to address the specific needs of their electorate, charter counties in Florida are
differentiated from non-charter counties in that they can levy utility services taxes in the
unincorporated areas of the county. The taxes on consumption of electricity, water, sewer,
natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and kerosene/heating oil are a significant source of
revenue that is not available to non-charter counties (Jewett, 2010). Table 2 identifies the
counties in Florida that operate under home rule.
Table 2
Florida’s Charter Counties and the Year of
Adoption
County

Year

Alachua
1987
Brevard
1994
Broward
1975
Charlotte
1986
Clay
1991
Columbia
2002
Duval
1967
Hillsborough
1983
Lee
1996
Leon
2002
Miami-Date
1957
Orange
1986
Osceola
1992
Palm Beach
1985
Pinellas
1980
Polk
1998
Sarasota
1971
Seminole
1989
Volusia
1971
Wakulla
2008
Note. Adapted from “County Government Structure in Florida,” by A. Jewett, 2010, In Florida county
government guide (pp. 7 – 26), Tallahassee, FL: Florida Association of Counties.
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Non-charter counties have been granted the power of self-government, but only by
way of legislation and not via the constitution. The delegation of this authority is subject
to regulation through special law similar to the authority the legislature has over
municipalities. Non-charter counties and municipalities are still subject to regulation by
local law adopted by the Legislature, whereas charter counties are limited by general law
of the legislature and by special law approved by the electors (Tucker, 2007a). In certain
instances, the state may authorize non-charter county ordinance preemption over
municipal ordinances, as is typically done in the area of emergency management (Tucker,
2007b). When there is a conflict between a county ordinance and a municipal ordinance,
the Constitution requires that the county charter clarify which ordinance would prevail
(Tucker, 2007a).
The Florida Constitution provides for a procedure in which local governments may
transfer powers among and between cities, counties and special districts. The legislature
has also recognized the need to encourage interlocal cooperation by adoption of the
Florida Interlocal Cooperation Act (FICA) in Part I of F.S. Chapter 163. Agreements
pursuant to this Act have been used to jointly finance capital projects and to consolidate
various services to achieve greater efficiencies and economies of scale. Counties may not
use countywide ad valorem revenues for the benefit of unincorporated residents without
there being shown a direct benefit accruing to the municipal property or taxpayers
(Tucker, 2007b).
The existence of a home rule charter is important in this research. Since the
charter grants the power of self-rule to a county, it makes it easier for the county to
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respond to citizen demand for increased and improved levels of services (Benton, 2002).
Benton (2002) concluded that the expenditure patterns of charter county governments
place greater emphasis on local services, including developmental expenditures, when
compared with non-charter counties regardless of the form of government. This position
is supported by the findings of Choi et al. (2010) in which they found that developmental
and redistributive expenditures increased with the existence of a home rule charter.

Changing Role of Counties
About 51% of the population in Florida lives inside one of the 410 cities (Florida
League of Cities, 2011). The balance resides in unincorporated areas governed by one of
Florida’s 67 counties (Duval County consolidated with the city of Jacksonville into a citycounty government and is considered a city when calculating municipal population in the
state). The shift in the demographics of the last forty years toward suburbanization forced
many counties to transform into urban service delivery agencies without many of the
requisite revenue generating tools to be successful (Martin, 1993). As a result, twenty of
Florida’s counties have adopted a charter to organize and design the form and function of
county government to address their changing demographics and service delivery needs
(Jewett, 2010).
In evaluating the expenditure patterns of Florida’s counties, consideration should
be given to understanding which services are provided countywide as compared to those
municipal type services provided primarily to the unincorporated population. Benton
(2002) found that as counties urbanized and existing resident migrated to the suburbs,
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much of the population remained unincorporated. This created a growing demand for
‘local’ services – those municipal type services traditionally provided by cities. These
include utilities, police, fire, parks, recreation, and public works. These local services are
contrasted with ‘regional’ services that are provided countywide, without regard for
incorporation. Utilizing countywide population in determining per-capita expenditures for
what Benton (2002) defines as local services could present measurement concerns.
Therefore, separate measures of total county population and unincorporated population
will be used in measuring per-capita expenditures for counties. This is discussed further
in Chapter 4.

Summary of Cities versus Counties
The Florida Constitution and state statutes define the powers of cities and counties.
There are slight differences between the home rule powers granted to municipalities and
those approved by adoption of a county charter. The twenty counties that have adopted
charter government in Florida are also those counties containing the highest concentration
of population and urban development in Florida.

Form of Government as a Determinant of Local Government Expenditures
The study of the relationship between the form of local government and
expenditures has been well examined with mixed results. Earlier works focused on cities
and whether the two basic forms of city government – Council-Manager and MayorCouncil – had significant differences in spending patterns. Some found higher spending

37

under the Mayor – Council form and/or lower expenditures with an appointed city
manager (Booms, 1966; Coate & Knight, 2011; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1977;
Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). These early studies of the 1960s and 1970s were rudimentary
and limited in the use of multivariate analysis. Never the less, they did conclude that the
form of government was a factor in municipal spending (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010).
There is no uniform consensus in the literature on this topic. Others concluded that
the Council-Manager form produced higher per-capita expenditures as compared to the
Mayor-Council form of government (Sherbenou, 1961). Later studies starting in the
1980’s concluded that there was no significant difference in expenditure patterns between
the two basic forms of municipal government (Deno & Mehay, 1987; Deno & Mehay,
1987; Farnham, 1986; Hayes & Chang, 1990; Jung, 2006; Macdonald, 2008).
This research uses local government expenditures as a surrogate for policy action
as measured pre and post-recession. Studies dating to the late 1960’s have explored the
relationship between governmental structure and policy outcomes. The form of
government has been found to be a contributing factor in certain policy decisions
(Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Dye, 1967, 1969; Dye & Macmanus, 1976).
Clingermayer and Feiock (2001) identified one of the most important determinants of
municipal policy decisions is the form of government. During the past decade, the form of
county government has been the subject of equal emphasis as cities. More research has
been conducted in this area for municipalities than for counties (Benton, 2002). As with
the earlier research on cities, the form of county government has been determined to be
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one of the factors in shaping county government policy (Choi et al., 2010; DeSantis &
Renner, 1996; Feiock, 2004; Lubell, Feiock, & Ramirez, 2005).
Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) suggest that the relationship between form of
municipal government and policy is a mainstay of empirical research on municipal policy
decisions. They identified three areas where there have been obstacles to a more complete
understanding of this relationship. First, the notion that the city manager in the CouncilManager form is the only example of a form of government with professional
management has been disrupted with the advent of the appointed position of Chief
Administrative Officer (CAO) in some Mayor-Council forms of government. Secondly,
the use of expenditure data does not necessarily reflect improvement in the effectiveness
of service delivery, often overlooking examples of administrative efficiency. Finally, Carr
and Karuppusamy (2010) identify the complexity of the relationship between form of
government and fiscal policy as a reason why prior research may not have properly
specified the causal models used in the analysis of data.

Form of County Government
There are three basic forms of county government in the United States, and are the
existing forms in the state of Florida (Florida Association of Counties, 2009; National
Association of Counties, 2013). These include the Commission, CommissionAdministrator (or Manager), and the Commission-Executive forms of government. Each
form grants the authority for policy implementation to a different entity. In the
Commission form, the executive powers to administer policy lies jointly with the elected
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County Commission. In the Commission-Administrator form, a county administrator,
sometimes called a county manager, is appointed by the county Commission to run the
day-to-day operations of government, including the power to hire and fire department
heads. The county administrator is also responsible for preparing a budget for adoption by
the County Commission. The Commission-Executive form provides for an elected county
executive that typically has veto powers over ordinances and other prescribed actions of
the County Commission. The county executive has the authority to hire and fire
department heads (Jewett, 2010; National Association of Counties, 2013; Turnbull, 2007).
The Commission form is considered the traditional, “unreformed,” form of county
government. As a result of their not being an appointed administrator or manager to
oversee day-to-day operations, operating departments and agencies report directly to the
elected body (Feiock, 2004; Jewett, 2010). This form of county government has been
characterized as being more easily swayed by local politics, especially those representing
growth and development interests (Turner, 1990).
The Commission-Administrator form and Commission-Executive form of county
government are also referred to as “reformed” county governments throughout the
literature (Feiock, 2004; Jewett, 2010; Svara & Nelson, 2008). The reform movement in
county government began as an attempt to increase professionalism to provide better
leadership in an increasingly complex service delivery agenda (DeSantis & Renner, 1994;
Schneider & Ok Park, 1989). The reform movement for counties started much later than
that for cities. The shift away from the Commission form to the CommissionAdministrator and Commission-Executive forms is the result of the county reform
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movement (Benton, 2002; Lubell et al., 2005; Schneider & Ok Park, 1989). The county
reform movement had a different motivation than municipal reform. City reformers
pursued greater efficiency and a reduction in spending, whereas county reformers sought
to make the form of government more responsive to the needs of its citizens, which is
likely to result in greater spending (Benton, 2002; Choi et al., 2010).

Significance of the Form of County Government
The form of county government has bearing in the evaluation of the response to
the Great Recession of 2008. The traditional Commission form has been the subject of
some criticism due to the lack of a single executive, either elected or appointed, to
effectively execute policy. The traditional Commission form has been viewed as having a
limited ability to respond to the service needs of a growing metropolitan region. The
Commission form of county government exists without the benefit of a home rule charter,
and may only provide those services authorized by the state with revenue sources
restricted by state statute (Benton, 2002).
The level of urbanization and complexities of urban issues tend to drive counties to
the reform movement, either through adoption of a home rule charter or other structural
reform. Service demands are higher resulting in higher expenditure requirements (Benton,
2002; Choi et al., 2010; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Morgan & Kickham, 1999; Schneider
& Ok Park, 1989). Studies examining the relationship between expenditures and form of
county government reveal that reformed county governments have higher levels of
expenditures than the non-reformed Commission form (Benton, 2002; Choi et al., 2010;
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DeSantis & Renner, 1994, 2002; Menzel, 1996; Schneider & Ok Park, 1989; Svara &
Nelson, 2008). This is contrasted by Campbell and Turnbull (2003) who found no
significant differences between the spending patterns of different forms of county
government. Their national study of cities and counties did indicate some slight
differences in expenditure patterns when regional location was taken into account
(Campbell & Turnbull, 2003).
Schneider & Park (1989) found the relationship between the form of county
government and the role in service provision significant. Their national study identified
the Commission-Executive form as providing the most services, with CommissionManager forms providing the second most services, and Commission form counties
lagging far behind. In comparing county form by type of expenditure, Schneider and Park
(1989) found that the Commission form and Commission-Manager form spent similar
amounts on developmental expenditures, but far less than the Commission-Executive
form. Choi et al., (2010) found that Commission-Manager and Commission-Executive
forms had a negative relationship with expenditures in the developmental and
redistributive policy arenas. Some have explained this relationship as being the result of
efficiency and commitment to formal process as the top priority of the appointed
executive, whereas the Commission form of county government is more responsive to the
political demands for developmental and redistributive expenditures (Choi et al., 2010;
Feiock, 2002, 2004; Lubell et al., 2005)
Jewett (2010) classified the form for all of Florida’s counties. Those findings are
shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Three Forms of County Government in Florida with Date of Adoption of New Form
Commission

Commission-Administrator or Manager
(Terms used interchangeably in Florida)
Administrator Manager

County

Date

Calhoun
Franklin
Hamilton
Jefferson
Lafayette
Levy
Liberty
Madison
Suwannee
Union

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

County

Date

County

Date

Commission-Executive
(Mayor)
County

Date

Baker
1990 Alachua
1987 Duval
1968
Broward
1975 Bay
1987 Miami-Dade
2007
Charlotte
1986 Bradford
1993 Orange
1986
Citrus
1999 Brevard
1994
DeSoto
1987 Clay
1991
Escambia
1985 Collier
1993
Flagler
1995 Columbia
2002
Gadsen
1989 Dixie
?
Gilchrist
2004 Glades
1995
Gulf
1993 Hardee
2001
Hendry
1978 Lake
1990
Hernando
1983 Lee
1996
Highlands
1991 Nassau
1986
Hillsborough
1983 Osceola
1992
Holmes
2006 Polk
1998
Indian River
1990 Seminole
1989
Jackson
1984 Volusia
1971
Leon
2002
Manatee
1991
Marion
1983
Martin
1981
Monroe
1977
Okaloosa
1993
Okeechobee
1992
Palm Beach
1985
Pasco
1974
Pinellas
1980
Putnam
1990
Santa Rosa
1989
Sarasota
1971
St. Johns
1990
St. Lucie
1959
Sumter
1983
Taylor
2003
Wakulla
2008
Walton
1984
Washington
1991
Note. Charter counties appear in italics. Adapted from “County Government Structure in Florida,” by A.
Jewett, 2010, In Florida county government guide (pp. 7 – 26), Tallahassee, FL: Florida Association of
Counties.
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Jewett (2010) has identified a relationship between size of county population and
form of government in Florida. This evolution of form of government is borne out in
Table 4.
Table 4
Average County Population by Form of Government
Form of Government
Commission
Manager/Administrator
Executive

Average County
Population
18,969
260,723
1,493,914

Note. Adapted from “County Government Structure in Florida,” by A. Jewett, 2010, In Florida county
government guide (pp. 7 – 26), Tallahassee, FL: Florida Association of Counties.

As counties grow in population, so does the complexity of issues that need to be
addressed. There are currently ten counties remaining with the original Commission form
of government. They are all rural counties. These counties would be expected to have the
lowest per-capita expenditures for governmental services among forms of county
government (Benton, 2002). When matters grow beyond the ability of the Commission
form and professional management is required, there typically is a move to adopt a charter
affirming the Commission-Manager form (Svara & Nelson, 2008). Given the inability of
that form to address the even more complex political, economic, and social issues of
counties greater than one million in population, the pattern has been to move to the
Commission-Executive form. A countywide elected county executive, with veto power
over certain Commission decisions is often viewed as a more effective governing
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mechanism, especially in areas of large population and complex problems. As county
governments move from the Commission form to Commission-Administrator to
Commission-Executive, there is an increase in the number and scale of services provided
as demands from increasing population grows (Benton, 2002, 2003; Morgan & Kickham,
1999; Schneider & Ok Park, 1989). In Florida, three counties have adopted the
Commission-Executive form – Miami-Dade, Orange, and Duval counties. The elected
county executive in these three counties has a leadership role in policy making as well as
the responsibility for administering most of the services delivered by the county. In all
three instances, the county executive employs a profession administrator to assist with the
administrative function (Jewett, 2010).

Form of City Government
The Florida Constitution permits cities to adopt any form of government they
desire, as long as the legislative body is elected. The Florida Statutes go further in
requiring that any proposed municipal charter must clearly define the legislative and
executive functions (Florida League of Cities, 2013). There are four generalized forms of
city government in Florida that establish the structure of governance for municipalities.
These include:


Council-Manager – a city council, or commission, sets policy and adopts the
annual budget. The council appoints a city manager that oversees the day-to-day
administrative operations. The mayor is typically selected from among the council
and the position is held on a rotating basis.
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Council-Strong Mayor – the Mayor is elected citywide and is the chief executive,
and has significant control over policy, administration, and the annual budget. The
mayor typically has veto power over certain actions of the council. The mayor can
also be a voting member of the council depending upon the charter.



Council-Weak Mayor – the role of mayor is limited to ceremonial, and is often
rotated on an annual basis. The council is responsible for legislative functions and
administrative oversight. Department heads report to the entire council.



Commission – the commission has both legislative and executive responsibilities.
Each city commission is responsible for a department of function of government,
such as police, fire, finance, public works, etc. One commissioner is designated
the mayor to have a presiding officer (Florida League of Cities, 2013; National
League of Cities, 2013).
The most common form of municipal government in the United States is the

Council-Manager form. In 2007, 49% of the cities and towns over 2,500 in population in
the U.S. were operating under this form. The percentage is even higher (58%) for U.S.
cities with populations over 100,000 (International City-County Management Association,
2013). More than half of the municipal governments in Florida operate under the CouncilManager form of government (Florida League of Cities, 2013). The Council-Mayor form,
both strong and weak, is the second most utilized form of government nationally. The
Commission form, the oldest form of government in the U.S., is relatively rare, operating
in just 1% of cities nationally and has limited presence in Florida (National League of
Cities, 2013). In the past 30 years, there has been a hybridization of some of these forms
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as individual cities tailor their structure to fit the unique needs and character of their
community. Most of these alterations have occurred between the Council-Manager and
Council-Strong Mayor forms (DeSantis & Renner, 2002).

Significance of the Form of City Government
In the analysis of how local governments respond to fiscal stress, several studies
have attempted to measure the effects of the form of government. There is a considerable
volume of literature examining the relationship between government expenditures and
form of city government, with mixed results. Various studies looked at the Council-Weak
Mayor form versus the Council-Manager (reformed) form of city government and found
that reformed cities are likely to tax and spend less than their unreformed counterparts
(Booms, 1966; J. Chapman & Gorina, 2012; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Lineberry & Fowler,
1967; Lyons, 1978; Sass, 1991). However, more recent results are mixed. These studies
indicate that cities with administrative leadership rather than political leadership result in
higher per-capita expenditures (Coate & Knight, 2011; Eskridge & French, 2011), while
others concluded that the presence of a professional manager had no impact on the pattern
of expenditure reductions as a result of fiscal stress (Nelson, 2012).
Other studies have concluded that the city manager is more detached from the
political process than elected strong mayors when comparing the expenditure levels of
each form, and therefore result in more efficient measures of service delivery and more
detachment from the politics of spending (Booms, 1966; Chapman & Gorina, 2012; Coate
& Knight, 2011; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Stumm &
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Corrigan, 1998). Hawkins (2010) notes that the Council-Manager form of city
government may be more oriented toward redistributive policies based on the guidelines
for the professional city manager that emphasizes citizen access and equity in the
distribution of resources.
The role of the mayor in the municipal governance structure is important in
understanding the relationship between developmental and redistributive expenditures as
defined in the City Limits typology. Basolo and Huang (2001) found that the strong
mayor form had a positive relationship with developmental policy expenditures as
compared with redistributive initiatives. The mayor in a Council-Strong Mayor form of
city government is expected to be more responsive to political pressure from pro-growth
business and citizen interest groups, resulting in the adoption of policies that favor
developmental expenditures (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong,
1992). Less reformed city governments may lack the ability to implement certain
development policies (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001). Contradicting results have found
the Council-Manager form to be more aligned with the growth and development interests
of the city by favoring expenditures for roadways, and sewer and water infrastructure
(Nunn, 1996).
The early literature that relied upon the dichotomous description of city
government as either council-manager or mayor-council has been criticized as being far
too simple to fully explain fiscal policy actions (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008; Frederickson
& Johnson, 2001; Karuppusamy & Carr, 2012). During the 1990s, researchers began to
identify changes that were occurring in each of the two basic forms, incorporating aspects
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of each other. What emerged in the literature was a classification system known as the
Adapted Cities Framework (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001). This framework categorized
mayor-council form cities as political or Type I cities. Council-manager form cities are
described as administrative in nature and classified as Type II cities. The Adapted Cities
Framework recognized the amalgamation of aspects of each of these two forms into what
is known as a Type III form of government. (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001;
Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004; Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003). The
classification of Florida’s cities based on the Adapted Cities Framework has not yet been
undertaken, and would be a welcome addition to the literature. This represents a ripe area
to expand upon the research proposed in this study. The classification system deployed by
the Florida League of Cities (2013) will serve as the analytical typology for this research.

Summary of Government Structure
The elected strong mayor in the Council-Strong Mayor form is analogous to an
elected County Executive in the Commission-Executive form of county government
(Feiock, 2004). In a Council-Strong Mayor form for cities or the Commission-Executive
form for counties, it is theorized that the coalition building required to govern a more
complex community results in compromise with interests groups that are well organized
and have access to decision making at the highest level of local government. Those
service areas that have internal as well as external political support during the budgeting
process are likely to be the winners when measuring expenditures during times of fiscal
stress (Rubin, 1982). Developmental policies are generally favored over redistributive
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policies in a Council-Strong Mayor form of government (Basolo & Huang, 2001;
Longoria, 1994). On the other hand, the ideology that serves as the basis for the CouncilManager structure is that this form of government will deliver services more efficiently,
and will be less vulnerable to special interest groups. The role of the appointed manager is
instrumental in how a local government responds to fiscal stress. The budget preparation
responsibilities of the city or county manager are expected to insulate the process from
interest group politics and result in a more even treatment of competing service areas
(Booms, 1966; J. Chapman & Gorina, 2012; DeSantis & Renner, 2002; Morgan &
Pammer, 1988; Nelson, 2012; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998).
The examination of the relationship between form of government, local
government expenditures, and local government policy has advanced to include a number
of additional factors. More recent studies have built models that rely upon the interjurisdictional competition argument (Tiebout, 1956; Craw, 2006; Karuppusamy & Carr,
2012). Craw (2006) suggests that government form of is just one aspect of the political
structure, along with inter-jurisdictional competition, that drive expenditure patterns. This
research uses form of government as one of several potential determinants of local
government per-capita expenditures.

Socio-Economic Conditions as Determinants of Local Government Expenditures
The socio-economic conditions that exist within the community are key factors in
driving the government’s fiscal condition and ultimately what strategies they use to
respond to fiscal stress (Choi et al., 2010; Maher & Deller, 2007; Pammer, 1990). The
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demand for local government services is determined by a complex set of factors that
includes population size, density, growth, level of urbanization and the demographic
characteristics of the community (Choi et al., 2010). There is a positive relationship
between household income, higher tax base, higher unemployment, higher percentage of
minority population, and higher intergovernmental aid, with higher levels of per capita
expenditures (Chicoine & Walzer, 1985; Choi et al., 2010).
One of the critical focal points for analyzing the fiscal health of a local government
is the social and economic condition of the community it serves (Gauthier, 2007). Central
to Gauthier’s (2007) view is that local governments do not exist in a vacuum. They exist
in a macro political, social, and economic environment, which has a direct relationship to
its financial position. This economic condition includes its intergovernmental
relationships with the state and other local governments and the strength of its economic
base. Elements of the macro environment that contribute to the local government’s
economic condition also include the prevalence of social and economic stress occurring in
its neighborhoods and communities. The relationship between the macro economy and
fiscal stress is consistent with Chapman’s (2008) definition of cyclical and structural
pressures, and Skidmore and Scorsone’s (2011) consideration of factors external to the
local government.
The identification of appropriate measures of community economic stress can
include factors that drive local government revenues including the level of employment,
the change in value of its property tax base, and household income. Measures that can
have significant impacts on local government expenditures include the age of community
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residents, crime rate, education level, and the increase or decrease in the size of the
community population over the measurement period (Chapman & Gorina, 2012).
Population density and degree of urbanization are also variables that can shape local
government policy (Holcombe & Williams, 2009; Peterson & Rom, 1989). Population
density can affect the type and efficiency of service delivery. People living in higher
concentrations may require more public safety services than those in less dense
communities (Holcombe & Williams, 2009). In his review of empirical studies from the
1950s through the mid-1970s, Raimondo’s (1992) generalized findings concluded that:
1. A positive association exists between personal income and general
government, police, fire and highway expenditures;
2. A negative association exists between population density and general
government, sanitation, and highway expenditures;
3. A positive association exists between population density and police and fire
expenditures;
4. A positive association exists between urbanization and general government,
police, fire, and sanitation expenditures; and
5. A negative association exists between urbanization and highway
expenditures (pp. 82 – 83).
In summarizing these findings, Raimondo (1992) acknowledged that differences
exist between local government expenditures between states, confirming that any national
study of the behavior of local governments has imbedded validity issues. Only some of
these findings are relevant to this research, including the relationship that density and
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personal income have with police and fire expenditures.
The social and economic characteristics of the community are factors to consider
in studying expenditure patterns of cities. Understanding these external elements and how
they affect and ‘limit’ local government choice is to better understand local government
structure, and the specific interests of local government (Peterson, 1981). To this end,
additional demographic factors are worthy of inclusion in the study to determine their
potential relationship with the change in expenditures by City Limits policy category.
These include poverty rate, age of the resident population, education level, and ethnicity
of the population (Campbell & Turnbull, 2003; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010; Chapman &
Gorina, 2012; Chicoine & Walzer, 1985; Choi et al., 2010; Gauthier, 2007; Hayes &
Chang, 1990; Holcombe & Williams, 2009; Maher & Deller, 2007; Pammer, 1990;
Peterson & Rom, 1989; Raimondo, 1992).

Gaps in the Literature
Given that the effects of the Great Recession of 2008 are still being realized today,
it is not surprising that the body of literature examining the impacts on local government is
still evolving. Very little, if any, research has been discovered to date focused specifically
on Florida, and none has included a comparison between cities and counties.
In Florida, the unique political culture of the state has resulted in a local
government form that has a very large proportion of the state’s residents living in
urbanized unincorporated areas with municipal services being provided primarily by
counties. Many metropolitan counties in Florida provide more urban and municipal
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services than some suburban municipalities (Benton, 2003; Schneider & Ok Park, 1989).
This study will examine the expenditure patterns of cities as well as counties, and will
allow for measuring the differences between the two different governmental entities.
Most literature regarding counties does not differentiate between the countywide function
of the county, and those municipal functions of the county that only apply to the
unincorporated population, which is prevalent in Florida.
Much of the prior research focused on what tools and management strategies were
used by local governments during an economic downturn. Little has been done in
analyzing changes in expenditures and correlating those changes to local government
policy. Analyzing the implications of the different forms of local governmental structure
while controlling certain socio-economic variables will help explain the relationship
between these factors and any shift in local governmental policy as a result of this period
of extreme fiscal stress. While there are studies examining the relationship between the
determinants of local government expenditures and fiscal stress, they have largely been
conducted during periods of normal economic growth.
Finally, the quality and availability of comparative financial data that exists today
for local governments did not exist in the 1980s and 1990s, when much of the
determinants literature was produced. Given the recent amplification of the local
government financial condition, states have become more interested in detecting the early
stages of fiscal stress by its cities and counties (Kloha et al., 2005). In Florida, the state
legislature has established indicators of financial stress focusing on the unit of local
government’s failure to pay employees, employee benefits, pension obligations, and
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having a fund balance or retained earnings deficit (Coe, 2008). The Florida Legislature
has mandated strict financial reporting requirements by all local governments to the State.
Section 218.33, Florida Statutes (F.S.), directs the Department of Financial Services to
establish rules and regulations regarding uniform procedures and classification of accounts
to assure proper fiscal management by local governments. This data is collected annually
by the state and has been operating under a uniform chart of accounts (See Appendix B)
(State of Florida Department of Financial Services, 2012). Utilization of this data will
allow for an evaluation of policy adjustment through actual expenditure data rather than
reliance on information gained by opinion survey or other means. The data will show
what changes in funding occurred to specific service areas on an annualized basis. The
year-over-year change before, during, and after the Great Recession will show the
evolution of local government policy through this period of extreme fiscal stress. By
using expenditure data, a very accurate assessment of the impact of the event can be
measured.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Charles Lindbloom’s (1959) theory of budgetary incrementalism helps explain
why there is stability in local government budgetary priorities year-over-year. The local
government budgetary process is largely predictable as political equilibrium is sought
between internal and external interests of the governmental organization (Davis et al.,
1966; Dempster & Wildavsky, 1979; Levine, 1979; Lewis, 1984; Lindblom, 1959).
Dempster and Wildavsky (1979) explained that these theories work in both positive and
negative economic cycles. They used the term decrementalism to describe the process of
budgeting during downturns in the economic cycle.
In order to answer the research questions and test the study hypotheses, a
conceptual framework that operationalizes local government budgetary behavior explained
by decrementalism is required. This is best achieved by the operationalization of local
government policy into local government expenditures.
The categorization and classification of public policies is often used to better
understand the substance, process and implications on society. The literature of the
1960’s introduced the use of typologies to simplify the understanding of public policy.
Typologies help bring order to the realm of explanation and have their place in social
science research (Ostrom, 1980; Steinberger, 1980). The very nature of categorizing
public policies by type favors the use of qualitative description in lieu of quantitative
measurement (Williams & Adrian, 1968).
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History of the City Limits Typology
The origin of Peterson’s City Limits typology can be traced back to Theodore J.
Lowi in 1964. In writing about the prevalence of single-issue political decisions and case
studies in the political science literature, Lowi (1964) observed that there was no
comprehensive system for understanding the implications of the varied findings from
previous research. He concluded that there was a lack of understanding of the role of
theory in policy research. Lowi’s argument was grounded in three principles: (1)
relationships among people are based on expectations, (2) In the political realm, the
relationship between groups and government are defined by policies, and (3) political
relationships are defined by the governmental policy in question. He concluded that
governmental policies are what government produces and those policies define the balance
of power between groups. He called for a framework in which policies would be
organized by their expected impact on society (Lowi, 1964).

Lowi’s Three Policy Arenas
Lowi (1964) focused on creating a scheme that centered on types of public policies
based on their impact on society. His view was that when basing a classification of
policies in this manner, there are only a limited number of possible categories. In using
the federal government as the model, his framework consisted of three classifications of
policies - distribution, regulation, and redistribution. He argued that his typology would
replace policy description with policy function, and that all of the functions of the federal
government could be described with just these three classifications (Lowi, 1964). The use
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of a classification system would allow policy analysts to address the shortcomings of the
case-study method which had, up until now, dominated the literature (Steinberger, 1980).
According to Lowi (1964), federal policies of distribution were commonplace in
19th century land programs, and included such areas as agricultural subsidies, federal lands
and natural resource management systems, and other federal ‘pork’ programs. Regulatory
policies are those that result in the increase of costs to the regulated and/or the limitation
of private choices in the market place. Redistributive policies are those that focus on
social classes within the economic system. Redistributive policies are not based on how
property can be used like regulatory policies. Instead they are geared toward the property
itself and the equal redistribution of that property throughout society (Lowi, 1964). A
fourth category of constituent policies was later added to his initial typology, but is not
relevant to this study (Lowi, 1972)
Lowi (1964) believed that the nature of a policy influences the political
environment that attempts to form and shape it (Sharkansky, 1980; Smith, 2002;
Steinberger, 1980; Waste, 1989). Each of the three policy types had their own ‘arena’ of
power. Each arena would be composed of its own political structure, process, and policy
elites (Lowi, 1964). To Lowi, the assumption that “policies determine politics” only has
value when the policy typology reflects the most important aspect of real government.
Real government coerces behavior. A meaningful classification system for public policy
will capture the context of this coercion (Lowi, 1972).
Steinberger (1980) highlights an element of Lowi’s (1964) original work as an
important perspective on using a typology to understand public policy. He noted that
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Lowi observed that it is not the actual outcome but what the political expectations are of
the outcome that shape the politics of a policy (Steinberger, 1980).

The Typology Literature
The literature utilizing typologies to classify public policies essentially begins with
Lowi (1964, 1972) and emerged into a number of alternative approaches and empirical
analyses (Smith, 2002). The appropriateness of typologies to simplify and explain the
complexities of public policy spawned great debate among scholars. Greenberg et al.
(1977) noted that policies evolve over time and have a number of decision points. The
complexity of policy outputs can make it difficult to put in just one classification. The
determinants of policy type are often subjective and subject to interpretation that will vary
by individual (Greenberg, Miller, Mohr, & Vladeck, 1977; Waste, 1989).

Peterson’s ‘Best Interests of the City’
Paul Peterson (1981) explained the relationship between local government
expenditures and the role and purpose of cities that differed from others during the same
period in the literature. While others offered explanations of how expenditures were
affected by the internal struggle for power, he viewed the expenditures as a holistic
expression of the interests of the city. Much of the literature of his time explained levels
of expenditures as a function of the sum total effect of the political forces at work at the
local level. He did not disagree that some effects of the struggle for power between
political elites and pluralists, and agencies and factions, helped shape urban policy.
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Remarking about his colleagues who had attempted to explain the causal factors for local
government expenditures, he concluded that there was enough evidence from so many
different perspectives that the “findings of expenditure patterns among states and localities
within the United States remain largely a muddle” (Peterson, 1981, p. 9).
Underlying Peterson’s argument is the notion that cities and counties compete with
each other to improve their economic and fiscal position. Elected officials are keenly
aware that supporting policies that promote job creation and economic growth, especially
during times of fiscal stress, are important to the fiscal health of the local government.
The loss of property tax revenue to Florida’s local governments as a result of the Great
Recession has been significant. It can be expected that local governments will actively
pursue policies that promote and advance the expansion of revenues (Peterson, 1981, p.
29). Recent research has shown that county economic development expenditures used to
incentivize economic expansion may be caused by political as well as economic
conditions. Competition between counties in a metropolitan region drives local
governmental expenditures, especially in urban counties with high capacity to carry out
such incentives (Betz, Partridge, Kraybill, & Lobao, 2012).

Peterson’s Adaptation of Lowi
Peterson (1981) adapted Lowi’s (1964) classification of public policies to apply to
local governments, and cities in particular. The modified classification scheme included
the three following policy arenas:
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1. Developmental Policies – policies that enhance the economic
interests of the local economic base and support competition with
other local governments;
2. Redistributive Policies – policies that benefit lower socio-economic
and working class groups by addressing substandard conditions in
the community; and
3. Allocational Policies – policies that are neutral in their effect on the
local economy in that they are uniformly applied throughout the
community.
The underlying principle of this typology is that local government policies are
organized around what impact the policies have on the economic base of the community
(Peterson, 1981). The central focus of City Limits is that the driving force behind local
government policy is the economic survival of the community, and improving the local
jurisdiction’s position in the national, state, and regional economy. Each of the policy
categories is characterized by its accretive, dilutive, or neutral relationship with the local
economy. This classification system is known as the City Limits typology and has been
used extensively in the urban policy literature. Some have described the approach as the
predominant explanatory model for local government policy choice (Basolo & Huang,
2001; Longoria, 1994; Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). Mount (1983) referred to City Limits
as undeniably important for the field of urban policy research.
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The City Limits Typology
Each of the policy categories is characterized by its accretive, dilutive, or neutral
relationship with the local economy. Peterson (1981) uses a measure of marginal benefits
to marginal costs to the average taxpayer as one of the principal determinants of the policy
type in the classification of expenditures. Table 5 provides a summary of the net effect of
each of the policy types on the local economy.
Table 5
Summary of City Limits Typology
Policy Type

Benefit/Tax Ratio

Type of Expenditure

Developmental

>1.0

Economic Development
Utilities, Streets &
Highways

Redistributive

<1.0

Health & Human
Services
Housing

Allocational

=1.0

Police and Fire
Sanitation
Parks & Recreation

Note. Adapted from City Limits, by P. E. Peterson, 1981, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Developmental Policies
Local government developmental policies encompass those expenditures,
programs and activities that support the expansion of the local economic base. The net
effect of these policies results in positive growth and expansion of the tax base and
promote further economic expansion (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Henig, 1992; Wolman &
Spitzley, 1996). There may be costs associated with these policies in terms of higher taxes
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or fees, trade-offs between land uses, and increases in traffic congestion and
environmental impacts. However, the community will typically realize growth in
employment, increased land values and higher local governmental revenues (Peterson, p.
42). Given that the City Limits typology is framed by an economic and fiscal impact
structure, developmental policies promote economic expansion and are assumed to be in
the best interests of all residents (Henig, 1992).
Examples of local government activities that reflect developmental policies include
expenditures for streets and highways, transportation facilities, and utilities. These
expenditures have the effect of reducing the cost to conduct business by improving
mobility, making the city more competitive in the marketplace for private investment and
economic expansion. This in turn improves the benefit/tax ratio for those who can take
advantage of the improvements and increase wealth in the community. Developmental
expenditures build urban infrastructure, positively impact the fiscal state of the jurisdiction
and are popular with elected officials (Schneider, 1989).
The contention that local governments are singularly focused on developmental
policies means that governments will likely favor large employers and wealthy residents
because of their contribution to the tax base and their ability to generate additional
economic activity (Mounts, 1983).

Redistributive Policies
Local government policy advisers and elected officials do not set out to adopt
policies that have a detrimental affect on the local economic base. In Peterson’s (1981)
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City Limits typology, local governmental redistributive policies act as a drag on the local
economy. Given that redistributive policies are geared toward assisting lower income
groups with equal access to public services, they are an integral part of the financial model
of local government service delivery. Waste (1989) said that redistributive policies must
cost the local government more than benefit it. He also notes that the benefit/tax analysis
is measured as a short-term drag on the economy in the form of lost expenditures that
could otherwise have been spent on developmental policies. Redistributive policies often
have long-term benefit value that is not realized in the short term due to improved housing
and social conditions for the community’s working class (Waste, 1989).
Not every local government policy can or should have a benefit/tax ratio greater
than 1.0 nor can every policy decision be made on the basis of its accretive value. Local
government jurisdictions have economically challenged communities and neighborhoods
that require programs and expenditures to help equalize access to services. Peterson
(1981) clarifies that redistribution policies are a transfer of resources from the well off to
the less well off, and are not intended to include income transfer programs of the federal
or state governments (Peterson, p. 43). Examples include expenditures for social welfare
programs, housing, community health and hospitals (Schneider, 1989).

Allocational Policies
A third category of local government policies created by Peterson (1981) has
neither a positive nor negative impact to the local economy. Allocational policies do not
fit into the developmental/redistributive dichotomy. Peterson (1981) describes these as
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“housekeeping services” that all members of the community benefit from equally.
Examples include police, fire and garbage collection services and are proportionately
allocated throughout the jurisdiction. Allocational policies provide average benefit/tax
ratio to the average taxpayer. According to Peterson, increasing expenditures on
allocational policies have no positive or negative effect on the attractiveness of the
community to an average taxpayer.

Summary of the City Limits Typology
The developmental and redistributive policies of a local government are significant
to the economic importance of the community. Developmental policies are designed to
enhance employment, land values, and economic expansion. Redistributive policies act to
provide much needed human services to support lower-income segments of the
community. Some note that redistributive policies counter the growth nature of
developmental policies by syphoning resources away from a local government’s
developmental potential. This can result in competition between local jurisdictions to
expand developmental policies and limit redistributive programs (Basolo, 2000; Sanders
& Stone, 1987).
Henig (1992) identifies the central premise of City Limits as local governments
being limited from spending on redistributive policies to only when there are excess
resources available. Taking away resources that could otherwise be spent on
developmental policy items risks alienating those individuals and businesses that add to
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the stature of the political, social and economic realm in favor of those who cost more than
they benefit the community.

Historical Use of the City Limits Typology
The City Limits typology has been influential in the field of local government
policy research, especially as it relates to examining the role of local governments in
economic development. As capital has become more and more mobile, local governments
have a single and overriding interest in attracting it to their jurisdiction (Wolman &
Spitzley, 1996). Local governments promote economic development as an outgrowth of
competing in the marketplace for new capital investment. That is why the predominant
policies at the local level are developmental due to their contribution to improve the fiscal
and economic position of the government and set the conditions for ongoing and continual
economic expansion. This has been a central theme of the City Limits typology research
(Logan, 1976; Molotch, 1976; Sanders & Stone, 1987; Wolman & Spitzley, 1996).
The theory has been used to understand the underlying politics behind economic
development strategy at the local government level. Each policy regime has its own
‘elites’ (Lowi, 1964; Peterson, 1981). Molotch (1976) identified the groups that are
dependent upon local government developmental policies as the ‘land elite.’ These groups
help promote the idea that there is a collective economic ‘interest’ of the local government
and thus reinforce the importance of developmental policies over redistributive and
allocational policies. Reinforcing the importance of developmental policies to local
governments, the land elite’s goal is to increase land values for their personal gain. This
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goal aligns with local government’s interest in increasing land values to reap higher
property tax revenues (Molotch, 1976; Molotch & Logan, 1984).

The City Limits Typology and Form of Government
Wolman and Spitzley (1998) used the City Limits explanation of the competition
among local governments to explain why local governments engage in providing financial
incentives to businesses to invest in their jurisdictions. Economic development policy is
formed in the political arena by policy actors that influence decision making (Hawkins,
2010). The desire of politicians to remain in office can become a ‘high-powered’
incentive to expend funds on visible projects that support economic development for their
jurisdiction (Frant, 1996). This is especially true for the Strong Mayor-Council form of
government. The Mayor would be viewed as a ‘deal-maker and the facilitator of
developmental policies (Hawkins, 2010). This is consistent with Longoria’s (1994)
observation that mayors in the U.S. prefer developmental expenditures to allocational and
redistributive spending. Hawkins (2010) describes the differences between the Strong
Mayor form and the Council-Manager form when it comes to developmental expenditures.
The elected mayor and the appointed manager have different time frames for execution of
policy. Mayors operate on an election cycle whereas managers have a longer time horizon
(Hawkins, 2010). In a post-recession environment where short term improvement in the
economic environment is highly desired and also aligns with the political interests of the
elected leadership, the Council-Strong Mayor form will favor developmental expenditures
(Feiock, Jeong, & Kim, 2003).
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Empirical Studies
The City Limits typology has been used in a number of ways in the literature to
examine local government policy. In City Limits, Peterson (1981) chose to test this policy
framework with an empirical study used to develop the theory. He set out to prove that
policy decisions are driven by economic and environmental factors as opposed to political
forces. He examined the combined expenditures of state and local governments in all fifty
states during the late 1970’s. State and local expenditures were combined to resolve the
unit of analysis concern regarding cities located in different states operating under
differing municipal authorizing statutes. The assignment of expenditures to the three
policy regimes was done based on Census Bureau information – the best data available at
the time. Eight independent variables were selected to serve as proxies for three
groupings of determinants of expenditures: 1) fiscal capacity, 2) demand-supply factors,
and 3) non-economic need (Peterson,1981, p.52). The statistical test was a simple
correlation analysis. The conclusions affirmed the expected relationships between certain
determinants of expenditures and the applicable policy regime. Strong relationships were
found between several independent variables and expenditures in the policy regimes. To
Peterson, these findings affirmed that the City Limits typology was a sound explanatory
framework for policy decisions, and that economic forces trumped political activity in
local government policy setting.
Basolo (2000) studied 709 U.S. cities with a 1990 population greater than 25,000
to identify whether economic or political factors influenced policy decisions that favored
economic development (developmental) over affordable housing (redistributive). Political
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factors were determined to be slightly more important than economic factors in explaining
certain policy choices (Basolo, 2000).
Schneider (1989) used the three-category City Limits typology to predict the
effects of competition on levels of expenditures for the three policy domains for suburban
cities in the U.S. Competition was operationalized by the number of nearby municipalities
and by the variation of the tax rate in each. Schneider’s (1989) hypothesis was that
developmental expenditures should increase and redistributive spending would decrease as
competition between local governments increased. The findings included a refuting of
Peterson’s (1981) contention that developmental policy expenditures increase as
competition increases. The study confirmed that redistributive policies are a distinct
policy regime and that in a suburban setting, allocational policy expenditures are more
responsive to competition than developmental spending (Schneider, 1989).
The relationship between the Commission-Manager form of County government
and the favoring of developmental policies was found to be positive when examining
growth management policies in Florida (Feiock, Tavares, & Lubell, 2008). Feiock et al
(2008) found that the existence of professional management diminished the probability of
strict growth policies being in place that would inhibit economic expansion.
Choi et al (2008) used the City Limits typology to analyze the expenditure patterns
of county governments in Florida. A pooled cross-section time series design was
deployed to understand the hypothesized explanatory variables on the dependent variable county expenditures across the three City Limits policy regimes. The independent
variables used were categorized as county economy, citizen political ideology, form of

69

government and home rule charter, and population characteristics. The conclusions are
varied, but indicated that charter counties have higher developmental and allocational
expenditures, and that political ideology has a positive influence on all three spending
categories. In addition, Choi (2008) found that population density and economic
conditions have a positive relationship with spending. In contrast to the Peterson’s (1981)
insistence that economics drives local government policy, politics does matter at the
county level (Choi et al., 2010).

Application of the City Limits Typology to this Research
The City Limits Typology has been described as a successful analytical model that
simplifies complex and abstract aspects of organizational behavior relating to the pursuit
of economic interests. It is a framework that explains the consequences of the pursuit of
those economic interests (Henig, 1992).
It is the interests of local government that is central to this research. What is in the
best interest of a city or county can be explained to exist whenever aspects of the entire
jurisdiction such as economic base, political influence, or elevated social interaction are
achieved by way of policy or program (Peterson, 1981, p. 20). Even though a single
individual may be harmed by any one policy, the collective interest of the local
government is enhanced by that same policy, and therefore justified.
Peterson’s central premise is that local governments are driven to improve their
status through enhancements to three stratified systems – economic, social and political.
Of the three, it is the economic system - the city’s market position in the national, state
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and regional economy – that drives local government policy decisions. The collective
economic interest of the local government is the driving force behind local public policy
and how a city or county expends its resources. Peterson assumes that local governments
are rational actors pursuing their organizational self-interest. Local governments will act
to protect and enhance their economic system within their borders and, like private firms,
will compete with one another to improve their regional position (Mounts, 1983). Local
governments will adopt policies that help its economic base prosper and promote the
exporting of its products and services, often at the expense of policies that aid lower
income groups. These economic base policies often take the form of expenditures for
infrastructure – roads, utilities, airports, seaports, etc. - necessary for the local economy to
thrive and expand (Peterson, 1981).
Public policies can be inherently ambiguous (Sharkansky, 1980; Smith, 2002;
Steinberger, 1980). Public policy typologies often lack the ability to provide clear
distinctions between categories needed to be fully explanatory for researchers (Smith,
2002). However, Henig (1992) saw Peterson’s (1981) typology having face validity as
an interpretive tool to evaluate policy choices. It reflects the real-world political
struggles regarding growth and economic development that local governments face on a
regular basis. Basolo (2000) identifies actual expenditure data from the local government
as one of the best indicators of public policy choice.
Using real expenditure data collected from the state of Florida, Department of
Financial Services, the analytical model proposed for this research is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Analytical model of City Limits typology identifying policy shift.

Policy Typology, Research Questions, and Study Hypotheses
The culmination of the literature review and the theoretical framework results in
specific and testable hypotheses which is the focus of this research:
RQ 1: Did the expenditure patterns of local governments in Florida change from
pre-recession to post-recession?
Local governments operating in an environment of fiscal stress will seek to
maintain their political equilibrium through various mechanisms, including cutting back
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on expenditures that are less visible to the external environment while maintaining service
levels for as long as possible (Baker, 2011; Hoene & Pagano, 2009; Levine et al., 1981;
Lewis, 1984; Wolman, 1980, 1982). This tends to present a more stable policy
environment and suggests that avoidance of a significant shift in policy is an objective of
decremental budgeting.
A policy hierarchy has been found to exist for the funding of certain services
during times of fiscal stress. Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) and West and Davis (1988)
concluded that public safety services – police, fire and emergency medical response –
fared better that parks and recreation and general government. All of these services fall
within the allocational category of the City Limits typology. The higher funding of public
safety will likely offset, at least to some extent, the reduction in funding of other
allocational services. From an overall policy regime standpoint, this suggest that the prerecession to post-recession policy distribution of local governments will be stable, with
only significant shifts in funding occurring within the allocational policy category.
Hypothesis 1: The proportionate share of expenditures of all Florida local
governments for all three policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%,
indicating no significant difference in expenditure patterns as a result of the Great
Recession.

RQ 2: What differences or similarities, if any, exist between the type of local
government and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to postrecession?
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About one-half of the population in Florida lives either inside one of the 410 cities
(Florida League of Cities, 2011) or in unincorporated areas governed by one of Florida’s
67 counties. Martin (1993) described the changing demographics of suburbanization that
have resulted in the creation of twenty charter counties largely in Florida’s urban areas.
The adoption of the home rule county charters is in response to the lack of governance and
taxation tools to deliver urban services in unincorporated communities lying outside
Florida’s central cities (Jewett, 2010).
There are only modest differences between the home rule powers granted to
municipalities and those approved by adoption of a county charter, although each county
charter is unique to the needs of its electorate. However, it is hypothesized that counties
that have adopted home rule charters will respond to the Great Recession of 2008 more
similar to municipalities than to non-charter counties.
Hypothesis 2: The proportionate share of expenditures for all cities for all three
policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant
difference in expenditure patterns.
Hypothesis 3: The proportionate share of expenditures for all counties for all three
policy groups from pre to post- recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant
difference in expenditure patterns.
Hypothesis 4: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of charter
counties from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for non-charter counties.
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RQ 3: What differences or similarities, if any, exist between the form of local
government and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to postrecession?
The literature on the relationship between the form of local government and
expenditures from the 1960s and 70s indicates that Council-Manager form cities are likely
to spend less than other forms of city government (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons,
1978). However, there was no differentiation of funding for individual services amongst
these studies. More recent studies are mixed regarding the existence of a professional
manager and the impact on spending. Some concluded that administrative leadership as
compared with elected leadership (Council - Strong Mayor form) resulted in higher percapita expenditures (Coate & Knight, 2011; Eskridge & French, 2011). Nelson (2012)
found that the existence of an appointed manager had no effect on any pattern of response
to fiscal stress.
The finding that the Council-Manager form is more insulated from the politics of
large changes in year to year budget priorities (Booms, 1966; Chapman & Gorina, 2012;
Coate & Knight, 2011; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Stumm &
Corrigan, 1998) supports the notion that there would be a finding of no policy shift in the
City Limits typology from pre to post-recession for Council-Manager cities, affirming the
existence of the decremental approach to budgeting. The same is likely for CommissionManager form of county government.
The county reform movement in Florida started with Miami-Dade’s charter
adoption in 1957 and has continued through decades of growth, leaving only ten rural
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counties with the original Commission form (Jewett, 2010). Home rule charters are
sought so that county government can gain control of local issues away from the state
(Florida Association of Counties, 2009; Jewett, 2010). Home rule counties are better
equipped to manage local issues under local governance rather than limited only to the
powers authorized by the state (McCabe, 2000). Given the combination of home rule
counties with a Commission-Manager form of government, it is hypothesized that these
counties will have a similar detachment from the politics of large year-over-year changes
in budget priorities and respond to fiscal stress in a manner similar to Council-Manager
cities.
Hypothesis 5: The proportionate share of expenditures of Council-Manager cities
and Commission-Manager form counties for all three policy groups from pre to
post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant difference in expenditure
patterns.
Hypothesis 6: The proportionate share of redistributive expenditures of CouncilManager cities for from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for non-Council
Manager cities.
In a Council-Strong Mayor form for cities and the Commission-Executive form for
counties, the elected executive is responsible for policy as well as administrative
leadership. It is the elected Executive’s budget that is presented to the Council or
Commission. The coalition building required to successfully govern a more complex
community results in compromise with interests groups that are well organized and have
access to decision making at the highest level of local government. In turn, the existence
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of Council-Strong Mayor form for cities, or a Commission-Executive form for counties,
would be less likely to result in equity budgeting during times of fiscal stress.
Economic development policy is formed by policy actors and ultimately adopted
by elected officials. The desire of politicians, especially city mayors and county
executives, to remain in office is a ‘high-powered’ incentive to expend funds on economic
development projects in their jurisdiction (Frant, 1996). Longoria (1994) confirmed that
mayors in the U.S. prefer developmental expenditures to other spending demands.
Hawkins (2010) identifies the orientation differences between forms of local government
and developmental policy spending. A chief elected executive will have more urgency to
promote economic development projects than will a city or county manager (Hawkins,
2010).
Hypothesis 7: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of CouncilStrong Mayor form cities from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for other
forms of city government
RQ 4: What relationships exist, if any, between the socioeconomic characteristics
of a local government, and changes in expenditure patterns from pre-recession to
post-recession?
Local government’s response to fiscal stress is influenced by a number of socioeconomic attributes of the community it serves, including, the size and density of the
population, and level of income in the community. These are key factors in determining
the demand for governmental services (Choi et al., 2010; Maher & Deller, 2007; Pammer,
1990; Peterson & Rom, 1989). There is a positive relationship between household income
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and higher levels of per capita expenditures, which would be hypothesized to continue
post-recession (Chicoine & Walzer, 1985; Choi et al., 2010). The increase or decrease in
population of the community over the measurement period, and the level of crime rate can
be significant factors affecting response to fiscal stress (Chapman & Gorina, 2012).
Peterson (1981) discussed the relationship between external elements such as the
social and economic characteristics of the community as factors to better understand the
interests of local government and their policy regime. Raimondo (1992) found a positive
relationship between density, personal income, and police and fire expenditures. This
finding would be hypothesized to a relationship between density, household income, and a
policy regime favoring allocational expenditures.
The use of total population in the jurisdiction is as a control variable is intended to
incorporate the concept of the size of the jurisdiction and its role as a determinant of
expenditure patterns. There is precedence in using total population as a predictor variable
in a model where the dependent variables have been standardized by measuring them on a
per-capita basis (Storm & Feiock, 1999). In measuring the effects of support for higher
education on statewide economic development outcomes, Storm and Feiock (1999)
utilized total state population as one of several variables that predicted Gross State Product
and personal income – two outcomes measured on a per capita basis.
Hypothesis 8: Average household income is positively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
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Hypothesis 9: Average household income is negatively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Hypothesis 10: Population size is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Hypothesis 11: Population size is negatively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Hypothesis 12: Population density is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Hypothesis 13: Population density is negatively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.

Frant (1996) described how important visible economic development projects are
to politicians who desire short-term success to retain their elected position. Hawkins
(2010) noted that this is especially true for the Mayor in the Council-Strong Mayor form
of government, where the time horizon for mayors is short term as opposed to the longer
policy horizon held by city managers. This is consistent with observations made by
Longoria (1994) that mayors in the U.S. prefer developmental expenditures to allocational
and redistributive spending. The Mayors election cycle contributes to a shorter policy
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horizon (Hawkins, 2010). The Council-Strong Mayor form will favor developmental
expenditures over other expenditure types in a post-recession environment due to the
political interests of the elected leadership (Feiock et al., 2003; Fleischmann et al., 1992).
The Council-Strong Mayor form of city government is expected to be more responsive to
pro-growth business and citizen interest groups, resulting in the adoption of policies that
favor developmental expenditures (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Fleischmann et al., 1992).
Hypothesis 14: The Council-Strong Mayor form is positively associated with a
change in the proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures
from pre-recession to post-recession.
In Schneider and Park’s (1989) national study of counties, they found that the
Commission form and Commission-Manager form spent similar amounts on
developmental expenditures, but far less than the Commission-Executive form. Choi et al.
(2010) concluded that the Commission-Manager and Commission-Executive forms had a
negative relationship with expenditures in the developmental and redistributive policy
arenas. Some have explained this relationship as being the result of the efficiency
orientation and commitment to formal process instilled in the training of the professional
county manager, whereas the Commission form of county government is more responsive
to the political demands for developmental and redistributive expenditures (Choi et al.,
2010; Feiock, 2002, 2004; Lubell et al., 2005)
Hypothesis 15: The Commission-Manager form of county government is
negatively associated with a change in the proportionate share of local government
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developmental and redistributive expenditures from pre-recession to postrecession.
There are two types of counties in Florida - charter and non-charter. A county that
properly adopts a home rule charter can operate in any manner not specifically prohibited
by state law, similar to municipalities. A county with a home rule charter takes the
Florida Legislature out of the settlement of local issues and puts it in the control of the
local electorate (Florida Association of Counties, 2009; Jewett, 2010). When counties
adopt home rule powers, they are better capable of providing services to meet the demands
of a growing metropolitan, and unincorporated population (Benton, 2002; McCabe, 2000).
Charter counties in Florida are differentiated from non-charter counties in that they can
levy utility services taxes in the unincorporated areas of the county, a power that all
municipalities have within their jurisdiction (Jewett, 2010). Benton (2002) concluded that
the expenditure patterns of charter county governments place greater emphasis on local
services, including developmental expenditures, when compared with non-charter counties
regardless of the form of government. Choi et al. (2010) concluded that the existence of a
home rule charter was associated with an increase in developmental and redistributive
expenditures
Hypothesis 16: Home rule charter counties are positively associated with a change
in the proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from
pre-recession to post-recession.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS

This Chapter is divided into sections to reflect the manner in which the research is
separated into two distinct studies. Each of these sections will describe the elements of
the research design and methodology applicable to that particular study. The first section,
which includes the sources of data and measurement methods, is common to both studies.
Study #1 will examine whether or not the relative importance of per-capita
expenditures among the three City Limits policy categories changed from pre-recession to
post-recession for all local governments by type and form of government. This is a
descriptive study. There are no independent variables, only control variables. This
analysis utilizes the entire population of cities and counties in Florida. Hypotheses 1
through 7 are associated with this first analysis. Since this analysis is using data for the
entire population, the findings represent real differences and not results based on
inferential statistics.
Study #2 will focus on the determinants of change – what factors explain the
proportional changes among and between the expenditure patterns from pre to postrecession, based on government type and form. This is an explanatory study will include
the entire county population (N = 65) and a sample drawn from the 410 cities (n = 197) in
the state, for a total n = 262. Hypotheses 8 through 16 are associated with the second
study.
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Common Aspects of Both Studies

Sources of Data
There are several sources of data necessary for the execution of this study. The
primary source for city and county expenditure information is the state of Florida.
Detailed data regarding the form of government will be derived from the Florida League
of Cities. Similar data for counties will come from the Florida Association of Counties.
Finally, additional demographic data will come from a variety of state and federal sources.
Each is discussed briefly below.

Operationalization of the Study Variables
Tables 6 and 7 display the manner in which the variables required for the study
are to be operationalized. Table 6 identifies the three dependent variables to be used in
both studies.

Local Government Per-Capita Expenditure
The primary measure for quantifying city and county policy that has been selected
for this research is per-capita expenditures. Measuring the scale of policy change from pre
to post-recession can be achieved by transforming raw expenditure data from actual dollar
change to per-capita expenditures. The use of per-capita expenditures is a means of
standardizing expenditure data that will allow for the meaningful comparison of one local
government’s pattern of expenditure change to another (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010;
Eskridge & French, 2011; Wolman, 1982).
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Table 6
Dependent Variables for Both Studies
Variable

Level of
Measurement

Description

Change in per capita
developmental expenditures

Ratio

The increase or decrease in developmental
expenditures as a percentage of total
expenditures, from pre-recession (average of
FY2006 - FY2008) to post-recession (average of
FY2009 – FY2011)

Change in per capita redistributive
expenditures

Ratio

The increase or decrease in redistributive
expenditures as a percentage of total
expenditures, from pre-recession (average of
FY2006 - FY2008) to post-recession (average of
FY2009 – FY2011)

Change in per capita allocational
expenditures

Ratio

The increase or decrease in allocational
expenditures as a percentage of total
expenditures, from pre-recession (average of
FY2006 - FY2008) to post-recession (average of
FY2009 – FY2011)

Section 218.30 of the Florida Statutes is also known as the Uniform Local
Government Financial Management and Reporting Act. This Act requires each local
government in the state to submit a copy of its annual financial report to the state of
Florida at the close of each fiscal year. This section of the Statutes defines the fiscal year
for local governments as beginning on October 1 and ending on September 30 of the
following year. The Act authorizes the department of state government that receives the
annual financial information to promulgate rules regarding proper accounting and fiscal
management, including a uniform classification of revenue and expenditure accounts
(State of Florida, 2013).
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The responsibility of administering this section of Florida law has been delegated
to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. An amendment to the Florida Constitution
resulted in the merging of the Departments of Treasury, Insurance, Banking and Finance,
and Insurance into the Department of Financial Services (DFS), under the direction of the
Chief Financial Officer in 2003. DFS is organized into 14 separate Divisions, including
the Division of Accounting and Auditing. Each Division is organized into Bureaus. The
Bureau of Local Government is responsible for implementing the laws prescribed in
Chapter 218.30, F.S. (State of Florida Department of Financial Services, 2011).
DFS requires all local government financial reporting to be completed by June 30
of the year following the September 30 close of the local government fiscal year. The
Department has established a Local Government Electronic Reporting (LOGER) system,
and has promulgated procedures for submittal of revenue and expenditure data (Bureau of
Local Government, 2005). To assist in the collection of uniform and consistent data, DFS
has established manuals for uniform accounting and reporting practices. A separate
manual exists for cities and one for counties. Fund type, organizational unit, function,
activity, and object code classify data collected pursuant to this Uniform Accounting
System. This ensures the functional equivalency of data collected from all governmental
units in the state (Bureau of Local Government, 2011a, 2011b). Data has been acquired
from the DFS for fiscal years 2005 – 2012.
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The annual expenditures for the study population acquired from the Department of
Financial Services will be matched with the annual population estimates3 for each local
government from the Bureau of Business and Economic Research (BEBR) at the
University of Florida to calculate annual per-capita expenditures. Averages will be
calculated for the pre-recession period (FY2006 – FY2008) and the post-recession period
(FY2009 – FY 2011) from these data sets.
The use of per-capita data for expenditures requires population figures for each of
the fiscal years under study. The Office of Economic and Demographic Research (EDR)
provides economic and social trend forecasting for the Florida Legislature. Section
216.133-138, F.S. enables the creation of an annual Revenue Generating Conference for
the state’s planning and budgeting function. EDR, along with Governor’s Office, the
Senate and House of Representatives, are official participants in developing agreed upon
forecasts for the development of the annual state budget. As part of their annual work
plan, EDR also provides technical support to Florida’s Demographic Estimating
Conference, which is another critical component of forecasting to support the state’s
annual budget process. Included in EDR’s annual responsibilities is to estimate municipal
population for state revenue sharing purposes. The annual publication of EDR’s Local
Government Financial Information Handbook contains estimates of municipal population

3

BEBR estimates of population use the housing unit method. Changes in population are based on changes
in the number of households. A wide variety of data is used in this method and it is the most commonly
used in the U.S. BEBR estimates are widely recognized by the state of Florida and its local governments
for use in planning, budgeting and analytical purposes (Bureau of Economic and Business Research.
(2014). Population studies methodology. Retrieved from http://www.bebr.ufl.edu/content/methodologyproducing-estimates-total-population-counties-and-subcounty-areas-florida
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and unincorporated population for charter counties (Office of Economic and Demographic
Research, 2013b). This research will rely upon EDR for municipal and county population
estimates. The U.S. Census figures for 2010 are used by EDR in calibrating their
population estimates and actual 2010 population counts from the Census Bureau will be
used for 2010.

Independent and Control Variables
The variables used as either independent or control variables for both studies are
the same. Tables 7 and 8 identify all non-dependent variables to be used in each study
and what function they perform by study. The nominal variables are operationalized as
dummy variables.
All of the data in Table 8 will be sourced from the 2000 U.S. Census except the
data for the Financial Condition Ratio variable. Year 2000 data is used because the postrecession measurement period (FY09-11) transcended the next decennial census (2010).
The use of the 2000 census data for the designated variables resolves any validity issues
that could arise as a result from the timing of the study periods.
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Table 7
Independent and Control Variables - Description
Variable Name

Description

Source of Data

City

A municipality as defined by Chapter
165.031, Florida Statutes

State of Florida

County

A county as defined by Chapter 165.031,
Florida Statutes

State of Florida

Council – Manager
Form City

Municipal form of government

FL League of Cities

Council – Strong
Mayor Form City

Municipal form of government

FL League of Cities

Council – Weak
Mayor City

Municipal form of government

FL League of Cities

Commission Form
City

Municipal form of government

FL League of Cities

Hybrid Form City

Municipal form of government

FL League of Cities

Commission Form
County

County form of government

FL Association of
Counties; Jewett, 2010

Commission–
Manager Form
County

County form of government

Florida Association of
Counties; Jewett, 2010

Commission–
Executive Form

County form of government

Florida Association of
Counties; Jewett 2010

County Charter

County Charter adopted pursuant to
Florida Statutes

Jewett, 2010

Total City Population

Total resident population within the
municipal jurisdiction

U.S. Census, 2000

Total County Population

U.S. Census, 2000

Unincorporated Population

Total resident population within the entire
County
Percentage of total County population
within the unincorporated areas of the
County

Poverty Rate

Percentage of residents living in poverty

U.S. Census, 2000
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Bureau of Economic
and Business Research,
University of Florida

Variable Name

Description

Source of Data

Population Density

Resident population per
1000 acres of land

Florida League of
Cities; U.S. Census,
2000

Age

Percentage of residents age 65 and up

U.S. Census, 2000

Education

Percentage of residents achieving high
school education or equivalent

U.S. Census, 2000

Ethnicity

Percentage of non-white residents

U.S. Census, 2000

Average Household Income

Average Income per household in the
jurisdiction

U.S. Census, 2000

Financial

Change in Net Position as a % of
Beginning Net Position at Start of FY06

State of Florida Auditor
General

Table 8
Independent and Control Variables – Variable Types and Roles

Variable Name

Variable
Type

Measure

Role of
Variable in
Study #1
Control

Role of
Variable in
Study #2
Independent

City

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

County

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

Control

Independent

Council – Manager
Form City

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

Control

Independent

Council – Strong
Mayor Form City

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

Control

Independent

Council – Weak
Mayor City

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

Control

Independent

Commission Form
City

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

Control

Independent

Hybrid Form City

Nominal

0 = No
1 = Yes

Control

Independent
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Variable Name

Variable
Type

Commission Form
County

Nominal

Commission–
Manager Form
County

Nominal

Commission–
Executive Form

Nominal

County Charter

Nominal

Total City Population

Measure
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes
0 = No
1 = Yes

Continuous

Role of
Variable in
Study #1
Control

Role of
Variable in
Study #2
Independent

Control

Independent

Control

Independent

Control

Independent

Control

Independent

Control

Independent

Control

Independent

Control

Control

Control

Independent

Control

Control

Control

Control

Control

Control

Control

Independent

Control

Independent

Population count
Total County Population

Continuous
Population count

Unincorporated Population

Continuous
Population count

Poverty Rate

Ratio

Population Density

Ratio

Age

Ratio

Percentage
People per 1000
acres
% > 65 years old

Education

Ratio

Ethnicity

Ratio

Percentage of total
population

Percentage of total
population
Average Household Income

Ratio

Financial Condition Ratio

Ratio

Dollars/ household
Increase/
Decrease in FY06
Net Position over
Starting FY06 Net
Position
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Type and Form of Government
The Florida Association of Counties (FAC) is a membership organization of
county governments, designed to advance the interests of counties. The Association
provides a wide array of services, including legislative advocacy, education, and
collaborative enterprise programs (Florida Association of Counties, 2013). The FAC
collects data regarding county governments and will be used as a source for land area and
form of government variables (Florida Association of Counties, 2009).
A similar organization, the Florida League of Cities, provides the same type of
function for Florida’s municipalities. The League has been collecting data from its
member cities on a wide array of subjects, including population estimates. The League
also maintains a current inventory of the form of government for each of the 410 cities in
the state, and this will serve as the source of the variable in this study (Florida League of
Cities, 2012).

Socioeconomic Characteristics
Socio-economic variables will be deployed to understand the relationship that
certain community characteristics have with the dependent variables. These include
variables such as household income, population density, poverty rate, resident population
age 65 and older, percentage of residents achieving high school education or higher, and
the percentage non-white population.
Socio-economic data for the county level is available through the Florida
Statistical Abstract Online from the University of Florida’s Bureau of Economic and
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Business Research. This extensive data set will be the source of annual population
estimates, population density, and median household income. Annual data from 2004 to
2012 is currently available (Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 2013).
Data for the socio-economic control variables will also be derived from the 2010
U.S. Census. Ideally, time series data for the control variables would be utilized to
coincide with the time series data for local government expenditures for pre and postrecession measurement periods. The data for the entire study population is only available
from the decennial census. Researchers are often confronted with this dilemma and rely
upon one measure in time due to the availability and reliability of the U.S. Census.

Financial Condition Ratio
The Financial Condition Ratio variable was added to the research design as a
means of quantifying the relative state of the financial condition of the local government
prior to the onset of the Great Recession of 2008. The State of Florida’s Auditor General
has identified a series of financial indicators that are to be used by local governments
pursuant to Chapter 218, Florida Statutes. The rules of the Auditor General of the State
of Florida require all local governments to use financial condition assessment procedures
and certain financial indicators to identify deteriorating financial conditions in their
annual audits (State of Florida Auditor General, 2013). There are currently 18 such
indicators. The indicator chosen for this study is the change in net position as a
percentage of the beginning net position at the start of FY06, the first fiscal year in the
pre-recession measurement period. This indicator takes the broadest view of
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government-wide activities, and shows how the financial position of the local
government changed during that fiscal year leading into the study period (State of Florida
Auditor General, 2013).

Validity and Reliability of Data
The research design envisioned for this study only requires the use of secondary
data and does not rely upon primary data collection. The dependent variable, change in
expenditures, is a product of a statutorily required compliance process for each city and
county in the state. The method of accounting and reporting to the state is set out in
procedural manuals promulgated by the Department of Financial Services.
The data used for the study’s independent and control variables come from a
variety of government and institutional sources. Socio-economic variables such as
population and income will be acquired from the U.S. Census Bureau from the 2010
decennial census. Annual projections of population and income will be derived from a
combination of sources, including the University of Florida’s Bureau of Economic and
Business Research (BEBR). The Florida Legislature often uses BEBR’s data and research
in the development of public policy and new legislation.
The source of data for the variable ‘form of government’ will be acquired from the
Florida League of Cities and the Florida Association of Counties. The form of a local
government is a fairly static attribute that nearly always requires an extensive charter
amendment process to change government form. These membership organizations are in
ongoing contact with their membership and update their databases when events warrant.
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The sources of the data for this study are reliable governmental agencies and
institutions that produce information that is highly utilized in program evaluations and
policy development. These sources present minimal concerns for the validity of the
research.

Measurement
The examination of whether or not a shift in local government policy has occurred
due to the Great Recession can be measured by aggregating local government
expenditures into Peterson’s three City Limits policy types. Table 9 identifies how the
City Limits policy types are organized by the Uniform Expenditure Account Codes
promulgated for local governments by the Florida Department of Financial Services.
Choi, et al. (2008) utilized a similar method of organizing expenditures to analyze the
impact of the county economy, citizen political ideology, and government form on local
government policy. Table 9 reflects only those expenditure types that will be used in this
research. Appendix B includes the entire list of Uniform Expenditure Account Codes
from the Department of Financial Services.
Actual expenditure data are a measure of the true impact of local government
policy (Kelly & Rivenbark, 2008). Basolo (2000) concluded that local government
expenditures are one of the best indicators of policy choice. Per-capita expenditures
represent one of the better measures to be able to compare one organization’s pattern of
expenditure change and potential shift in policy position to another organization
(Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Eskridge & French, 2011; Wolman, 1982).
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The Descriptive Analysis - Study #1
Study #1 is descriptive in nature. A robust descriptive analysis will be produced
which will include the central tendency and variability of the data for groups defined by
type of government and form of government. This analysis will be conducted to address
Research Questions 1-3 and their associated hypotheses (H1 through H7). These data will
be reported in tables and graphs, illustrating any trends that may exist within and between
cities and counties from pre to post-recession.

Sampling
Of the 410 cities that exist today, 405 of them were in existence in the year 2000.
Year 2000 socio-economic data is being used for this study. The 405 municipalities in the
state range in population from 10 (Lake Buena Vista) to 399,508 (Miami). The 65
counties in Florida range in population from 8,365 (Liberty) to 1,748,066 (Broward;
United States Census Bureau, 2010). Two of Florida’s counties - Miami-Dade and
Jacksonville-Duval – are being excluded due to their unique organizational structure that
resulted from charter amendments. Each county has evolved into different hybrids of
traditional city and county functions that do not fit the government type classification
approach used in this study. Including these two counties would distort the findings of the
analysis.
This component of the study will include the entire population of cities (405) and
counties (65) in Florida with N = 470. Since the entire population is included, there is no
need for the use of inferential statistics in Study #1 (Gliner, Morgan, & Leech, 2009).
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Analytical Method
Hypotheses are testable expectations based on general propositions (Babbie, 2010).
In order to test the hypotheses in this study, a means of measuring the change in
expenditures from pre to post-recession is required. Utilizing actual dollar amounts would
produce a wide distribution of values for the dependent variables based on the variation in
government size. In operationalizing the dependent variables by per-capita expenditures,
the element of population size of each unit of analysis has been incorporated into the
dependent variables and likely reduces the variation in the distribution.
Measuring the change in expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession is
central to both studies in this research. Table 9 identifies the method for hypothesis
testing in this research. The pre and post-recession percentage columns represent the
proportionate share for that policy group of the three policy groups combined. The
percentage change column is the increase or decrease that the proportionate share of
expenditures for that policy group change post-recession.

Analytical Framework
Each of the study hypotheses associated with Study #1 are discussed below with
the manner in which each will be tested. Decision criteria are provided to guide the data
analysis.
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Decision Criteria for the Descriptive Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The proportionate share of expenditures of all Florida local
governments for all three policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%,
indicating no significant difference in expenditure patterns as a result of the Great
Recession.
A summary of per-capita expenditure change table will be produced for all cities
and for all counties in the study population as one group. Measures of central tendency
and dispersion will be calculated for pre and post-recession results. The results will be
evaluated to identify similarities and/or differences between the two measurement periods.
The percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will be compared pre to postrecession to test the hypothesis. If any of the percentages for the three policy arenas in the
“Percent Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column exceed ± 10%, then the
hypothesis will be rejected.
Hypothesis 2: The proportionate share of expenditures for all cities for all three
policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant
difference in expenditure patterns.
Hypothesis 3: The proportionate share of expenditures for all counties for all three
policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant
difference in expenditure patterns.
Summary of expenditure change tables will be produced for all cities and for all
counties in the study population as two separate groups. Measures of central tendency and
dispersion will be calculated for pre and post-recession results for each group. The results
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will be evaluated to identify similarities and/or differences between the two groups. The
percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will be compared between groups
pre to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If any of the percentages for the three policy
arenas in the “Percent Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column exceed ±
10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
Hypothesis 4: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of charter
counties from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for non-charter counties.
Summary of expenditure change tables will be produced for charter counties and
non-charter counties as two separate groups. Measures of central tendency and dispersion
will be calculated for pre and post-recession results for each group. The results will be
evaluated to identify similarities and/or differences between the two groups. The
percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will be compared between groups
pre- to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If the percentage for developmental
expenditures in the “Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column is
< 10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
Hypothesis 5: The proportionate share of expenditures of Council-Manager cities
and Commission-Manager form counties for all three policy groups from pre to
post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant difference in expenditure
patterns.
Summary of expenditure change tables will be produced for Council-Manager
form cities and Commission-Manager form counties as two separate groups. Measures of
central tendency and dispersion will be calculated for pre and post-recession results for
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each group. The results will be evaluated to identify similarities and/or differences
between the two groups. The percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will
be compared between groups pre to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If any of the
percentages for the three policy arenas in the “Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to
Post Recession” column exceed ± 10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
Hypothesis 6: The proportionate share of redistributive expenditures of CouncilManager cities for from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for non-Council
Manager cities.
Summary of expenditure change tables will be produced for Council – Manager
cities and for all other forms of city government as two separate groups. Measures of
central tendency and dispersion will be calculated for pre- and post-recession results for
each group. The results will be evaluated to identify similarities and/or differences
between the two groups. The percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will
be compared between groups pre- to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If the
percentage for redistributive expenditures in the “Percentage Change from Pre-Recession
to Post-Recession” column is < 10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
Hypothesis 7: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of CouncilStrong Mayor form cities from pre- to post- recession is +10% of that for other
forms of city government.
Summary of expenditure change tables will be produced for Council-Strong Mayor
form cities and all other forms of city government as two separate groups. Measures of
central tendency and dispersion will be calculated for pre and post-recession results for
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each group. The results will be evaluated to identify similarities and/or differences
between the two groups. The percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will
be compared between groups pre to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If the percentage
for developmental expenditures in the “Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to PostRecession” column is < 10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.

The Explanatory Analysis - Study #2
This study is a repeated measure design where more than one measurement is
made for each local government over a period of time. In this study design, each
participating local government serves as its own control. Its advantage in research is that
the analysis can focus more on the effect of the intervention (Spatz, 2011). In this case,
the treatment, or intervention, is the Great Recession of 2008, a natural exogenous event.
There are three components to the analysis in Study #2. First, a series of repeated
measures t-tests will be conducted to understand the change in the mean per-capita
expenditures from pre to post-recession for the three policy arenas. The second
component of the analysis is the testing of hypotheses 8 through 15. Finally, an overall
model will result in three linear equations – one for each of the dependent variables. Each
uses the same data and similar, but not identical, analytical methods. The three
components comprise the explanatory component of this research.
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Sampling
Study #2 will include the total population of counties (N = 65) as defined by this
research, and a sample drawn from the 405 cities in the state. Including all 405 cities in
the explanatory analysis would likely skew the results given the large spread in population
and related service delivery functions. A review of the data for cities indicates that those
with very small resident population do not always have the full complement of services
compared with larger cities. In addition, cities with small resident populations do not have
consistent expenditure patterns conducive to this study. Given these factors, it was
determined that a minimum population size criterion is necessary. An examination of the
expenditure data indicates that cities with 2000 population below 5000 have a higher
incidence of missing values for expenditure groups. This is not an indication of irregular
data reporting, but is characteristic of smaller sized cities not providing the full
complement of services. Using the 2000 minimum population of 5000 would yield a
study sample of 197 cities out of a total population of 405 in Florida, or 48.6% of all
cities. The use of this type of non-probability sampling, called purposive or judgmental
sampling, is appropriate when the researcher has critical knowledge of the population and
the negative effect that random sampling of that population would have on the usefulness
of the study (Babbie, 2010).
The city sample of 197 added to the county population of 65 yields a total n for the
research of 262. A power analysis was conducted to test n = 262 for use in a multiple
linear regression model. Assuming a significance level of 0.05, 18 normally distributed
covariates, a minimum R2 of 0.10, and a power level of 80%, a minimum of n =192 would
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be required. The sample size in this study of n = 262 exceeds the minimum power
required to detect a specific alternative effect size (“Sample Size,” 2012).

Analytical Model: Paired-Samples t-Test
The first step in the explanatory component of the research involves comparing
the mean per-capita expenditures from before the Great Recession of 2008 to after. A
series of t-tests will be conducted on the entire group of local governments, as well as
groups defined by government type and form of government. The results can provide
insight into the variability of the data from before and after the recession.
There are general assumptions that apply to the utilization of the t-test. These
include:
1. Level of Measurement − the dependent variable must be measured on a
continuous basis;
2. Random Sampling – there must be a random sample from the
population;
3. Independence of Observations – each observation or measurement
must be independent of influence by another participant or measurement;
4. Normal Distribution – the scores for the dependent variables for the
study population are normally distributed; and
5. Homogeneity of Variance – the variability of the scores for each paired
group is similar.
Test – Levene’s test for equality of variance (Pallant, 2007).
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Analytical Method: Multiple Linear Regression
This study of the effect of the Great Recession on local government policy in
Florida requires an analytical tool that can measure the importance of the independent
variables in predicting changes in local government policy shift, expressed as the
percentage change in per-capita expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession, across
the three City Limits policy regimes. The best explanatory analytical tool to use in this
instance is multiple linear regression. This model is chosen to answer Research Question
4 and to test the associated hypotheses. Multiple regression allows for the exploration of
the interrelationship between several independent and control variables and a continuous
dependent variable. If the research design is based on sound theoretical principles, the
outcome of a linear regression model will provide a tool for predicting the dependent
variable (Spatz, 2011). The linear regression model also allows for the control of specific
independent variables when there is one normally distributed dependent variable (Gliner
et al., 2009; Pallant, 2007). The statistical software package selected to conduct the
multiple regression model is SPSS version 22.
In attempting to understand the relationship of the independent variables with the
three dependent variables, a regression model that is designed to find the best linear
relationships is desired. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is a statistical method
that assumes that the hypothesized relationships are linear. The objective of OLS is to
estimate the impact of predictors and the variance of the linear equation based on the data
(Pallant, 2007).
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Assumptions of Multiple Regression
OLS regression has assumptions about the data that must be met. The following
lists those assumptions with the corresponding test that will be conducted to confirm
compliance:
1. Multicollinearity – the independent variables and control variable
cannot be highly correlated (r = .9 and above);
Test - Correlation analysis (table) to identify those independent and
control variables that have a higher than acceptable correlation
coefficient.
2. Normality – normal distribution of residuals is required;
Tests – Q-Q Plots, skewness and kurtosis, Shapiro-Wilk
3. Linearity – residuals should be aligned in a straight line with the
predicted dependent variable scores;
Test – Scatterplots
4. Homoscedasticity – assumes that the variance of the residuals for all of
the predicted dependent variable scores is the same.
Test – Normal P-P Plot; scatterplots of residuals
5. Sample Size – in order to maintain generalizability of the findings, a
sample of sufficient size is necessary. Differences exist in the literature
regarding minimum size for multiple regression. This research has an n =
262 and is sufficient for use of the technique.
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6. Outliers – This technique is sensitive to outliers. Standardized residuals
will be tested for their influence on the model. Offending cases may be
removed.
Test – Mahalanobis Distance; Cook’s Distance. (Pallant, 2007)
If the results from the testing of the assumptions indicate a deviation from a
normal distribution, the use of a log transformation may be utilized to normalize the data.
An initial correlation matrix of all independent and control variables will be developed as
a data reduction strategy. If any two variables have a bivariate correlation of .7 or above,
those variables will be examined further and consideration will be given to eliminating
one of the variables from the model. For data reduction purposes, correlation coefficients
of .25 and below will be reviewed for potential elimination.
The results of the SPSS collinearity diagnostics for Tolerance and Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) will be utilized to determine any multicollinearity issues not
evident in the correlation matrix. A Tolerance value of < .10 or a VIF value of >10 for
any variable will be identified for further examination and consideration for removal
from the model (Pallant, 2007).

Statistical Inference in Multiple Regression
There are three steps to judging the output of a multiple linear regression model.
The first step is to examine the value of R2, the coefficient of determination, which will
indicate the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the
remaining independent and control variables included in the final model (Lewis-Beck,
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1986). This result is also known as goodness of fit. The higher the R2 score the better
the fit of the data to the model.
The second step of the output evaluation is to determine the statistical significance
of the results. The SPSS output includes the ANOVA output component of the multiple
linear regression analysis in the form of results for an F test. The F test indicates whether
the result of the regression analysis is statistically significant and the variation explained
in the model is not due to random error (Pallant, 2007).
The third and final step in evaluating the output of the multiple linear regression is
to determine the relative importance of each of the independent and control variables in
predicting the dependent variable. This is achieved first by evaluating the t-test for Betas
(β) for all of the variables remaining in the model to determine if the variables are
statistically significant at p < 0.05. Then an evaluation of the standardized coefficients
expressed as beta (β) for the remaining statistically significant predictor variables in the
final model will be conducted. The larger the Beta weight, the stronger the contribution
the variable is making to the explanation of the dependent variable(s), without regard for
the direction (±) of the relationship.
Standardized regression coefficients will be utilized in this study as opposed to
unstandardized coefficients or betas (β). The independent and control variables in the
study are expressed in a number of different measurement units. Unstandardized betas
(β) represent the relative importance of the regression variables in the various
measurement units. In order to better understand the relative importance that each
variable has on predicting the dependent variable, standardized betas will be utilized.
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Standardized coefficients are expressed in a common unit of measurement - standard
deviations. The standardized beta represents how many standard deviations the
dependent variable will change based on a one standard deviation change in the
independent variable (Menard, 2004).

Dummy Variables and Multiple Regression
There are numerous nominal variables in this research that require the use of
dummy variables to include them in the regression analysis. The inclusion of two or
more dummy variables creates complications because the binary variables are
mathematical functions of each other. This causes computational problems in the
regression analysis (Allen, 1997). This issue will be addressed by utilizing all but one of
the categories for the nominal variables.

Analytical Framework
Study #2 is an examination of the factors that might explain the changes in the
expenditure patterns of Florida’s local governments from pre to post-recession.
Hypotheses 8 through 16 are associated with this part of the study. The analytical
approach to the study and the decision criteria that will be used to test the hypotheses are
discussed below.

Procedure – Data Reduction
Utilizing the multiple regression module of version 22 of the SPSS statistical
software, a separate regression model will be run for each of the three dependent variables.
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For these three overall models, each of the dependent variables will be regressed against
only the control variables, to determine which of the control variables reach a level of
significance to be included in the final model. The results of these control models will
establish the base R2 and beta (β) levels for those control variables that reach a level of
significance (p < 0.05) to be further included in the analysis.
A second set of three models, one for each of the dependent variables, will be
created using only those control variables that were determined to be significant in the
first series of models, along with all of the independent variables. The resulting R2 and
beta levels for those variables reaching the level of significance (p < 0.05) for these three
models will be compared with the results of the three control models, to measure the effect
of the control variables and the difference that each of the independent variables had on
improving the R2 of these last three models. By regressing the control variables first, the
overall role of the independent variables in explaining the variance in the three dependent
variables can be evaluated when controlling for various factors (Pallant, 2007). The
resulting R2 values, p-values and beta weights will be recorded.

Procedure – Hypothesis Testing
The second analytic component of Study #2 is the testing of hypotheses 8 through
13. This component will utilize a simple regression analysis since the hypotheses address
the relationship between a single explanatory or predictor variable and a single dependent
variable. Three critical outputs from SPSS version 22 will guide the analysis and testing
of the hypotheses. First, the ANOVA results will be evaluated to determine if the model
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is significant (p < 0.05). Second, the adjusted R2 will be evaluated to identify the
proportion of the dependent variable explained by the predictor variable. Finally, the
standardized coefficient Beta will be evaluated to determine the level of change in the
dependent variable created by one standard deviation change in the predictor variable.

Decision Criteria for Explanatory Hypotheses
The following are the decision criterion for testing each of the hypotheses H8
through H16:
Hypothesis 8: Average household income is positively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change In Per Capita Allocational Expenditures will be
regressed against the variable Average Household Income utilizing the SPSS simple
linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and standardized Beta output will be
recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the
change in allocational expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the
variable Average Household Income. If the results indicate that the model is statistically
significant (p < 0.05) and the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Allocational
Expenditures is positive, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported.
Overall observations regarding the results of the model run will be discussed.
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Hypothesis 9: Average household income is negatively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures will be
regressed against the variable Average Household Income utilizing the SPSS simple
linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and standardized Beta output will be
recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the
change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the
variable Average Household Income. If the results indicate that the model is statistically
significant (p < 0.05) and the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Redistributive
Expenditures is negative, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported.
Overall observations regarding the results of the final stepwise model run will be
discussed.
Hypothesis 10: Population size is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures will
be regressed against the variable Total Population utilizing the SPSS simple linear
regression module. The R2, p-value, and standardized Beta output will be recorded. The
results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in
developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable
Total Population. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant (p <
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0.05) and the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures is
positive, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall
observations regarding the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.
Hypothesis 11: Population size is negatively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures will be
regressed against the variable Total Population utilizing the SPSS simple linear
regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the
model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in redistributive
expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Total
Population. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and
the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures is negative,
then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall observations
regarding the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.
Hypothesis 12: Population density is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Allocational Expenditures will be
regressed against the variable Population Density utilizing the SPSS simple linear
regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the
model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in redistributive
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expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Population
Density. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and the
relationship with the Change in Per Capita Allocational Expenditures is positive, then
there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall observations regarding
the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.
Hypothesis 13: Population density is negatively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures will be
regressed against the variable Population Density utilizing the SPSS simple linear
regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the
model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in redistributive
expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Population
Density. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and the
relationship with the Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures is negative, then
there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall observations regarding
the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.
Hypothesis 14: The Council-Strong Mayor form is positively associated with a
change in the proportionate share of local government developmental
expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures will
be regressed against the variable Form of City Government (all forms using dummy
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variable coding) utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value,
and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the
proportion of the variance in the change in developmental expenditures from pre to postrecession that is explained by the variable Form of City Government. If the results
indicate that the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) for the Council-Strong Mayor
Form, and the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures is
positive, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall
observations regarding the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.
Hypothesis 15: The Commission-Manager form of county government is
negatively associated with a change in the proportionate share of local
government developmental and redistributive expenditures from pre-recession to
post-recession.
The dependent variables Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures and
Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures will be regressed against the variable
Form of County Government (all forms using dummy variable coding) utilizing the SPSS
simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The
results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in
developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable
Form of County Government. If the results indicate that the model is statistically
significant (p < 0.05) for the Commission-Manager Form, and the relationship with the
Change in Per Capita Developmental and Redistributive Expenditures is negative, then
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there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall observations regarding
the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.
Hypothesis 16: Home rule charter counties are positively associated with a change
in the proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from
pre-recession to post-recession.
The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures will
be regressed against the variable Home Rule Charter (using dummy variable coding)
utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output
will be recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the
variance in the change in developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession that is
explained by the variable Home Rule Charter. If the results indicate that the model is
statistically significant (p < 0.05) for the variable Home Rule Charter, and the
relationship with the Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures is positive, then
there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported. Overall observations regarding
the results of the final stepwise model run will be discussed.

Resulting Linear Equations – Final Predictive Models
The multiple linear regression approach assumes that the relationship between the
dependent variable (Y) and the independent variables (X1, X2, …) is linear, as long as an
unobserved variable (∑) is included to address random error. Each variable will have a
resulting regression coefficient (β), which represents the weighted significance for that
specific predictor variable. The symbol α is used to depict the regression constant that is
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a product of the model output. As a result, the linear regression equation (Spatz, 2011)
takes the following form:
Y = α +β1X1 + β2X2 +… +∑
Three final linear regression equations will result from this analysis. These will be the
predictive models for the three dependent variables.

Summary of Model Specifications for the Testing of Hypotheses
The use of descriptive statistics and two methods of regression analysis will
provide the ability to answer the research questions and hypotheses presented in this
research. A robust database will be constructed to support the needs of the study as well
as provide additional insight into the behavior of local governments as a result of the Great
Recession of 2008. The findings and conclusions of the descriptive study and the
hypothesis testing, as well as any other ancillary findings will be reported in a systematic
and orderly fashion.

Study Limitations
The financial database that is being used in this research is assembled by the State
of Florida pursuant to statutory requirements. The value of the historical consistency of
the aggregation and classification of the data cannot be underestimated. Without benefit
of this existing data, the magnitude of collecting the information would render this study
impractical. However, there are modest nuances in the data that reflect how the State of
Florida has chosen to mandate the coding of expenditures. For instance, pension benefit
payments are classified as Account Code 518, which falls under the General Government
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category. In so doing, a significant personnel expense is aggregated as a general
government expense, and not distributed amongst the different governmental functions.
Therefore, the pension expenses of police and fire personnel are captured in General
Government, and not in Public Safety. Since this is consistent amongst all governments in
the database, it does not present an internal validity issue. In addition, both General
Government and Public Safety are categorized as Allocational under the City Limits
typology. The pension expenses of other governmental employees in the Developmental
and Redistributive policy areas are accounted for in the Allocational policy expenditures.
This will tend to inflate Allocational expenditures over what is actually occurring in cities
and counties.
There may also be instances where specific services are provided through
interlocal agreement or other cooperative mechanisms that may not be reflected in the
financial data reported to the State of Florida. The level of data collection necessary to
uncover these anomalies is well beyond the scope of this study but provides an
opportunity to advance this research further.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This research examines the behavior of Florida’s local governments in response to
the Great Recession of 2008 by using per-capita expenditure data categorized by
Peterson’s (1981) City Limits typology - developmental, allocational and redistributive
expenditures. This research is comprised of two distinct studies – one descriptive and the
other explanatory. This chapter presents the findings and results of Study #1 – the
Descriptive Study.

The Study Population
The Descriptive Study population consists of a total of 470 local governments –
65 counties and 405 cities. There are a total of 477 cities and counties in existence in
Florida today - 67 counties and 410 cities. Two counties, Miami-Dade and JacksonvilleDuval were eliminated due to their unique form of government and whose data would
skew the findings of the research. The number of cities included in this study is 405, or
five less than the 410 that exist today. During this study’s pre and post-recession
measurement periods, there were 405 cities that reported complete data. Five cities have
been eliminated from
consideration in the analysis due to not being in existence during both measurement
periods. Four of these cities were newly created municipalities established during the
study measurement periods and did not report complete data. The merger of two existing
cities into a single municipality created the fifth city. As a result, the Descriptive Study
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population size is 470, comprised of 405 cities and 65 counties.
Prior to examining characteristics of the data, an overview of the characteristics of
the study population is warranted. Table 9 displays the distribution of the study
population by type and form of government.
Table 9
Composition of Descriptive Study Population by Type and Form
of Government

Counties

Frequency

Share of All Local
Governments

Commission
(County)

10

2.1%

Commission
Executive

1

0.2%

Commission
Manager

54

11.5%

Sub-Total

65

13.8%

3

0.6%

268

57.0%

Council-Strong
Mayor

49

10.4%

Council-Weak
Mayor

83

17.8%

2

0.4%

Sub-Total

405

86.2%

Total

470

100.0%

Commission
(City)
CouncilManager
Cities

Hybrid

The Council-Manager form city is the predominant local government structure in
the state, making up more than half (57%) of the entire study population. The
Commission Manager form is the predominant form of county government in Florida.
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Analysis of the Dependent Variables
The data used for the Descriptive Study is paired for each local government from
the two measurement periods. Pre-recession data (FY06-08) is matched with postrecession data (FY09-11) to form matched pairs. Each of the three dependent variables
in this Descriptive Study – percentage change in per-capita expenditures for
developmental, allocational and redistributive purposes) was then calculated by
comparing the paired data from the two measurement periods for each local government.
Complete data (n = 470) is reported for two of the three dependent variables in the study.
Table 10 shows the study population reporting complete data to allow for the calculation
of each dependent variable.
Table 10
Local Governments Reporting Data by Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable
Type of Government

City
County
Total

% Change in
Developmental
Expenditures

% Change in
Allocational
Expenditures

% Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures

n

405

405

95

% Of Total
n
% Of Total
n
% Of Total

86.2
65
13.8
470
100.0

86.2
65
13.8
470
100.0

59.4
65
40.6
160
100.0
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Table 10 shows the 470 local governments in the Descriptive Study based on the
reporting of complete matched pair data used to calculate each dependent variable. All
470 local governments reported complete data for developmental and allocational
expenditures. Only 160 of the 470 local governments reported complete data for the third
dependent variable – (percent change in redistributive expenditures). This represents
34% of all local governments in this study. All 65 counties reported complete data for all
three dependent variables.
Only 95 of the 405 cities in the Descriptive Study reported complete paired data
for the dependent variable percent change in redistributive expenditures. This represents
23.5% (95/405) of the total population of cities in this study. Most of the cities in the
state did not make redistributive expenditures during the two measurement periods in this
study. This finding is likely due to the different roles that counties and cities have played
in the provision of various social and human services in the history of the US and in
Florida. City governments have historically existed for the interests and convenience of
their residents. County government have historically existed to oversee the
administration of specified state responsibilities, including civil administration, finance,
education, and provision for the poor (Martin, 1993). It is this historic role difference
that explains the vast majority of redistributive services made by local governments in
Florida have been the responsibility county governments. This historic difference also
explains why the majority of Florida’s municipalities reported no expenditures in this
City Limits category for this study’s measurement periods.
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Findings for the Descriptive Hypotheses
The results of the testing of the Descriptive hypotheses were derived from the
comparison of means of the paired data for each of the dependent variables. It is not
necessary to conduct parametric statistical tests to determine the statistical significance of
the comparison of means between the two measurement periods. Since this first study is
analyzing the entire population of local governments in Florida, any differences in means
from T1 (pre-recession) to T2 (post-recession) are real and not an artifact of sampling
error. Consequently, the use of parametric statistics is not required.
Each of the study hypotheses associated with this Descriptive Study are presented
below along with the decision criteria to guide the data analysis. The results are
generated through a comparison of pre-recession to post-recession mean percentage
expenditures for the applicable dependent variable(s). The following is a discussion of
the findings.

Hypothesis 1 – All Local Governments
Hypothesis 1 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
expenditures for all three dependent variables for all 470 local governments in Florida.
Hypothesis 1: The proportionate share of expenditures of all Florida local
governments for all three policy groups from pre to post- recession is within ±
10%, indicating no significant difference in expenditure patterns as a result of the
Great Recession.

121

Decision Criteria: If any of the percentages for the three policy arenas in the
“Percent Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column exceed ± 10%,
then the hypothesis will be rejected.

The data for analyzing Hypothesis 1 is derived from the mean of each of the
expenditure policy groups as a proportion of the total expenditures for a single population
of local governments (cities and counties, n = 470) for each of the measurement periods.
The paired sample data was analyzed to compare the pre and post-recession means for the
entire population of local governments. Table 11 displays the results for Hypothesis 1.
Table 11
Change in Proportional Share of Expenditures by Policy Group for All Cities and
Counties
Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
(T2)

Mean % of
Change

Standard
Deviation

N

Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
(TI)

(T1-T2)

(T1 – T2)

Developmental

470

40.5

41.1

0.6

.088

Allocational

470

58.6

57.9

-0.7

.088

Redistributive

160

2.5

2.8

0.3

.022

Expenditure
Policy Group

The mean percentage change from pre to post-recession for each of the three City
Limits policy groups is less than 1%, illustrating a level of stability in the profile of local
governmental expenditures from pre to post-recession. This modest expenditure pattern
change (< ± 1%) exhibited by the study population for each of the expenditure policy
groups supports the existence of budgetary incrementalism between the measurement
periods in this study. The lack of significant shifts in the proportional share of
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expenditures amongst the City Limits policy arenas is indicative of organizations seeking
stability in resource allocation and relying on previous spending patterns as legitimate
public policy (Boyne et al., 2000; Breunig & Koski, 2012; Davis et al., 1966; Lewis,
1984).
The decision criteria established for testing Hypothesis 1 requires an examination
of the percentage change from pre-recession to post-recession for all three expenditure
policy groups. If the results for any of the three expenditure policy groups shown in the
“Percentage Change from Pre to Post-Recession” column exceed ± 10%, then the
hypothesis would not be supported. Since none of the percentages exceed the decision
criteria, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
This finding is consistent with the majority of the research in the literature that
local governments seek to stabilize their policy environment during times of fiscal stress
(Baker, 2011; Hoene & Pagano, 2009; Levine et al., 1981; Lewis, 1984; Wolman, 1980,
1982). This is one of the key attributes of Lindbloom’s (1959) theory of budgetary
incrementalism.

Hypothesis 2 – All Cities
Hypothesis 2 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
expenditures for all three dependent variables for all 405 cities in Florida during the study
measurement periods.
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Hypothesis 2: The proportionate share of expenditures for all cities for all three
policy groups from pre to post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant
difference in expenditure patterns.
Decision Criteria: If any of the percentages for the three policy arenas in the
“Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column exceed ±
10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.

The data for testing Hypothesis 2 is derived from the mean of each of the
expenditure policy groups as a proportion of the total expenditures for all cities (cities, n =
405) for each of the measurement periods. The paired sample data was analyzed to
compare the pre and post-recession means for all cities. Table 12 displays the results for
Hypothesis 2.
Table 12
Change in Proportional Share of Expenditures by Policy Group for All Cities
Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
(T2)

Mean % of
Change

Standard
Deviation

N

Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
(TI)

(T1-T2)

(T1 – T2)

Developmental

405

41.4

42.4

1.0

.092

Allocational

405

58.3

58.3

-1.0

.092

Redistributive

95

1.3

1.3

0.2

.018

Expenditure
Policy Group

The mean changes in proportional share of total spending for both the
developmental and allocational categories approximate 1%. However, the direction of
the mean change in developmental expenditures is positive, reflecting an increase in the
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post-recession proportional share of overall expenditures. The mean change in
allocational expenditures is negative, indicating a reduction in the percentage of overall
expenditures for the post-recession period. The mean change for redistributive
expenditures is positive at 0.2 5. The mean changes for all three City Limits policy
expenditure groups for cities reflect very slight expenditure pattern changes between
negative and positive 1%. This finding of slight adjustments to the proportionate share of
expenditure categories for Florida city governments supports the existence of budgetary
incrementalism between the two measurement periods in this study.
The decision criteria established for testing Hypothesis 2 requires an examination
of the percentage change from pre-recession to post-recession for all three expenditure
policy groups. If the results for any of the three expenditure policy groups shown in the
“Percentage Change from Pre to Post-Recession” column exceed ± 10%, then the
hypothesis would not be supported. Since none of the percentages exceed the decision
criteria, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
The results show that the proportional change amongst the expenditure policy
groups remains relatively stable from pre to post-recession. This confirms the presence of
incrementalism throughout the study period. The scale of the shift between groups of less
than 10% is consistent with the finding of incrementalism in prior work presented in the
literature (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; LeLoup, 1978; Wildavsky, 1974).
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Hypothesis 3 – All Counties
Hypothesis 3 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
expenditures for all three dependent variables for the 65 counties included in this study.
Hypothesis 3: The proportionate share of expenditures for all counties for all three
policy groups from pre to post- recession is within ± 10%, indicating no
significant difference in expenditure patterns.
Decision Criteria: If any of the percentages for the three policy arenas in the
“Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column exceed ±
10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
The data for testing Hypothesis 3 is derived from the mean of each of the
expenditure policy groups as a proportion of the total expenditures for all counties (N =
65) for each of the measurement periods. The paired sample data was analyzed to
compare the pre and post-recession means for all counties. Table 13 displays the results
for Hypothesis 3.
Table 13
Change in Proportional Share of Expenditures by Policy Group for All Counties

Expenditure
Policy Group

N

Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
(TI)

Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
(T2)

Mean % of
Change

Standard
Deviation

(T1-T2)

(T1 – T2)

Developmental

65

35.4

33.2

-2.2

.047

Allocational

65

60.4

62.1

-1.7

.053

Redistributive

65

4.2

4.7

0.5

.028
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The mean change for the developmental and allocational categories for counties
approximates 2%. However, the direction of the change for developmental expenditures
is negative, reflecting a decrease in the post-recession proportional share of overall
expenditures. The mean of the change in allocational expenditures is positive, indicating
an increase in the percentage of overall expenditures for counties post-recession. This
finding is in direct contrast to the findings for cities in Hypothesis 2. The data indicate
that as groups, cities and counties shifted their developmental and allocational
expenditures in opposite directions between the two measurement periods. This finding
might be explained when the evolving role of county government in Florida is considered.
Twenty of Florida’s counties have adopted home rule charters, breaking away from the
traditional constitutional role. Eighteen of those counties are included in this study
population (n = 65). When counties adopt home rule charters, they are better capable of
providing services to meet the demands of a growing metropolitan, unincorporated
population addressing similar issues that face Florida’s cities (Benton, 2002; McCabe,
2000). The majority of counties still operate without the benefit of a charter and function
in the traditional constitutional role, differentiating their expenditure priorities from cities.
The role of the form of county government in explaining differences in expenditures from
pre to post-recession is explored further in Chapter 6 – Results of the Explanatory Study.
In contrast to the divergence in developmental and allocational expenditures,
counties and cities shared similar scale and direction of the mean change in redistributive
expenditures between the measurement periods. The mean change in county redistributive
expenditures was positive at 0.5%.
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The decision criteria established for testing Hypothesis 3 requires an examination
of the percentage change from pre-recession to post-recession for all three expenditure
policy groups. If the results for any of the three expenditure policy groups shown in the
“Percentage Change from Pre to Post-Recession” column exceed ± 10%, then the
hypothesis would not be supported. Since none of the percentages exceed the decision
criteria, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Similar to the results for Hypothesis 2 (cities), these results for counties show that
the proportional change amongst the expenditure policy groups remains relatively stable
from pre to post-recession. The scale of the shift between policy expenditure groups of
less than 10% confirms the presence of incrementalism through the study period. The
scale of these changes in proportional spending is identified as incremental in prior work
presented in the literature (Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; LeLoup, 1978; Wildavsky,
1974).

Hypothesis 4 – Charter vs. Non-Charter Counties
Hypothesis 4 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
developmental expenditures for the 65 counties included in this study based on their
home rule charter status.
Hypothesis 4: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of charter
counties from pre to post-recession is ±10% of that for non-charter counties.
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Decision Criteria: If the percentage for developmental expenditures in the
“Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column is < 10%,
then the hypothesis will be rejected.

The data for testing Hypothesis 4 is derived from the mean of the developmental
expenditure policy group as a proportion of the total expenditures for non-charter counties
(n = 47) and charter counties (n = 18) for each of the measurement periods. The paired
sample data was analyzed to compare the pre and post-recession means for developmental
expenditures as a percentage of overall spending for all counties based on their charter
status. Table 14 displays the results for Hypothesis 4.
Table 14
Change in Proportional Share of Developmental Expenditures as a Percentage of Total
Expenditures for All Counties by Charter/Non-Charter Status

Developmental
Expenditure
Policy Group

n

Mean PreRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

Charter Counties

18

34.4

Mean Post-Recession
% of Total
Expenditures

Mean %
Change
from Pre to
PostRecession

32.8

-1.6

Difference in
Change (%)

0.70%
Non-Charter
Counties

47

35.7

33.4

-2.3

The results shown in Table 14 demonstrate that charter counties reduced their
developmental expenditures as a proportion of overall spending less than non-charter
counties between the two measurement periods. This direction is consistent with
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hypothesized relationship established in Hypothesis 4. The difference between the
changes in the means for the two forms of government was 0.7%.
The decision criteria established for testing Hypothesis 4 requires an examination
of the percentage change of the mean from pre-recession to post-recession for
developmental expenditures of charter and non-charter counties. If the results for the
developmental expenditure policy groups shown in the “Percentage Change from Pre to
Post-Recession” column exceed ± 10%, then the hypothesis would not be supported. The
results of the analysis indicate that non-charter counties reduced their developmental
expenditures as a percentage of overall spending greater than charter counties between
the two measurement periods. However, the difference in the change between the two
types of counties was only 0.7%. Since the difference between the groups is less than
10%, Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Although the Hypothesis was not supported, these results demonstrate that charter
counties favor developmental expenditures in this study more than non-charter counties,
and perhaps acting more similar, but not identical, to cities. This finding might be
explained by the similarity in service delivery challenges facing charter counties and
cities in Florida. Large unincorporated areas with growing populations with increasing
demands for municipal type services are characteristic of Florida’s charter counties
(Benton, 2002; McCabe, 2000).
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Hypothesis 5 – Council-Manager Cities and Commission-Manager Counties
Hypothesis 5 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
expenditures for all three dependent variables for all Council-Manager form cities (n =
268) and Commission-Manager form counties (n = 54) in Florida during the study
measurement periods.
Hypothesis 5: The proportionate share of expenditures of Council-Manager cities
and Commission-Manager form counties for all three policy groups from pre to
post-recession is within ± 10%, indicating no significant difference in expenditure
patterns.
Decision Criteria: If any of the percentages for the three policy arenas in the
“Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to Post-Recession” column exceed ±
10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
The data for testing Hypothesis 5 is derived from the mean of each of the
expenditure policy groups as a proportion of the total expenditures for Council Manager
cities and Commission Manager form counties for each of the measurement periods. The
two groups compared in this Hypothesis share a common trait in their form of
government. They are professionally managed with elected officials serving in a policy
making role with professional staff executing policy directives and overseeing various
administrative functions (Jewett, 2010). The paired sample data was analyzed to compare
the pre and post-recession means for all expenditure policy groups for all CouncilManager cities and Commission-Manager counties. Table 15 displays the results for
Hypothesis 5.
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The direction of the changes in the means for these two forms of government for
all three expenditure categories are consistent with the results for all cities and counties, as
shown in hypotheses 1 through 3 above. Cities increased the proportionate share of
development expenditures and reduced the proportion of allocational expenditures. The
opposite was true for counties. Table 15 shows that same trend continued when
comparing the means for those two expenditure categories for these two forms of
government.
Table 15
Change in Proportional Share of Expenditures by Policy Group for Council-Manager
Cities and Commission-Manager Counties

n

Mean PreRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

Mean PostRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

% Change
from Pre to
PostRecession

Council-Manager. Cities

268

40.9

41.4

0.5

Commission-Manager
Counties

54

33.7

31.8

-1.9

Council-Manager Cities

268

58.7

58.1

-0.6

Commission-Manager
Counties

54

62.3

63.7

1.4

Council-Manager Cities

67

1.3

1.6

0.3

Commission-Manager
Counties

54

4.1

4.4

0.3

Expenditure Policy Group
by Form of Government

Difference
in Change
(%)

Developmental
2.4

Allocational
2.0

Redistributive
0.0

Commission-Manager counties and Council-Manager cities showed a similar
increase in the mean proportionate share for redistributive expenditures between the two
measurement periods. The increase for Council-Manager cities runs slightly higher at
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0.3% than the findings for Hypothesis 2 (all cities) where redistributive expenditures as a
share of total spending increased 0.2% from pre-recession to post-recession. These two
forms of government showed the same size and direction of change in proportional
expenditures for redistributive spending as compared to the larger city and county
populations. Council-Manager cities showed a slightly higher change (0.3%) than all
cities (0.2%) as determined in Hypothesis 2. Commission-Manager counties exhibited a
smaller change (0.3%) than all counties (0.5%) as demonstrated in the results for testing of
Hypothesis 3.
The testing results for this hypothesis reflect a similar pattern of size and direction
of change in proportional expenditures for all cities and counties. This raises the
possibility that the form of government may not be as influential on the change in the
proportional share of City Limits policy group expenditures from pre to post-recession as
other factors such as the type of government. Further consideration of this finding will be
analyzed in Study #2 – the Explanatory Study.
The decision criteria established for testing Hypothesis 5 requires an examination
of the percentage change from pre-recession to post-recession for all three City Limits
expenditure policy groups between Council Manager cities and Commission Manager
counties. The comparison of changes in the proportion of expenditures between the two
groups over the two measurement periods indicate that the difference in all three City
Limits policy groups fall within the ± 10% decision criteria established for Hypothesis 5.
Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is supported.
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Hypothesis 6 – Council-Manager Form Cities vs. All Other Forms of City Government
Hypothesis 6 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
redistributive expenditures for all Council-Manager form cities (n = 67) and all nonCouncil-Manager form cities (n = 28) in Florida during the study measurement periods.
Hypothesis 6: The proportionate share of redistributive expenditures of CouncilManager cities for from pre to post-recession is +10% of that for non-Council
Manager cities.
Decision Criteria: The percentage of redistributive expenditures will be compared
between groups pre to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If the percentage for
redistributive expenditures in the “Percentage Change from Pre-Recession to PostRecession” column is < 10%, then the hypothesis will be rejected.
The data for testing Hypothesis 6 is derived from the mean of the redistributive
expenditure policy group as a proportion of the total expenditures for Council Manager
cities and all other cities (non-Council-Manager cities) for each of the measurement
periods. The paired sample data was analyzed to compare the pre and post-recession
means for redistributive expenditures for Council-Manager cities and non-CouncilManager cities. Table 16 displays the results for Hypothesis 6.
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Table 16
Change in Proportional Share of Redistributive Expenditures for Council-Manager and
Non-Council-Manager Cities

n

Mean PreRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

Mean PostRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

% Change
from Pre to
PostRecession

Council-Manager Cities

67

1.3

1.6

0.3

Non-Council Manager
Cities

28

1.2

1.1

-0.1

Expenditure Policy Group
by Form of Government

Difference
in Change
(%)

Redistributive
0.4

The results indicate that Council-Manager cities increased redistributive
expenditures between the two measurement periods by a proportionate 0.3% of total
expenditures. Non Council-Manager cities slightly reduced proportionate expenditures by
0.1%. The hypothesized relationship between these two sub-groups of cities assumed that
the Council-Manager form of city government would exhibit a larger increase in the
change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession than non-CouncilManager cities. The results indicate that the hypothesized direction of the relationship is
confirmed.
The decision criteria established for testing Hypothesis 6 requires an examination
of the percentage change from pre-recession to post-recession for redistributive
expenditures of Council-Manager cities and Non Council-Manager cities. The
comparison of changes in the mean expenditures between the two groups over the two
measurement periods indicate that the difference in the City Limits redistributive
expenditures between the two forms of city governments is 0.4%, which is below the ±
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percent minimum decision criteria established for Hypothesis 6. While the direction of
the findings is consistent with the Hypothesis, the strength of the difference falls short of
what was predicted. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is not supported.

Hypothesis 7 - Council-Strong Mayor Form Cities vs. All Other Forms of City
Government
Hypothesis 7 requires the examination of the change in proportional share of
developmental expenditures for all Council-Strong Mayor form cities (n = 49) and all
non-Council-Strong Mayor for cities (n = 356) in Florida during the study measurement
periods.
Hypothesis 7: The proportionate share of developmental expenditures of CouncilStrong Mayor form cities from pre to post-recession is ± 10% of that for other
forms of city government.
Decision Criteria: The percentage of expenditures for the three policy arenas will
be compared between groups pre to post-recession to test the hypothesis. If the
percentage for developmental expenditures in the “Percentage Change from PreRecession to Post-Recession” column is < 10%, then the hypothesis will be
rejected.
The data for testing Hypothesis 7 is derived from the mean of the developmental
expenditure policy group as a proportion of the total expenditures for Council-Strong
Mayor form cities and all other cities (Non Council-Strong Mayor form cities) for each of
the measurement periods. The paired sample data was analyzed to compare the pre and
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post-recession means for redistributive expenditures for Council-Manager cities and non
Council-Manager cities. Table 17 displays the results for Hypothesis 7.
The findings from Hypothesis 2 (all cities) indicated that the mean change in the
proportion of all expenditures that were developmental increased between the
measurement periods for all cities by 1.0%. Table 17 indicates that Council-Strong Mayor
forms of city governments, on average, increased proportional spending on developmental
activities more than other forms of city government between the measurement periods.
That difference was just a modest 0.2%. This finding is consistent with direction of the
relationship predicted in Hypothesis 7.
Table 17
Change in Proportional Share of Developmental Expenditures for Council-Strong Mayor
Cities and Non-Council-Strong Mayor Cities

Expenditure Policy Group
by Form of Government
Developmental
Council-Strong Mayor
Cities
Non-Council Strong Mayor
Cities

n

Mean PreRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

Mean PostRecession % of
Total
Expenditures

% Change
from Pre to
PostRecession

49

39.1

40.2

1.1

356

41.7

42.6

0.9

Difference
in Change
(%)

0.2

The decision criteria established for testing hypothesis 7 requires an examination
of the proportional change in developmental expenditures as a share of overall spending
for Council-Strong Mayor form cities and Non Council-Strong Mayor form cities. The
comparison of changes in mean proportionate share of developmental expenditures
between the two groups over the two measurement periods indicates that the difference is
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0.2%. This is below the hypothesized ± 10% decision criteria established for this
hypothesis. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is not supported.

Summary of Hypothesis Testing
The findings for the testing of the Hypotheses in Study #1, the Descriptive Study,
are summarized in Table 18.
The results for the testing of the hypotheses in this chapter begin to indicate how
Florida’s local governments responded to the Great Recession of 2008. When all local
governments are considered as a single group as in Hypothesis 1, there is an increase
(.6%) in spending in the developmental policy category which is offset by a
corresponding decrease (-.7%) in allocational expenditures. Mean redistributive
expenditures increased only modestly (.3%) from T1 to T2.
However, when the type of government is examined in hypotheses 2 and 3, a pattern
begins to emerge which illustrates real differences between cities and counties. Cities
increased their proportional share of developmental spending by 1.0% and reduced their
allocational spending by the same amount (-1.0%), displaying the pro-developmental
characteristic of cities espoused by Peterson (1981). Counties exhibited the opposite
tendency from pre to post-recession. Counties reduced their developmental spending (2.2%) and increased their allocational (1.7%) and redistributive expenditures (.5%),
displaying a much different response from T1 to T2.
Further examination of the data indicates other differences between the two types
of governments. When comparing the proportional share of spending among the three
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policy arenas, the overall distribution of spending between the types of government is
different. Cities spent 6% more on a proportional basis for developmental activities than
counties in T1 (41.4% vs. 35.4%) and 9.2% more in T2 (42.4% vs. 33.2%). Counties
spent 2.1% more than cities for allocational expenditures in T1 (60.4% vs. 58.3%) and
4.8% more during T2 (62.1% vs. 57.3%). There is also a difference between cities and
counties in the proportional share for redistributive expenditures of total spending.
Counties spent 2.9% more than cities in T1 (4.2% vs. 1.3%). This difference remained
nearly the same at 3.0% in T2 (4.5% vs. 1.5%).
This discussion of proportional spending in the two measurement periods
indicates that cities and counties in Florida had different spending models based on the
City Limits typology. In the pre-recession measurement period, both types of
governments spent a majority of their funds on allocational expenditures. Cities made a
higher share of expenditures on developmental policy matters while counties favored
redistributive activities. In the post-recession measurement period, this difference in
spending patterns between the two was amplified with counties increasing the share of
spending for allocational matters and cities doing the same for developmental activities.
The relative share of redistributive spending remained constant from T1 to T2 when
comparing cities and counties.
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Table 18
Summary of the Results for Hypothesis Testing in Descriptive Study
Hypothesis

H1

H2

H3

Subject
Change in % of
all three
expenditure
categories
Change in % of
all three
expenditure
categories
Change in % of
all three
expenditure
categories

Group(s)

Hypothesized Result

Result

All Local
Governments

% Change for each
category is within ±
10%

Supported

All Cities

% Change for each
category is within ±
10%

Supported

All Counties

% Change for each
category is within ±
10%

Supported

H4

Change in % of
developmental
expenditures

Charter and NonCharter Counties

% Change for Charter
Counties > 10% for
Non-Charter Counties

Not Supported

H5

Change in % of
developmental
expenditures

Council-Manager
Cities and
CommissionManager
Counties

% Change is within ±
10%

Supported

H6

Change in % of
redistributive
expenditures

Council-Manager
Cities and Non
Council-Manager
Cities

% Change is > 10%

Not Supported

H7

Compare
Changes in %
developmental
expenditures

Council-Strong
Mayor cities and
Non Council
Strong Mayor
cities

% Change for
Council-Strong Mayor
Cities is > 10%

Not Supported

This finding indicates that by utilizing Peterson’s City Limits typology as a
theoretical framework, expenditure data can be instrumental in deciphering policy
differences between the two types of local governments. The typology can be used to
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measure the policy changes or ‘shifts’ made in response to a significant natural event
such as the Great Recession of 2008. This is an application of Peterson’s (1981) theory
that has not been utilized before in the literature.
The Explanatory Study in Chapter 6 is designed to further explore and identify the
underlying reasons why the policy differences identified in this Descriptive Study
occurred between Florida’s local governments from pre to post-recession.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY STUDY

There are three components to the analysis in Study #2. First, an analysis will be
conducted to understand the change in the mean per-capita expenditures from pre to postrecession for the three City Limits policy arenas. The second component of the analysis is
the testing of hypotheses 8 through 15. Finally, three final overall models are constructed
and evaluated– one for each of the dependent variables. The results for the final models
are shown in Chapter 7. These three components comprise the Explanatory Study
component of this research.

The Study Sample
The study sample consists of a total of 262 local governments. This represents all
counties included in this research (n = 65) and a sample of Florida’s 410 cities. The cities
included (n = 197) are those whose population exceeded 5000 in the 2000 U.S. Census.
The number of cases in this study (n = 262) exceeds the 192 cases required by the power
analysis.

Descriptive Statistics
The composition of the independent variables in this component of the study is
shown in Table 19. There are a total of eight different forms of government
classifications representing all of Florida’s 470 local governments that were included in
the earlier Descriptive Study in Chapter 5. Table 19 shows that two forms of local
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government dominate this Explanatory Study sample - Council-Manager form cities and
Commission-Manager form counties. Collectively, they comprise close to 90% of all of
the 262 local governments. Since three of the forms of government – Commission City,
Hybrid City, and Commission-Executive County - have only one instance in this study
sample, they have been eliminated from this analysis. This leaves five forms of
government to be analyzed.
Table 19
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
% Of Cases
Variable
City

N

(N = 262)

197

75.2

65

24.8

175

66.8

Council-Strong Mayor Form City

14

5.3

Council-Weak Mayor Form City

6

2.3

Commission-Manager Form County

54

20.6

Commission Form County

10

3.8

262

100.0

County
Council-Manager Form City

County Charter

The independent variable ‘Charter County’ is shown as having 262 cases. There
are only 18 charter counties in Florida. If a municipality was located within a charter
county, the variable was coded as ‘yes’ to explore the relationship between charter county
status and municipal expenditures. Therefore, all 262 cases had a value for this variable.
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Descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables for the study sample (n =
262) are shown in Table 20.
Table 20
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables
% Change in
% Change in
Developmental Allocational
Expenditures
Expenditures
(n = 262)
(n = 262)
No Data
Mean
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis

0
-0.005
0.063
-0.764
6.42

% Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures
(n = 134)

0
0.0035
0.064
0.739
6.03

128
0.0028
0.021
4.915
44.35

All local governments included in this study reported complete expenditure data
for two of the three dependent variables for both measurement periods – developmental
and allocational expenditures. Table 20 shows that nearly half of the 262 local
governments (129) had no data for redistributive expenditures. All 129 of these
governments are cities. The original data collected from the State of Florida indicated
that these cities did not have any redistributive expenditures in either of the two
measurement periods.

Comparing Group Means
The first analytical component of Study #2 calls for comparing the mean percapita expenditures for each of the City Limits expenditure categories between the two
measurement periods. The initial research design called for the use of the paired sample
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t-test to analyze the data for three separate grouping of the cases - all local governments
as a single group, a group based on type of government, and the third group analyzed by
form of government. There are general assumptions that apply to the utilization of the
paired sample t-test. One of those assumptions is that the data for the dependent
variables is normally distributed (Gliner et al., 2009; Pallant, 2007).

Assessing Normality
Table 20 displays the outcome of testing of the distribution of each of the
dependent variables in the study. Measures of skewness and kurtosis are indicators of
normality when the scores fall between -2 and +2 (Pallant, 2007). In the case of kurtosis,
all three distributions fall outside the acceptable range to be considered a normal
distribution. The same is true for the skewness for the percent change in redistributive
expenditures distribution. These findings were confirmed utilizing a number of other
tests used to assess the normality of the distribution of data. These include comparing the
mean and 5% trimmed mean, review of Q-Q plots, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic
(Pallant, 2007). In addition, histograms with a normal distribution curve overlay
provided visual confirmation of the statistical results.
These findings led to the conclusion that the t-test requirement for a normal
distribution for all three dependent variables could not be attained in order to utilize one
common parametric test. Therefore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
matched pairs test was selected to compare the means between the various groups in this
study. The Wilcoxon test is used when there has been a violation of the assumption of
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normality when comparing group means from the effect of a single independent variable
with two levels (Gliner et al., 2009). In this instance, the independent variable would be
considered time, with the pre-recession measurement period (FY06-08) being T1 and the
post-recession measurement (FY09-11) period being T2.

Analysis of All Local Governments as a Single Group
The mean proportion of total expenditures for the three City Limits policy groups
for the pre-recession period FY06-08 (T1) was compared to the mean proportion of total
expenditures for the post-recession period FY09-11 (T2) for all local governments (n =
262). The results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks matched pairs test are shown in Table 21.
Table 21
Changes in Mean Expenditures from T1 to T2 for All Local Governments

Expenditure Policy Group
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2
* p < .05

N
262
262
134

Mean % of Total
Expenditures
39.68
39.18
58.88
59.23
2.82
3.10

% Change
from T1T2
- 0.50
0.35
0.28

Standard
Deviation
0.13796
0.13924
0.13657
0.13780
0.04757
0.05433

p
.235
.507
.238

Two of the three expenditure policy groups – allocational and redistributive –
increased from pre to post-recession as indicated by the positive direction in the
“Percentage Change from T1 to T2” column in Table 21. Only developmental
expenditures decreased as a proportion of all spending between the two measurement
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periods (-0.50). The results in Table 21 indicate that none of the changes from T1 to T2
reached statistical significance. Collectively, all of the shifts in the proportion of total
spending were less than 1%. Given these findings, the possibility that the difference in
the means between the two measurement periods was due to random error cannot be
eliminated.
The relatively small percentage change from T1 to T2 for all three City Limits
policy regimes supports the existence of incrementalism. The changes from pre to postrecession do not rise to the level of significant shifts in local government policy
(Anderson & Harbridge, 2010; Boyne et al., 2000; Dempster & Wildavsky, 1979). The
data further support the notion that local governments operating in an environment of
economic stress seek to maintain their political equilibrium by avoiding significant shifts
in policy (Baker, 2011; Hoene & Pagano, 2009; Levine et al., 1981; Lewis, 1984;
Wolman, 1980, 1982).
The data in Table 21 shows the results when all types and forms of government
are grouped together. This overall analysis will tend to mask differences that might exist
between type and form of government, resulting in outcomes that are not statistically
significant. To further understand and explain the factors affecting the shift in
proportional spending by City Limits policy categories as a result of the Great Recession,
the study sample is evaluated based on other grouping attributes.

Analysis by Type of Government
The mean proportion of total expenditures for the three City Limits policy groups
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for the pre-recession period FY06-08 (T1) was compared to the mean proportion of total
expenditures for the post-recession period FY09-11 (T2) for two groups – cities (n = 197)
and counties (n = 65). The results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks matched pairs test are
shown in Table 22.
Table 22
Changes in Expenditures by Type of Government

Type of
Govt.

Expenditure Policy Group
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1

Cities

Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2

Counties

Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2

N
197
197

Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
41.10
41.15
58.38
58.27
1.48

69
65
65

1.64
35.37
33.21
60.40
62.14
4.23

65

4.65

%
Change
from
T1-T2
0.05
- 0.09
0.16
- 2.16
1.74
0.42

Standard
Deviation
0.14642
0.14688
0.14820
0.15092
0.05879
0.05404
0.08583
0.08244
0.08156
0.08418
0.04460
0.03470

p
.476
.321
.865
.001
.005
.288

*p <.05

The difference in the means for all three dependent variables for cities shows only
slight change between the measurement periods. The direction of the change is positive
for development and redistributive expenditures, and negative for the change in the
proportion of allocational spending. None of the changes in proportional spending by
expenditure policy group for cities is found to be statistically significant.
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The county data shown on Table 22 illustrates a more pronounced shift in
spending between the two measurement periods in this study. Counties decreased
developmental spending by 2.16% and increased allocational expenditures by 1.74%.
Both of these shifts in proportional spending were found to be statistically significant at p
< .05. Redistributive expenditures remained relatively flat with a modest 0.42% increase
from T1 to T2.
The results indicate that counties had a more pronounced shift in proportional
spending as compared with cities, but these changes appear to be consistent with
Lindbloom’s (1959) theory of budgetary incrementalism. The data also highlights the
differences between cities and counties in the proportion of spending between policy
groups. Counties have a higher proportion of allocational and redistributive expenditures
whereas cities focus more on developmental spending. This observation goes to the
central focus of the theoretical framework of this research - the driving force behind local
government expenditure policy is the economic survival of the community, and
improving the local jurisdiction’s position in the national, state, and regional economy
(Peterson, 1981, p. 41). The City Limits typology characterizes each of the policy
categories by its accretive, dilutive, or neutral relationship with the local economy.
Based on this typology, cities favor accretive (developmental) expenditures over
counties. The regression analysis in Chapter 7 will further illuminate this observation.

Analysis by Form of Government
The mean proportion of total expenditures for the three City Limits policy groups
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for the pre-recession period FY06-08 (T1) was compared to the mean proportion of total
expenditures for the post-recession period FY09-11 (T2) for all local governments (n =
262) by form of government. The results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks matched pairs
test are shown in Table 23.
The Council-Strong Mayor form of city government is the only form of
government, including counties, to increase developmental expenditures from pre to postrecession. This finding is consistent with much of the literature surrounding the City
Limits typology and the Council-Strong Mayor form of government. Hawkins (2010)
noted that strong mayors are viewed as dealmakers in the economic development arena,
with a shorter time horizon than appointed city managers. The Council-Strong Mayor
form of city government has been found to generally favor developmental policies over
redistributive expenditures, and to be more sensitive to economic development interest
groups (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Fleischmann et al., 1992;
Longoria, 1994). In an environment where short term economic recovery is highly
desired, such as in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, the Council-Strong
Mayor form will favor developmental expenditures (Feiock et al., 2003).
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Table 23
Changes in Expenditures by Form of Government

Form of
Government

CouncilManager
Cities

CouncilStrong
Mayor Cities

CouncilWeak Mayor
Cities

Commission
Counties

Expenditure Policy
Group
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2
Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1

N

175
175
47
14
14
14
6
6
6
10
10
10

Mean % of
Total
Expenditures
41.33
41.23
58.16
58.20
1.61
2.01
36.83
39.56
62.90
60.19
0.27
0.25
44.74
44.16
55.24
55.83
0.01
0.01
44.29
39.80
51.16
54.65
4.55

Redistributive -T2

CommissionManager
Counties

Developmental - T1
Developmental - T2
Allocational - T1
Allocational - T2
Redistributive -T1
Redistributive -T2

%
Change
from T1T2

-0.10
0.04
0.40
2.73
-2.61
0.02
-0.58
0.49
-4.49
3.49
1.00

5.55
54
54

33.65
31.84
62.27
63.73
4.08
4.43

54

*p <.05
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-1.81
1.46
0.35

Standard
Deviation
0.15034
0.15025
0.15187
0.15235
0.06461
0.06988
0.12500
0.12711
0.12193
0.12547
0.00548
0.00594
0.17662
0.18017
0.17667
0.18017
0.00033
0.00023
0.12615
0.10600
0.10521
0.10293
0.0685
0.08129
0.06611
0.07190
0.06361
0.07228
0.02455
0.03528

Sig. (p)
2 – tailed*

.566
.381
.122
.221
.272
.600
.917
.917
.317
.047
.139
.114
.002
.014
.483

The three instances of statistical significance shown on Table 23 all occur with
county forms of government. The reduction in developmental expenditures from T1 to T2
for Commission form counties is significant at p = .047. At 4.49%, it is the largest single
shift in proportional spending from pre to post-recession for all forms of government in
this study. Commission form counties also had the largest increase in proportional
spending in this study with a 3.49% increase in allocational spending between T1 and T2.
There is little in the way of past research that has examined this pronounced shift in
spending priorities as a result of an external event such as the Great Recession of 2008 for
Commission form counties. What is known is that this traditional ‘unreformed’ model of
county government in Florida has no single individual in administrative or political
leadership like Commission-Manager form counties (Feiock, 2004; Jewett, 2010). That
void of leadership is the antithesis of the Council-Strong Mayor form of city government
that has been shown to be a form of local government that prioritizes developmental
expenditures. However, the lack of individual leadership in the Commission form county
leads to more support for the political demands for developmental and redistributive
expenditures (Choi et al., 2010; Feiock, 2002, 2004; Lubell et al., 2005). This past
research holds true in these findings for redistributive spending but does not for
developmental expenditures.
The data for Commission-Manager counties was statistically significant for the
changes in developmental and allocational expenditures. The direction of change for all
three City Limits spending categories was the same as the Council-Manager form city, but
the size of the change was larger for counties. The reduction in proportional spending by
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Commission-Manager form counties from pre to post-recession runs counter to the
finding that there is a positive relationship between this form of county government and
developmental policies (Feiock et al., 2008).
Some interesting patterns among and between the five forms of government begin
to emerge from the data in Table 23. Of all cities, the Council-Weak Mayor form had the
highest proportion of developmental spending, either in T1 or T2. This finding conflicts
with prior research that found that the Council-Strong Mayor form would be more
responsive to policies that favor developmental expenditures (Basolo & Huang, 2001;
Fleischmann et al., 1992; Longoria, 1994). However, it should be noted that CouncilStrong Mayor cities had the largest proportional increase in developmental spending from
T1 to T2 of any of the five forms of government in this study.
Council-Strong Mayor cities had the highest proportion of allocational spending,
either pre or post-recession than the other two city forms. Public safety expenditures
make up the largest component of allocational spending. Other factors may explain the
proportion of allocational expenditures exhibited by Council-Strong Mayor cities,
including the socio-economic characteristics of the community, which are analyzed in the
final regression analyses in Chapter 7.
Council-Manager form cities had the highest level of redistributive spending
when compared to the other city forms of government. This last observation confirms
Hawkins (2010) finding that the Council-Manager form of city government will favor
redistributive expenditures based on the professional guidelines for City Managers that
stresses citizen access and equity in the distribution of resources.
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There is a significant difference in the proportional spending when comparing
county forms of government. The Commission form favors developmental expenditures
over the Commission-Manager form by a wide margin – over 10% pre-recession and
nearly 8% post-recession. This confirms the research by Choi et al. (2010), that the
Commission-Manager form has a negative relationship with developmental expenditures.
The data in Table 23 conflicts with Schneider and Park (1989) who found that the
Commission form and Commission-Manager form counties spent similarly on
developmental expenditures.

Hypothesis Testing
This component of the Explanatory Study is an examination of the relationship
between certain hypothesized factors and a dependent variable that might explain the
changes in the expenditure patterns of Florida’s local governments that occurred from pre
to post-recession. There are nine hypotheses associated with this part of the study (H8 –
H16). Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used to test the study hypotheses.

Descriptive Statistics
In addition to the variables for type and form of government, three additional
independent variables are introduced into the testing of hypotheses H8 through H16. The
descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 24.
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Table 24
Independent Variables
Variable
Total Population
Median Household Income
Population Density

N
262
262
262

Minimum
5072
$14,923
8.4

Maximum
1,623,018
$107,507
20,267.10

Mean
75,394
$39,021
2,506.30

Standard
Deviation
171,833
$13,386
2,885.60

Findings for the Explanatory Hypotheses (H8 – H16)
The results for each of the hypotheses tested in this explanatory study were
derived from a regression analysis conducted pursuant to the analytical framework
established during the research design. The results of the ANOVA test are indicated in
the significance column (p) indicating whether the result of the regression analysis is
statistically significant (p < .05) and the variation explained in the model is not due to
random error (Pallant, 2007). Each of the study hypotheses are presented below along
with the decision criteria to guide the analysis, followed by a brief discussion of the
findings.

Hypothesis 8 – Median Household Income and Allocational Expenditures
Hypothesis 8: Median household income is positively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
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Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change In Per Capita Allocational
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Median Household Income
utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and
standardized Beta output will be recorded. The results of the model will
demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in allocational
expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Median
Household Income. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant
(p < 0.05) and the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Allocational
Expenditures is positive, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is
supported.

Table 25 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 8.
Table 25
Effect of Median Household Income on Change in Allocation Expenditures
for All Local Governments

Variable

Unstandardized
Beta

Constant
.016
Median
Household
3.332E7
Income
Note: F = 2.287; R2 = .009
*p < .05

Standardized
Beta

-.095

t-test

p*

1.755

.081

-1.512

.132

The R2 (.009) shows that the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable
(DV), percentage change in allocation expenditures, which is explained by the
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independent variable (IV), median household income, for all local governments. This
result means that less than 1% of the variance in the DV can be explained by median
household income.
The hypothesized effect of median household income on the change in allocation
expenditures in Hypothesis 8 is positive, meaning that it would be expected that as
median household income increased or decreased, so would the change in allocational
expenditures from pre to post-recession. The beta (-.095) is negative, indicating the
results are not consistent with the hypothesized positive relationship between the
variables. The p-value (.152) for household income’s effect on the change in allocational
expenditures does not reach the level of statistical significance at p < .05.
These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The findings indicate that the data fails to support the hypothesized
direction of the linear relationship and does not attain statistical significance. Therefore,
Hypothesis 8 is not supported.

Hypothesis 9 – Median Household Income and Redistributive Expenditures
Hypothesis 9: Median household income is negatively associated with a change in
the proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Redistributive
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Median Household Income
utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and
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standardized Beta output will be recorded. The results of the model will
demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in redistributive
expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Median
Household Income. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant
(p < 0.05) and the relationship with the Change in Per Capita Redistributive
Expenditures is negative, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is
supported.

Table 26 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 9.
Table 26
Effect of Median Household Income on Change in Redistribution
Expenditures for All Local Governments

Variable

Unstandardized
Beta

Constant
-.003
Median
Household
1.048E-7
Income
Note: F = 2.240; R2 = .018
*p < .05

Standardized
Beta

.135

t-test

p*

-1.040

.300

1.497

.137

The R2 (.018) shows the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage change
in redistributive expenditures, which is explained by the IV, median household income,
for all local governments. This result means that slightly less than 2% of the variance in
the dependent variable can be explained by median household income.
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The hypothesized effect of median household income on the percentage change in
redistributive expenditures in Hypothesis 9 is negative, meaning that as median
household income decreases, the change in redistributive expenditures from pre to postrecession would increase. The result in Table 26 conflicts with the direction of the
hypothesized relationship indicated by the beta (.135). The p-value (.137) for household
income’s effect on the change in redistributive expenditures does not reach the level of
statistical significance at p < .05.
These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The findings indicate that the data does not support the hypothesized
direction of the linear relationship, and does not attain statistical significance. Therefore,
Hypothesis 9 is not supported.

Hypothesis 10 – Population Size and Developmental Expenditures
Hypothesis 10: Population size is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Developmental
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Total Population utilizing the
SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and standardized Beta
output will be recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion
of the variance in the change in developmental expenditures from pre to postrecession that is explained by the variable Total Population. If the results indicate
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that the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and the relationship with the
Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures is positive, then there will be a
finding that the hypothesis is supported.
Table 27 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 10.
Table 27
Effect of Total Population on Change in Developmental Expenditures
for All Local Governments

Variable

Unstandardized
Beta

Constant
-.001
Total
Population
-1.299E-8
Note: F = .606; R2 = .020
*p < .05

Standardized
Beta

-.049

t-test

p*

-1.040

.300

-.779

.437

The R2 (.020) shows the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage change
in developmental expenditures, which is explained by the IV, total population, for all
local governments. This result means that total population can explain 2% of the
variance in the dependent variable.
The hypothesized effect of total population on the percentage change in
developmental expenditures in Hypothesis 10 is positive, meaning that as total population
increases, the change in developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession would
increase. The result in Table 28 conflicts with the direction of the hypothesized
relationship indicated by the direction of the beta (-.049). The p-value (.437) for

160

household income’s effect on the change in allocational expenditures does not reach the
level of statistical significance at p < .05.
These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The findings indicate that the data does not support the hypothesized
direction of the linear relationship and does not attain statistical significance. Therefore,
Hypothesis 10 is not supported.

Hypothesis 11 – Population Size and Redistributive Expenditures
Hypothesis 11: Population size is negatively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Redistributive
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Total Population utilizing the
SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will be
recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the
variance in the change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession
that is explained by the variable Total Population. If the results indicate that the
model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and the relationship with the Change in
Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures is negative, then there will be a finding
that the hypothesis is not supported.
Table 28 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 11.
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Table 28
Effect of Total Population on Change in Redistributive
Expenditures for All Local Governments

Variable

Unstandardized
Beta

Constant
-.002
Total
Population
-4.827E-9
Note: F = 1.976; R2 = .016
*p < .05

Standardized
Beta

-.125

t-test

p*

-2.418

.017

-1.406

.162

The R2 (.016) shows the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage change
in redistributive expenditures, which is explained by the IV, total population, for all local
governments. This result means that 1.6% of the variance in the dependent variable can
be explained by total population.
The hypothesized effect of total population on the change in redistributive
expenditures in Hypothesis 11 is negative, meaning that as total population increases, the
change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession decreases. The beta (.125) in Table 30 is negative, confirming the hypothesized direction of the relationship
between these two variables. The p-value (.162) for the effect of population on the
change in redistributive expenditures does not reach the level of statistical significance at
p < .05.
These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The findings indicate that the data supports the hypothesized direction
of the linear relationship, but did not attain statistical significance. Therefore, Hypothesis
11 is not supported.
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Hypothesis 12 – Population Density and Allocational Expenditures
Hypothesis 12: Population density is positively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government allocational expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Allocational
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Population Density utilizing
the SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will
be recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the
variance in the change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession
that is explained by the variable Population Density. If the results indicate that
the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and the relationship with the
Change in Per Capita Allocational Expenditures is positive, then there will be a
finding that the hypothesis is supported.

Table 29 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 12.
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Table 29
Effect of Population Density on Change in Allocational Expenditures
for All Local Governments

Variable
Constant

Unstandardized
Beta

Standardized
Beta

-.012

Population
Density
-4.827E-9
Note: F = 8.656; R2 = .034
*p < .05

-.184

t-test

p*

2.892

.004

-2.942

.004

The R2 (.034) shows the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage change
in allocational expenditures, which is explained by the IV, population density for all local
governments. This result means that 3.4% of the variance in the dependent variable can
be explained by population density.
The hypothesized effect of population density on the change in allocational
expenditures in Hypothesis 12 is positive, meaning that as population density increases,
the change in allocational expenditures from pre to post-recession would increase. The
beta (-.184) in Table 29 conflicts with the direction of the hypothesized relationship
between the two variables. The p-value (.004) for the effect of density on the change in
allocation expenditures is statistically significant at p < .05. This finding is inconsistent
with prior work in the literature conducted by Raimondo (1992), who found that a
positive association exists between police and fire expenditures – the two largest
components of Peterson’s (1981) allocational spending category – and the density of the
community.
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These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The finding indicates that the data did not support the hypothesized
direction of the linear relationship. Therefore, Hypothesis 12 is not supported. The
relationship between the IV and DV is statistically significant and can explain a small
portion of the variance in the percentage change in allocational expenditures from T1 to
T2.

Hypothesis 13 – Population Density and Redistributive Expenditures
Hypothesis 13: Population density is negatively associated with a change in the
proportionate share of local government redistributive expenditures from prerecession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Redistributive
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Population Density utilizing
the SPSS simple linear regression module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will
be recorded. The results of the model will demonstrate the proportion of the
variance in the change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession
that is explained by the variable Population Density. If the results indicate that
the model is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and the relationship with the
Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures is negative, then there will be a
finding that the hypothesis is supported.
Table 30 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 13.
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Table 30
Effect of Population Density on Change in Redistributive
Expenditures for All Local Governments

Variable
Constant

Unstandardized
Beta

Standardized
Beta

.004

Population
Density
-3.852E-7
Note: F = .306; R2 = .002
*p < .05

-.048

t-test

p*

1.613

.109

-.553

.581

The R2 (002) shows that the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage
change in redistributive expenditures, which is explained by the IV, total population for
all local governments. This result means that less than 1% of the variance in the
dependent variable can be explained by population density.
The hypothesized effect of population density on the change in redistributive
expenditures in Hypothesis 13 is negative, meaning that as total population increases, the
change in redistributive expenditures from pre to post-recession would decrease. The
beta (-.048) in Table 30 supports the direction of the hypothesized relationship between
the two variables. The p-value (.581) for the effect of population density on the DV%
change in redistributive expenditures does not attain statistical significance at p < .05.
These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The finding indicates that the data supports the hypothesized direction
of the linear relationship, but the relationship between the variables does not attain
statistical significance. Therefore, Hypothesis 13 is not supported.
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Hypothesis 14 – Council-Strong Mayor Form and Developmental Expenditures
Hypothesis 14: The Council-Strong Mayor form is positively associated with a
change in the proportionate share of local government developmental
expenditures from pre-recession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Developmental
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Form of City Government (all
forms using dummy variable coding) utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression
module. The R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the
model will demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in
developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the
variable Form of City Government. If the results indicate that the model is
statistically significant (p < 0.05) for the Council-Strong Mayor Form, and the
relationship with the Change in Per Capita Developmental Expenditures is
positive, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported.
Table 31 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 14.

167

Table 31
Effect of Council-Strong Mayor Form of City Government on
Change in Developmental Expenditures

Variable
Constant

Unstandardized
Beta

Standardized
Beta

-.003

Council-Strong
Mayor Form of
Government
.031
Note: F = 4.832; R2 = .019
*p < .05

-.136

t-test

p*

-1.056

.292

.553

.029

The R2 (.019) shows the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage change
in developmental expenditures, which is explained by the IV, Council-Strong Mayor
Form, for all local governments. This result means that nearly 2% of the variance in the
dependent variable can be explained by the presence of the Council-Strong Mayor form
of city government.
The hypothesized effect of the Council-Strong Mayor form of city government on
the change in developmental expenditures in Hypothesis 14 is positive, meaning that the
presence of that form of city government would have a positive effect on the change in
developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession. The beta (.136) in Table 31
confirms the direction of the hypothesized relationship between the two variables. The pvalue (.029) for the effect of the Council-Strong Mayor form on the change in
developmental expenditures attains statistical significance at p < .05.
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These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The findings indicate that the data supported the hypothesized direction
of the relationship, and is statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 14 is supported.
The result of the testing of Hypothesis 14 confirms extensive prior research
regarding the importance of economic development projects to Strong Mayors in
municipal government due to their need to be more responsive to pro-growth business
interests (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Feiock et al., 2003; Fleischmann et al., 1992; Frant,
1996). Hawkins (2010) and Longoria (1994) identified the priority that elected Strong
Mayors will give to developmental type expenditures due to the desire to have short-term
impacts on the community.

Hypothesis 15 – Commission-Manager Form, Developmental and Redistributive
Expenditures
Hypothesis 15: The Commission-Manager form of county government is
negatively associated with a change in the proportionate share of local
government developmental and redistributive expenditures from pre-recession to
post-recession
Decision Criteria: The dependent variables Change in Per Capita Developmental
Expenditures and Change in Per Capita Redistributive Expenditures will be
regressed against the variable Form of County Government (all forms using
dummy variable coding) utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression module. The
R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the model will
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demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in developmental
expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Form of
County Government. If the results indicate that the model is statistically
significant (p < 0.05) for the Commission-Manager Form, and the relationship
with the Change in Per Capita Developmental and Redistributive Expenditures is
negative, then there will be a finding that the hypothesis is supported.

Table 32 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 15.
Hypothesis 15 requires two separate linear regression computations to address
two dependent variables. The first R2 (.037) shows the proportion of the variance in the
DV, percentage change in developmental expenditures, which is explained by the IV,
Commission-Manager Form, for all local governments. This result means that nearly 4%
of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the presence of the
Commission-Manager form of county government.
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Table 32
Effect of Commission-Manager Form of County Government on
Change in Developmental and Redistributive Expenditures

Developmental

Unstandardized
Beta

Constant

.002

Commission
Manager Form of
Government
Note: F = 9.440; R2 = .037
*p < .05

Redistributive

Standardized
Beta

-.021

-.191

Unstandardized
Beta

Standardized
Beta

Constant

.002

Commission
Manager Form of
Government
Note: F = 1.298; R2 = .010
*p < .05

-.002

-.101

t-test

p*

.786

.433

-3.072

.002

t-test

p*

2.113

.037

-1.139

.257

The hypothesized effect of the Commission-Manager form of county government
on the change in developmental expenditures in Hypothesis 15 is negative, meaning that
the presence of that form of county government would have a negative or opposite effect
on the change in developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession. The beta (.191) in Table 32 confirms the direction of the hypothesized relationship between the two
variables. The p-value (.002) for the effect of the Commission-Manager Form on the
change in developmental expenditures attains statistical significance at p < .05.
The second half of the testing of Hypothesis 15 addresses the relationship
between the IV Commission-Manager Form of county government and the DV
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percentage change in redistributive expenditures. The R2 (.010) shows the proportion of
the variance in the DV, percentage change in redistributive expenditures, which is
explained by the IV, Commission-Manager Form, for all local governments. This result
means that 1% of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the presence
of the Commission-Manager form of county government.
The hypothesized effect of the Commission-Manager form of county government
on the change in redistributive expenditures in Hypothesis 15 is negative, meaning that
the presence of that form of county government would have a negative or opposite effect
on the change in redistributive expenditures fromT1 to T2. The beta (-.101) in Table 32
confirms the direction of the hypothesized relationship between the two variables. The pvalue (.257) for the effect of the Commission-Manager form of county government on the
change in redistributive expenditures does not attain statistical significance at p < .05.

Hypothesis 16 – Home Rule Charter and Developmental Expenditures
Hypothesis 16: Home rule charter counties are positively associated with a change
in the proportionate share of local government developmental expenditures from
pre-recession to post-recession.
Decision Criteria: The dependent variable Change in Per Capita Developmental
Expenditures will be regressed against the variable Home Rule Charter (using
dummy variable coding) utilizing the SPSS simple linear regression module. The
R2, p-value, and Beta output will be recorded. The results of the model will
demonstrate the proportion of the variance in the change in developmental
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expenditures from pre to post-recession that is explained by the variable Home
Rule Charter. If the results indicate that the model is statistically significant (p <
0.05) for the variable Home Rule Charter, and the relationship with the Change in
Per Capita Developmental Expenditures is positive, then there will be a finding
that the hypothesis is supported.
Table 33 displays the results of the simple linear regression analysis conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of Hypothesis 15.
The R2 (.008) shows the proportion of the variance in the DV, percentage change
in developmental expenditures, which is explained by the IV, Home Rule Charter, for all
local governments. This result means that just less than 1% of the variance in the
dependent variable can be explained by the presence of a Home Rule Charter County.
Table 33
Effect of a County Home Rule Charter on Change in Developmental
Expenditures for All Local Governments

Developmental
Constant

Unstandardized
Beta
-.002

Standardized
Beta

-.015

-.088

Home Rule
Charter

t-test
-.527

p*
.599

-1.396

.164

Note: F = 1.948; R2 = .008
*p < .05

The hypothesized effect of the Home Rule Charter county government on the
change in developmental expenditures in Hypothesis 16 is positive, meaning that the
presence of that form of county government would have a positive effect on the change in
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developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession. The beta (-.088) in Table 33 is
opposite the direction of the hypothesized relationship between the two variables. The pvalue (.164) for the effect of the Home Rule Charter on the percentage change in
developmental expenditures fails to attain statistical significance at p < .05.
These results were evaluated in light of the decision criteria established in the
research design. The findings indicate that the data supports the hypothesized direction
of the relationship, but it is not statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 16 is not
supported.

Summary of Findings for Explanatory Hypothesis Testing
The findings for the testing of the hypotheses in Study #2, the Explanatory Study,
are summarized in Table 34.
Table 34
Summary of Hypothesis Testing in the Explanatory Study
Hypothesis

Subject

H8

% Change in
Allocational
Expenditures as
Predicted by Median
Household Income

H9

% Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures as
Predicted by Median
Household Income

H10

% Change in
Developmental
Expenditures as
Predicted by Total
Population

Groups

Hypothesized Result

Result

All Local
Governments

Median Household
Income is positively
associated with %
Change in Allocational
Expenditures

Not
Supported

All Local
Governments

Median Household
Income is negatively
associated with %
Change in Redistributive

Not
Supported

All Local
Governments

Total Population is
positively associated
with % Change in
Developmental
Expenditures

Not
Supported
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Hypothesis

H11

H12

H13

H16

Subject
% Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures as
Predicted by Total
Population
% Change in
Allocational
Expenditures as
Predicted by
Population Density
% Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures as
Predicted by
Population Density
Change in % of
Developmental
Expenditures as
Predicted by
Existence of Home
Rule Charter

Groups
All Local
Governments

All Local
Governments

All Local
Governments

All Local
Governments in
Home Rule
Charter
Counties

Hypothesized Result
Total Population is
negatively associated
with % Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures
Population Density is
positively associated
with % Change in
Allocational
Expenditures
Population Density is
negatively associated
with % Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures
Home Rule Charter
Counties are positively
associated with a%
Change in
Developmental
Expenditures

Result
Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

The summary of hypothesis testing in Table 34 shows that only one of the
hypotheses (H14) is supported. The remaining failed to reach statistical significance and
displayed very weak R2 results. The first six hypotheses (H8 –H13) tested the
relationship between three control variables (median household income, population size,
and population density) and one of the dependent variables.
Population density was the only control variable to be regressed in this portion of
the research that resulted in a finding of statistical significance. This finding occurred as a
result of testing H12 where the relationship of population density to the change in
allocational expenditures resulted in a p-value of .001. The hypothesized direction in H12
is positive. The testing of H12 resulted in a statistically significant finding, but with a
negative direction, meaning that population density has a negative effect on the change in
allocational spending from T1 to T2. This finding conflicts with the prior research of
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Raimondo (1992), who found a positive relationship between density and public safety
spending, the major component of allocational expenditures. However, this finding is
consistent with the spending patterns exhibited by cities between T1 and T2. Cities
favored developmental expenditures over allocational expenditures, and cities have much
higher levels of population densities than counties.
The last three hypotheses (H14-H16) tested the relationship between forms of
government and dependent variables. The result for H14 confirms extensive prior
research regarding the importance of economic development projects to Strong Mayors in
municipal government.
Economic development projects are important to Strong Mayors that desire
shorter-term success to retain their elected position (Frant, 1996). The importance to
Strong Mayors is amplified when comparing the tenure of the elected Strong Mayor in the
Council-Strong Mayor form of government to the longer policy horizon held by city
managers (Hawkins, 2010). Longoria (1994) also observed that mayors in the U.S. prefer
developmental expenditures to allocational and redistributive spending.
In a post-recession environment, where there is a high value placed on economic
recovery, developmental expenditures will be favored by the Council-Strong Mayor form
over other expenditure categories due to the political interests of the elected leadership.
(Feiock et al., 2003; Fleischmann et al., 1992). Additional research has shown that the
Council-Strong Mayor form of city government will adopt policies that favor
developmental expenditures to be more responsive to pro-growth business and citizen
interest groups (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Fleischmann et al., 1992).
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The results of the testing of H15 offer insight into the Commission-Manager form
of county government. H15 included two dependent variables – the percent change in
developmental and redistributive expenditures. Only one of the two hypothesized
relationships was confirmed, resulting in the overall finding of H15 being not confirmed.
However, the testing of the relationship between the Commission-Manager form and
developmental expenditures resulted in a statistically significant finding that was
consistent with the hypothesized negative relationship. This finding confirms the work of
Choi et al., (2010) who found that the Commission-Manager form of county government
does not favor developmental policies as a result of a strong efficiency orientation, longer
term policy horizon, and commitment to formal process instilled in the training of the
professional county manager. This is contrasted against the Commission form of county
government that is more responsive to the political demands for developmental and
redistributive expenditures (Choi et al., 2010; Feiock, 2002, 2004; Lubell et al., 2005).
This finding for H15 is also consistent with the overall treatment of developmental
expenditures by counties from T1 to T2. Counties made the largest statistically significant
shift in post-recession policy by increasing allocational and decreasing developmental
expenditures as shown in Table 20 in the Descriptive Study in Chapter 5.
While a majority of the hypotheses tested in this Explanatory Study failed to reach
statistical significance, there are statistically significant findings that provide confirmation
and rebuttal of prior research in this field of study. Hypotheses H8 through H16 examined
the effect of single variables on a dependent variable, providing insight into how and why
local governments responded to the Great Recession of 2008. A more composite
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understanding of the interrelationships of the variables is addressed in the multiple
regression section below.
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS OF FINAL REGRESSION MODELS

The final component of the Explanatory Study is the construction of predictive
models to understand why local governments reacted to the Great Recession of 2008 by
shifting their expenditure pattern using the City Limits theoretical framework. Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression is used to estimate the relative importance of the
predictor variables and the variance of the hypothesized linear relationship with each of
the three dependent variables.

Testing the Data for Compliance with Assumptions of OLS
OLS regression has assumptions about the data that must be met. Starting with
the study sample (n = 262), the data is analyzed for compliance with the following
assumptions:
Multicollinearity: A correlation matrix (Appendix B) shows that, with one
exception, no two variables correlated above .8. The highest Pearson Correlation factor
produced is -.788 between Education (Percent of Population > 25 years of age with HS or
above) and Poverty (Percent of families living below the poverty line). Given the
strength of this correlation, if both variables are included in the same explanatory model,
then the weaker of the two will be eliminated. The exception is for the type of
government variables (City and County). It is expected that these two would be highly
correlated with their respective forms of government. They could not be eliminated from
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the study. If a type of government variable is included in a final model with an
associated form of government variable, the weaker of the two will be eliminated.
The results of the SPSS collinearity diagnostics for Tolerance and Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) indicated that all Tolerance values were above .10 and VIF values
were less than 10 for all variables. Based on the findings from the correlation matrix and
VIF analysis, there are no additional issues of multicollinearity that warrant the
elimination of any other control or independent variables.
Normality: The normal distribution of residuals is required. Histograms of the
residuals and normal P-P plots of the standardized residuals indicate issues of skewness
and kurtosis outside acceptable ranges. Individual cases are removed when the casewise
diagnostics indicate the presence of outliers beyond three standard deviations. This
results in a distribution of the residuals that approached normality as indicated by the
histogram and P-P plots.
Linearity: The residuals in the models should be aligned in a straight line with the
predicted dependent variable scores. Normal P-P plots of the standardized residuals
indicate some deviation to linearity. Upon removal of the offending cases to comply with
the assumption of normality, satisfactory improvements to the P-P plots are achieved
Homoscedasticity: Scatterplots of the actual versus predicted residual values are
produced. After addressing the elimination of outliers, all results are found to comply
with the required assumption.
Outliers: Standardized residuals are tested for their influence on the models. The
results of the initial model runs produced diagnostic data indicating cases where the
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standardized residuals exceed three standard deviations. Once removed, the models
exhibited compliance with the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 35 summarizes the central tendency characteristics of the independent
variables used in all three final regression models. There is a wide range of scores for the
five continuous independent variables, illustrating the heterogeneity of local governments
across the state.
The range in unincorporated county population is explained by cities in JacksonvilleDuval County on the minimum end and Broward County at the maximum of the range.
The least dense community in the study is Liberty County in Florida’s panhandle. The
highest density local government is North Bay Village, a small island municipality in
Miami-Dade County.

Multiple Regression Models
Three regression models, one for each of the three dependent variables, represent
the third and final component of the Explanatory Study. Each model analysis includes
the testing for the influence of control variables first, then testing the independent
variables separately for statistical significance (p < 0.05). The results of these
preliminary analyses will determine which variables are included in the final model to
create the final model. By initially holding the control variables constant, the overall role
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of the independent variables in explaining the variance in the three dependent variables
can be evaluated when controlling for various factors (Pallant, 2007).
Table 35
Independent Variables
Variable

n

Min.

Max.

Mean

Median

SD.

City

197

0

1

NA

NA

County

65

0

1

NA

NA

175

0

1

NA

NA

14

0

1

NA

NA

6

0

1

NA

NA

54

0

1

NA

NA

10

0

1

NA

NA

262

0

1

NA

NA

Unincorporated

262

000

.969

.530

.534

.242

Total Population

262

5072

1,623,018

75,394

20,983

171,833

Council-Manager
Form City
Council-Strong Mayor
Form City
Council-Weak Mayor
Form City
Commission-Manager
Form County
Commission Form
County
Home Rule
Charter
% County
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Variable

n

Min.

Max.

Mean

Median

SD.

Income ($)

262

14,923

107,507

39,021

36,069

13,386

Population Density

262

8.4

20,267.1

2,506.3

1,741.6

2,885.6

262

-.246

.633

.103

.084

.091

Median Household

Financial Condition
Ratio

Change in Developmental Expenditures
The first of three final regression models was conducted using all local
governments that were retained after ensuring there were no violations of the assumptions
of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. The final sample size is n
= 256. All 65 counties remain in the model. The eliminated cases are all cities. Table 36
displays the results of the regression with the control variables and the dependent
variable.
Table 36
Change in Developmental Expenditures with Control Variables
Unstandardized
Beta

Std. Error

Constant
.047
-.043
Poverty
-.045
.086
Age
.036
.035
Education
.049
.050
Ethnicity
-.006
.028
Note: F – 2.453; R2 = .038; α = .047
* p < .05

Standardized
Beta

-.059
.071
.098
-.019
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t-test
-.915
-.528
1.035
.982
-.208

p
.361
.598
.302
.327
.835

None of the four control variables reached a level of significance (p < 0.05) in
Table 36. Therefore none will be included in the final model. Table 36 displays the
analysis of the independent variables on the dependent variable change in developmental
expenditures from T1 to T2. Since no control variables will be brought into the analysis
of the independent variables, the results in Table 36 represent the final model for this
dependent variable.
The final model in Table 37 has three predictor variables and an adjusted of R2
(.072), indicating that the model explains 7.2% of the variance in the Change in
Developmental Expenditures. The F statistic is 7.562 with a p-value approaching .000,
indicating the overall model is a better model fit than the model with only control
variables.
Table 37
Change in Developmental Expenditures Regression Model
Unstandardized
Beta
Constant
-.009
Council – Strong
Mayor Form
.019
Population
Density
3.366E-6
Commission Form
County
-.036
Note: F – 7.562; R2 = .083; α = .000
* p < .05

Standardized

Std. Error

Beta

.004

t-test

p

-2.195

.029

.014

-.086

-1.391

.166

.000

.194

3.096

.002

.016

-.139

-2.275

.024
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The model has two variables with positive Betas. The findings in Chapter 6
demonstrated that cities increased the proportional share of developmental expenditures
from T1 to T2 when compared with counties. The inclusion of the Council-Strong
Mayor Form and its positive influence on the dependent variable supports a long line of
research identifying this form of government as strongly favoring developmental policies
over other types of expenditures (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001;
Fleischmann et al., 1992).
The Commission Form county variable is statistically significant and has a
negative Beta (-.139). This is indicative of the data on counties overall, showing
decreases in developmental spending. This finding that Commission Form counties have
a negative correlation with developmental spending during times of fiscal stress is in
contrast to prior research which showed a positive relationship between Commission
Form counties and developmental expenditures (Choi et al., 2010; Feiock, 2002, 2004;
Lubell et al., 2005).
The statistically significant variable Population Density has a Beta of .194, and
has the strongest influence in the final model. This finding means that higher densities
are correlated with an increase in the proportional share of developmental expenditures
from pre to post-recession. This finding, along with the inclusion of the variable
Council-Strong Mayor can be viewed that Peterson’s (1981) City Limits typology and its
supporting theoretical framework is confirmed to exist during times of extreme fiscal
stress. These variables, all with positive Betas, advance the notion that Florida’s denser
cities spent proportionally more to improve the net benefit/tax ratio of the local economy
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through increasing developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession. The data
shows that even in times of extreme fiscal stress, cities still prioritize their economic
development roll when compared to counties. This finding means that the fiscal stress
experienced by local governments during the Great Recession of 2008 did not cause
cities to shift from their theorized role as described by Peterson (1981).

Regression Model Results – Change in Allocational Expenditures
The second of three final regression models was conducted using all local
governments that were retained after ensuring there were no violations of the assumptions
of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. The final sample size is n
= 256. All 65 counties remain in the model. The eliminated cases are all cities. Table 38
displays the results of the regression analysis of the control variables.
Table 38
Change in Allocational Expenditures with Control Variables
Unstandardized
Beta
Constant
Poverty
Age
Education
Ethnicity

-.040
.057
-.034
-.045
-.011

Standardized

Std. Error

Beta

.046
.084
.034
.049
.028

.078
.070
-.091
-.036

Note: F – 1.762; R2 = .028; Adjusted R2 = .012; α = .137.
* p < .05
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t-test
.865
.685
-1.011
-.907
-.398

p
.388
.494
.313
.365
.691

None of the four control variables reached a level of significance (p < 0.05) in
Table 38. Therefore, none will be included in the final model. Table 39 displays the
analysis of the independent variables on the dependent variable Change in Allocational
Expenditures from T1 to T2.
Table 39
Change in Allocational Expenditures Regression Model
Unstandardized
Beta

Standardized

Std. Error

Constant
.012
-.009
County
.014
.008
Population Density
-2.720E-6
.000
Median Household
Income
-2.673E-7
.000
Financial Condition
Ratio
.040
.035
Note: F – 4.829; R2 = .071; Adjusted R2 = .057; α = .001.
* p < .05

Beta

t-test

p

.118
-.154

.747
1 .697
-2.227

.456
.091
.027

-.068

-1.102

.272

-.071

1.141

.255

The final model in Table 39 has an adjusted of R2 (.057), indicating that the
model explains only 5.7% of the variance in the Change in Allocational Expenditures.
The F statistic is 4.829 with a p-value of .001, indicating the overall model is a better
model fit than the model with only control variables.
Four independent variables remain in the final model. The variables County and
Financial Condition Ratio have positive Betas, meaning they are positively associated
with increases in allocational expenditures from pre to post-recession. The findings in
Chapters 5 and 6 show that counties favor increasing allocational expenditures from T1
to T2, and the result of this regression analysis confirms that finding. The positive
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relationship between Financial Condition Ratio and the dependent variable can be
compared to the negative Beta for Median Household Income. Those local governments
in stronger financial position tend to increase allocational expenditures while the
financial condition of the residents tends to limit the change in these expenditures from
pre to post-recession. This finding conflicts with the work of Raimondo (1992) who
identified a positive association between personal income and general government, police
and fire expenditures.
Population Density (p = .027) is the only statistically significant variable in final
model. The Beta for Population Density is -.154; meaning lower density is correlated
with higher proportional allocational spending from pre to post-recession. The inclusion
of the variable County is expected given how counties increased their proportional
funding in favor of allocational expenditures in the earlier findings in Chapters 5 and 6.
This combination of a positive influencing County variable with the Population Density
finding is consistent with the occurrence of lower population densities in counties.
During this period of fiscal stress, lower density governments in Florida shifted their
policy priorities away from developmental purposes toward allocational services, such as
police, fire, EMS, and parks and recreation.

Regression Model Results – Change in Redistributive Expenditures
The third of three final regression models was conducted using all local
governments that were retained after ensuring there were no violations of the assumptions
of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. The final sample size is n
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= 126. All of the eliminated cases were counties. Table 40 displays the results of the
regression analysis for just the control variables.
Table 40
Change in Redistributive Expenditures with Control Variables
Unstandardized
Beta
Constant
Poverty
Age
Education
Ethnicity

-.032
.052
-.005
-.036
-.002

Standardized

Std. Error

Beta

.010
.019
.009
.011
.007

.401
-.055
.428
.030

t-test
-3.222
2.716
-.586
3.362
.242

p
.002
.008
.559
.001
.809

Note: F – 3.378; R2 = .100; Adjusted R2 = .071; α = .012.
* p < .05

The Adjusted R2 statistic for this model is .071, indicating that 7.1% of the
variance in the Change in Redistributive Expenditures is explained by the control
variables. Two control variables - Poverty (.008) and Education (.001) - are statistically
significant at p < 0.05. Given that the Pearson Correlation coefficient for these two
variables is -.788, Poverty is eliminated as the weaker of the two variables from further
consideration in the final model to avoid issues of multicollinearity.
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Table 41
Change in Redistributive Expenditures with Control Variables
Unstandardized
Beta
Constant
Poverty
Age

Std. Error

3.347E-5
-5.891E-9
1.289E-7

Ethnicity

-.026

Standardized
Beta

t-test

p

.003
.000
.000

-.152
-.136

.010
-1.751
1.551

.992
.070
.123

.009

-.261

2.969

.004

Note: F – 3.378; R = .71; Adjusted R = .100; α = .012.
* p < .05
2

2

The independent variable model in Table 41 has four predictor variables with an
adjusted of R2 (.086), indicating that the model explains only 8.6% of the variance in the
Change in Redistributive Expenditures from T1 to T2. The F statistic is 3.968 with a pvalue of .005, indicating a better model fit than the model with only control variables.
Two variables, Commission Form County and Financial Condition Ratio, reached
statistical significance and will be included in the final model.
The final model in Table 42 has three predictor variables with an adjusted R2
of .065, indicating that the model explains 6.5% of the variance in the Change in
Redistributive Expenditures from pre to post-recession. The F statistic is 3.943 with a pvalue of .010, indicating the overall model is a poorer fit when compared with the control
variable and the independent variable models.

190

Table 42
Change in Redistributive Expenditures with Independent and Control Variables
Unstandardized
Beta
Std. Error
Constant
.003
3.347E-5
Commission Manager
.003
Form County
.007
Total Population
-5.891E-9
.000
Median Household
Income
1.289E-7
.000
Financial Condition
Ratio
-.026
.009
Note: F – 3.968; R2 = .115; Adjusted R2 = .086; α = .005.
*p <.05

Standardized
Beta

t-test

p

.010

.992

205

2.294

.024

-.152

-1.751

.070

-.136

1.551

.123

-.261

2.969

.004

The independent variables, Commission Form County and Financial Condition
Ratio, maintain their statistical significance from the independent variable model.
The inclusion of the Commission Manager Form as a positive predictor in the final
model conflicts with the work of Choi et al. (2010) who found that the CommissionManager form had a negative relationship with the redistributive policy arena. This has
been further explained by others as the result of efficiency and commitment to formal
process being the top priority of the appointed county manager, whereas the other forms of
county government are more responsive to the political demands for redistributive
expenditures (Choi et al., 2010; Feiock, 2002, 2004; Lubell et al., 2005). This finding
means that during times of extreme fiscal stress, this form of County government responds
differently to redistributive expenditures than it would during normal economic periods.
The variable Financial Condition Ratio is statistically significant at p = .008, and
has a Beta of -.239, indicating that a lower rate of financial performance in FY 2006
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leading up to the Great Recession is negatively correlated with the proportional change in
redistributive expenditures from T1 to T2. The control variable Education failed to reach
statistical significance in the final model.

Summary of Multiple Regression Findings
When evaluating the results of a regression analysis, the researcher looks for
statistically significant variables and a high R2 value for the model. The combination of
these two elements indicates that changes in the predictor variables are related to the
dependent variable, and that the model explains a large portion of the variance in the
dependent variable. However, a low R2 value doesn't mean that the model is not useful.
The predictor variables can still identify important trends, even though the data points fall
away from the regression line. High R2 value models are important when precise
predictions are necessary. In this research, the identification of the statistically
significant variables that are predictors of local government expenditure behavior from
pre to post-recession is most important.
The results for the three models indicated relatively low R2 values. However,
important information can be gleaned from these models and the resulting statistically
significant variables. Table 43 displays a summary of these findings.
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Table 43
Summary of Statistically Significant Variables in Regression Models

Model

Variable

% Change In
Developmental
Expenditures

% Change in
Allocational
Expenditures

% Change in
Redistributive
Expenditures

Population
Density

Commission
Form County

Population
Density

Commission
Manager
County

Financial
Condition
Ratio

Standardized
Beta

.194

-.139

-.154

.213

-.239

Finding
Higher density correlated with
increase in proportional spending
from T1 to T2
Form of Government correlated
with decrease in proportional
spending from T1 to T2
Lower density correlated with
increase in proportional spending
from T1 to T2
Form of Government correlated
with decrease in proportional
spending from T1 to T2
Poorer financial performance in
FY06 correlated with increase in
proportional spending from T1 to
T2

The results of the multiple regression analysis align with the findings in Chapters
5 and 6, and begin to explain the reasons for the behavior of Florida’s cities and counties
as they experienced extreme fiscal stress as a result of the Great Recession of 2008.
When controlling for the socioeconomic character of their resident populations, cities and
counties responded very differently to the economic crisis. Cities favor developmental
spending while counties favor allocational and redistributive spending.
The most important factors that explain local government expenditure behavior in
response to the Great Recession of 2008 are identified in Table 43. Population Density
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emerges as an important predictor in two of the three models. This implies that the
physical character and pattern of land development in Florida’s local governments
directly impacts how spending priorities are established in times of fiscal stress. The
variable exerts a positive influence on developmental spending, which is consistent with
the actions of cities. It exerts a negative influence on allocational spending, indicating
consistency with lower density county governments.
The form of government variable appears in two of the three final models,
indicating the political and organizational structure of the local government matters when
examining the response to periods of extreme fiscal stress. The Commission Form
County has a negative influence on the change in developmental expenditures. The
Commission-Manager Form County influences the redistributive expenditure model
positively. This runs counter to prior research that found this form of government has a
negative association with the redistributive policy arena.
These findings will be discussed further in Chapter 8 – Conclusions.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
This research set out to address four questions about how and why Florida’s local
governments responded to the Great Recession of 2008. Using Peterson’s (1981) City
Limits Typology, expenditure data was analyzed to determine if significant shifts in the
policy positions occurred as a result of the most significant economic downturn in the U.S.
since the Great Depression. Data identifying the type, form, and socioeconomic attributes
of each local government in Florida was collected to perform the study.
The existing literature has examined how local governments have responded to
fiscal stress in the past. However, no literature found to date has used the City Limits
model in examining the effects of the Great Recession of 2008 on local governments
within the state of Florida. Using a study population of cities and counties, a series of
analytical tests were run to document how the expenditure pattern of local governments
has been affected by the economic downturn. Comparing the findings in this research to
the existing literature, the findings reveal some consistencies and some anomalies with
past studies.

Expenditure Pattern of Local Governments from Pre to Post-Recession
The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 show that as a single population, the
proportional change in expenditures from pre to post-recession for all local governments
is very modest and not indicative of a significant shift. The percentage change in all
policy expenditure groups is less than 0.5% between the two measurement periods. None
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of these shifts in spending is statistically significant. This finding was supported by
extensive literature describing budgetary incrementalism as the guiding fiscal and
political model for local governments. This finding is a result of treating Florida’s local
governments as a single study population.

Differences or Similarities Between Cities and Counties
Grouping cities and counties together as a single study population masks the
difference between the two types of governments. Cities and counties begin in the first
measurement period with a very different mix of proportional spending and do have
significant changes in spending from pre to post-recession. County expenditures are
more heavily weighted toward allocational and redistributive expenditures, while cities
favor developmental expenditures during the pre-recession measurement period. During
the post-recession measurement, both types of governments shift their proportional
spending further in favor of their pre-recession allocation.
The nature of each type of government is important in understanding the
differences that occurred in their proportional spending during this study. Counties are
more homogenous in their function as constitutional extensions of state government.
There are differences in form of government and home rule charter status. However,
counties shift in proportional expenditures from pre to post-recession was statistically
significant as a group for developmental (-2.16%) and allocational (1.74%) policy arenas.
Cities are more heterogeneous in form of government and mix of services
provided. Most cities in Florida do not provide redistributive services. When compared
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with counties, cities showed less movement in their proportional spending from pre to
post-recession. However, the shift away from allocational and toward developmental
spending is an important finding. This is one of Peterson’s (1981) underlying principles
of benefit/tax ratio – cities will act in their economic best interest. This research shows
that even during times of extreme fiscal stress, cities as a group still prioritized the
‘economic best interest’ principle and increased spending in this policy group.

Differences or Similarities Between Forms of Local Government
Within and amongst the two types of government, differences in proportional
spending occurred from pre to post-recession. For cities, the Council-Strong Mayor
Form exhibited the largest shift in spending away from allocational activities to
developmental functions. The Council-Strong Mayor Form City was found to be
positively associated with the change in developmental expenditures. Council-Manager
and Council-Weak Mayor Form cities had shifts in expenditures of less than 0.5% from
pre to post-recession.
There was similarity in the shifting spending between policy groups by the
different forms of County government. The Commission Form county displayed the
most extreme shift in proportional spending of all forms of local government in the study
by moving away from developmental spending and favoring allocational expenditures.
Commission-Manager counties displayed a similar pattern but the size of the shift was
proportionally smaller than Commission Form counties. The Commission-Manager
Form County was found to be statistically significant in its positive association with the
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change in redistributive expenditures. This is a change in policy direction that is likely
influenced by the extreme fiscal conditions experienced during the Great Recession of
2008.

Relationships Between Type, Form and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Local
Governments
The last component of the research examines the factors that contribute to the
conclusions discussed above. The results in Chapters 6 and 7 identify statistically
significant variables that help explain the pattern of local government policy change as
defined by the change in proportional expenditures that occurred from pre to postrecession.

Developmental Expenditures
The form of government and the characteristics of the community influence the
shift in developmental expenditures. The Commission Form County is negatively
associated with a change in developmental expenditures from pre to post-recession,
whereas the presence of the Council-Strong Mayor City has a positive influence on
developmental spending. These findings are consistent with prior research that explored
the nature of these forms of government. The manner in which these two forms influence
developmental spending in normal fiscal times is maintained during this period of
extreme fiscal stress.
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The socio-economic variable Population Density is a statistically significant
predictor of the change in developmental spending. Density is most closely associated
with highly urbanized areas, further supporting the notion that cities, not counties,
favored developmental spending from pre to post-recession. Peterson (1981)
acknowledged that part of the ‘economic best interest’ principle employed by cities is to
create an environment conducive for entrepreneurial investment by existing businesses
and investors. The influence of these variables in the change in the developmental
spending from pre to post-recession affirms that characteristically higher density cities
increase spending to advance their economic best interest, when compared to the other
two policy arenas even during a significant downturn in the macro economy.

Allocational Expenditures
The presence of a county government is a positive influence on the shift toward
the allocational policy arena. Within the group of county governments, there is a
significant difference in the percentage of spending for the allocational policy arena.
While Commission Form Counties show an increase their proportional spending more
than twice that of Commission-Manager Counties from pre to post-recession (3.49% to
1.46%), Commission-Manager Counties spend approximately 10% more on allocational
when compared to the developmental arena. This is likely due to the more rural nature of
the Commission Form County, where there is a lesser demand for urban services such as
public safety and parks and recreation.
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A similar relationship in proportional spending occurs between the CouncilStrong Mayor Form Cities and the other forms of city government. The larger, more
populous cities where the Strong Mayor Form resides have a higher proportion of total
expenditures for allocational services before and after the Great Recession. Unlike
counties, the Council-Strong Mayor Form City displayed a reduction in the proportional
of allocational expenditures from pre to post-recession. The variable Total Population
was found to be statistically significant on the change in Allocational expenditures.
Larger population size is a characteristic of both Commission-Manager Form Counties
and Council-Strong Mayor Cities.
Household income and population density are negatively associated with the
change in allocational spending. This is the inverse of the developmental model and
reinforces the difference between cities and counties in their shift to different
proportional spending patterns post-recession. Population density emerges as an
important variable for the developmental and allocational dependent variable models.
Density influences shifts in developmental spending positively and allocational spending
negatively. Within Peterson’s (1981) typology, allocational services (police, fire, solid
waste, and parks and recreation) are distributed equally across the population. The
influence of the Population Density may imply that the physical distribution of the
service population could possibly be a factor contributing to these findings. More
compact areas are typically within cities, and may be more efficient to serve. This is a
long-standing principle held by many urban planners who theorize that there is significant
relationship between urban form and the cost of delivering public services.
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Redistributive Expenditures
County governments are positively associated with the change in redistributive
spending. In prior research, the Commission-Manager form county has been found to be
negatively associated with the redistributive policy group. However, this research
indicates that this form of county government shifts its normally held negative policy
position to one that favored an increase in proportional spending from pre to postrecession.
The financial condition of the local government just prior to the Great Recession
is identified as a contributing factor to the change in redistributive expenditures. It is
shown to have a negative impact on the change in spending from pre to post-recession.
The population size of the local government is a factor in the change in redistributive
expenditures. The association is negative meaning the smaller the local government, the
larger the shift in proportional redistributive spending. Smaller local governments,
especially counties, have more rural populations and lower household incomes. The
demand for redistributive services is likely higher for these communities during periods
of significant fiscal stress.

Consideration for Further Research
There is a divergence between cities and counties when comparing the shift in
proportional spending from pre to post-recession. This difference in spending pattern can
be masked when all local governments are considered as a single group in the final
regression analyses. During this investigation, it became clear that further examination of
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the data by type of government, and perhaps form of government, might yield important
findings of significance. Future research design should begin with two separate study
populations – city and county - or develop sources of data that will allow for a
comparison of counties to cities based on comparable service populations.

Limitations
When analyzing local governments as a single study population, the data is
robust. Expenditure data from the State of Florida is readily available and has been
collected for over ten years. Local and state officials have extensive experience in
reporting and collecting the data. Data for counties that provide urban services through
mechanisms like Municipal Service Taxing Units (MSTU) or Municipal Service Benefit
Units (MSBU), and other similar structures is not reported to the state. Collecting the
data would require the examination of financial records for every county, without the
benefit of state law governing the form and method of data reporting. The availability of
this level of data would have made the comparison of cities and that portion of counties
that perform municipal service delivery much more meaningful. This researcher will
continue to explore methods for improving the source of data for future research
endeavors.

Public Affairs Perspective
This research is conducted as partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy of Public Affairs. The analysis is undertaken through the Governance and
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Policy Research track within the university’s Public Affairs program.
As a field of study, Public Affairs is inherently multidisciplinary, and not based
on any one discipline. The field of study is so broad that it encompasses a vast array of
academic disciplines. Dror (1984) established a list of ‘desiderata,’ or desires, for the
field of study. Included in the list of desired attributes of policy scientists as they
approach their research is a complete understanding of an area’s history and culture, the
structure of its society, the use of an array of different analytical methodologies, and an
ethical approach to the profession (Dror, 1984). Public Affairs is not a discipline unto
itself, but an amalgam of inter related-disciplines forming the interdisciplinary nature of
the field of study. Agiro (2006) identified the three main theoretical roots of Public
Affairs: Community Science, Organizational Science, and Administrative Science.

Community Sciences
The study of communities in the U.S. is a central concept in American sociology
that was described by Robert E. Park and his colleagues at the University of Chicago in
the 1930s. At its core, the study of community focuses on people associated with a
particular place, and the nature of their interactions (Lyon, 1989). Community science
has been defined as a field of study committed to improving quality of life (Wandersman,
2003).
Each local government in Florida is its own unique community and its values are
shaped by the unique characteristics and background of its residents. In this study, the
research considered how governments of a similar type and form were influenced by
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socio-economic factors in their response to extreme fiscal stress. The unique character of
each community is likely a factor in the low model fit results. The study of people and
the analysis of public problems in the context of their community is an important theme
in community science. Understanding their culture, history and economic means form
the basis of ‘contextualism’ in the area of community sciences (Luke, 2005). Future
research on how local government’s respond to fiscal stress would consider additional
contextual variables that might improve model performance and results.

Organizational Science
Complex organizations like local governments have characteristics and goals that
are separate and apart from their internal processes that provide the means to perform
tasks. The study of organizational science focuses on the nature of the organization, how
it is managed and led, and the role it plays in its external environment (Bolman & Deal,
2008). This component science of Public Affairs also considers local governments as
organisms that can and do adapt to their external environment (Bolman & Deal, 2008;
Smircich, 1983).
The consideration of form of government in this research acknowledges the
organizational science aspect of Public Affairs. Each form of government considered in
the study has a different approach to leadership and policy development. The results
indicated that the form of government is a statistically significant explanatory variable in
two of the three final explanatory models. These results acknowledge the role of
organizational science in this research and its importance to the field of Public Affairs.

204

Administrative Science
The study of administrative functions in organizations focuses on issues internal
to that organization independent of the community environment within which it sits
(Agiro, 2010). The use of the scientific method in studying administrative processes,
including internal communication systems, leadership styles, and the structure of
authority has been generally accepted for quite some time (Thompson, 1956). The
administrative function of an organization does not select goals, but is responsible for
their implementation.
The model specification and research design in this study did not focus on the
internal effectiveness of local governments in their response to the fiscal crisis of the
Great Recession. This work attempts to understand the effect of the economic downturn
on local government policy formation. However, this work can set the foundation for
further examination into the administrative science aspect of the research questions.
Performance measures can be used as independent variables in future research to quantify
how efficiency and effectiveness were impacted from pre to post-recession in a similar
manner as data was analyzed in this research.
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City Limits
Typology

Account
Code
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519

Allocational

521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
571
572
573
574
575
579
531
532
533
534
535
536
537

Developmental

538
539
541
542
543
544
545
549

Description

Function Code

Legislative
Executive
Financial and Administrative
Legal Counsel
Comprehensive Planning
Non-Court Information Systems
Debt Service Payments
Pension Benefits
Other General Governmental
Services
Law Enforcement
Fire Control
Detention and/or Corrections
Protective Inspections
Emergency and Disaster Relief
Services
Ambulance and Rescue Services
Medical Examiners
Consumer Affairs
Other Public Safety
Libraries
Parks and Recreation
Cultural Services
Special Events
Special Recreation Facilities
Other Culture/Recreation
Electric Utility Services
Gas Utility Services
Water Utility Services
Garbage/Solid Waste Control
Services
Sewer/Wastewater Services
Water-Sewer Combination Services
Conservation and Resource
Management
Flood Control/Stormwater
Management
Other Physical Environment
Road and Street Facilities
Airports
Water Transportation Systems
Mass Transit Systems
Parking Facilities
Other Transportation
Systems/Services

General Government
General Government
General Government
General Government
General Government
General Government
General Government
General Government
General Government

207

Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Public Safety
Culture/Recreation
Culture/Recreation
Culture/Recreation
Culture/Recreation
Culture/Recreation
Culture/Recreation
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Physical Environment
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation
Transportation

City Limits
Typology

Account
Code
551

Redistributive

552
553
554
559
561
562
563
564
565
569

Description

Function Code

Employment Opportunity and
Development
Industry Development
Veteran's Services
Housing and Urban Development
Other Economic Environment
Hospital Services
Health Services
Mental Health Services
Public Assistance Services
Developmental Disabilities Services
Other Human Services

Economic Environment
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Economic Environment
Economic Environment
Economic Environment
Economic Environment
Human Services
Human Services
Human Services
Human Services
Human Services
Human Services

APPENDIX B
CORRELATION MATRIX
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Correlation Matrix Part 1.

City

City

County

CouncilManager

Council- Council
Strong
-Weak
Mayor
Mayor

Commission
Manager
County

1

-1

.815

.136

.088

-.887

-1

1

-.815

-.136

-.088

.887

CouncilManager

.815

-.815

1

-.337

-.217

-.723

CouncilStrong Mayor

.136

-.136

-.337

1

-.036

-.121

Council-Weak
Mayor

.088

-.088

-.217

-.036

1

-.078

Commission
Manager
County

-.887

.887

-.723

-.121

-.078

1

Commission
County

-.347

.347

-.283

-.047

-.030

-.101

Charter
County

-.473

.473

-.385

-.065

-.042

.496

Total Pop.

-.415

.415

-.384

.058

-.060

.430

Unincorp.

-.385

.385

-.390

-.001

.122

.305

Density

.447

-.447

.305

.221

-.068

-.392

Median Hh
Income

.164

-.164

.240

-.095

-.112

-.105

Financial
Condition
Ratio

-.086

.086

-.062

-.040

.031

.020

County
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Correlation Matrix Part 2.
Commission
County

Charter
County

Total Pop.

Unincorp.

-.347

-.473

-.415

-.385

.347

.473

.415

.385

Council-Manager

-.283

-.385

-.384

-.390

Council-Strong Mayor

-.047

-.065

.058

-.001

Council-Weak Mayor

-.030

-.042

-.060

.122

Commission Manager
County

-.101

.496

.430

.305

1

-.054

-.068

.214

Charter County

-.054

1

.681

.044

Total Pop.

-.068

.681

1

-.073

Unincorp.

.214

.044

-.073

1

Density

-.171

-.174

-.093

-.379

Median Hh Income

-.150

.008

.003

-.209

Financial Condition
Ratio

.154

-.039

-.064

.211

City
County

Commission County
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Correlation Matrix Part 3.
Median Hh
Income

Density

City

Financial Condition
Ratio

.447

.164

-.086

-.447

-.164

.086

Council-Manager

.305

.240

-.062

Council-Strong Mayor

.221

-.095

-.040

Council-Weak Mayor

-.068

-.112

.031

Commission Manager County

-.392

-.105

.020

Commission County

-.171

-.150

.154

Charter County

-.174

.008

-.039

Total Pop.

-.093

.003

-.064

Unincorp.

-.379

-.209

.211

1

.016

-.147

.016

1

-.086

-.147

-.086

1

County

Density
Median Hh Income
Financial Condition Ratio
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Control Variables
Poverty

Age

Education

Ethnicity

Poverty

1

-.259

-.788

.692

Age

-.259

1

.230

-.419

Education

-.788

.230

1

-.572

Ethnicity

.692

-.419

-.572

1
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